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THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB |
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ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW At Camp Doha, Kuwait, on 15 February 2004: MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, U.S. Army, CFLCC Deputy Commanding General deposing. MASTER SERGEANT JOHN E. DAVIS, U.S. Army, CFLCC-SJA, Senior Court Reporter, has been detailed reporter for this interview and has been previously sworn. BRIGADIER GENERAL JANIS L. KARPINSkI, U.S. Army, was sworn, and interviewed as follows: Q. So let me ask you again. So the responsibility for the actions of those soldiers, that were charged by CID for mistreating those detainees should fallon the MI as opposed to the MPs? A. The responsibility? No sir. I saw some of the pictures. The -- I think the MI gave the MPs the ideas. And I think --- Q. So there's some complicity to that? A. Yes sir. Q. You're suggesting that there is? A. ---- And I think that it became sport. And -- and even saying this makes me feel sick to my stomach, but, they were enjoying what they were doing and the MPs who saw this opportunity -- seized the opportunity. I don't know if they shared the ideas with the MIs or whatever they did, but there was definitely agreement, and -- then some of the procedures they were following, they just elaborated on. And -- and I would imagine and I don't know this to be fact, but would imagine it went something like this -- in the DFAC or when they were sitting around the Internet Cafe. "Oh yeah, you should see what we do to the prisoners sometime." "Can I come over and watch?" "Oh yeah. How about Thursday." And because we had a clerk over there who was thoroughly enjoying all of this sport, and the pictures anyway, and she was the girlfriend of the guy who was one of the kingpins in this. We had a guy from the maintenance who must have been one of the invited participants and -- these are bad people. That was the first time I knew that they would do such a thing as to bring a dog handler in there to use for interrogation. I had never heard of such a thing and I certainly didn't authorize it. And if I had heard about it, I would have stopped it. I don't believe we've ever had a dog in the hard facility. Q. Speaking of dogs. Did you know that between the Army and the Navy dog handlers that they were not placed in their one command and control that they operated separately? A. That was at the direction of -- I don't want to put anybody on the hook, but I believe it was CFLCC. It's a -- it's a CENTCOM asset. Q. But, somebody requested for them. A. We did. But there were already two dogs there. The MI either brought them from Anaconda or -- and they said they were strictly for their operation. Q. Certainly, somebody requested for them. At least the three Navy dogs. That they would be placed under one command and control and be utilized properly without proper authority for employment. A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you check on them? A. No sir, I didn't. Q. Okay. Alright. Given the circumstances then, do you believe that perhaps proper supervision at night since these events happened between the periods of 2200 and 0400 and who would you place that supervision responsibility to? A. There is a and -- and it is precisely the reason that Sergeant Snyder is relieved from -- or suspended from his position right now. Because he was responsible. He was the Sergeant of the Guard; the NCOIC, whatever term they were using. He was all of those things. And a platoon sergeant. Q. Did you know what the Platoon Leader or the Company commander were doing? A. I do not. And I talked to the Captain Reese myself. And he said randomly he or the First Sergeant, or both of them would go through all of the facilities. Q. During night or day? A. Nighttime, daytime, afternoon, lunchtime, feeding time. Q. Would you be surprised to hear that Captain Reese's priorities was not detain -- detention operations, it was improving the facilities seventy percent of the time? A. I would be surprised to hear that, yes sir, because that's not what he told me. Q. Alright. A. And I don't -- what would he be improving? The LSA? Q. I was just conveying to you what he put on his statement and he conveyed to me. A. Because the contract there was for Iraqi contractor work to do the facility work, it was not for---- Q. That was what he conveyed and umm -- as far as he was concerned, his chain of command knew of his priorities. Thereby depended and over-relied on personnel who had correctional facilities experience. Did he tell you that? A. He did not. Q. Okay. A. Him and the First Sergeant both talked about how they were fully involved in the operation. He didn't say anything about seventy percent of his time doing facilities management. Q. He put that on the Sworn Statement. And that's exactly what he intimated in the---- A. Well, he's had enough time to figure out what the best avenue approach is, I guess. Q. Well, let me put it this way. Knowing that the importance of that particular facility, how often did you talk to the company commanders? A. I -- Q. Did you senior rate all the company commanders? A. I did. Uh -- I saw all the company commanders. I -- I would tell you that the -- unfortunately, that the largest gap of time uh -- between seeing a company commander and between seeing a company commander and seeing him again was more than six weeks with Captain Merck. Q. Would it surprise for you to know that there's at least one Company, the 320th as we speak today, or then at that time, that was assigned to that Battalion, 320th, and up until I believe two weeks ago was being utilized as a filler company? A. [Pause] Would it surprise me to know that? Q. That they were not employing him in his capability as a cohesive company with his capability, but yet he's being used as the -- you fill here, you fill there. So, basically, ---- A. his company was spread out. Q. Right. And he doesn't have a function. A. He -- if he's being used as filler, I mean, he's doing an MP mission. Q. He's doing an MP mission that ---- A. The Company Commander doesn't have a ---- Q. ---- the Company Commander is not responsible for any specific mission because his Company was being utilized as a filler company. Individual ---- A. I would tell you ---- Q. ---- fillers, not as a platoon, not as a squad, it was fill this and fill that. A. I will tell you, sir. It doesn't surprise me. Uh -- I didn't know about it, but like I said, I saw all those company commanders out there whenever I visited ---- Q. Sure, but nobody ever mentioned any problems of how things are being ---- A. No, because the personnel numbers were so serious and Major Sheridan was really making the best effort to get those internal taskings reduced. And it took a whole MP Company just to do the taskings. It got better when we got -- when the 82nd put a Company on the same compound. Q. How many Companies did the 320th have? A. Umm -- Q. Six, seven, eight? A. No, no. The 372nd, the 670th, the 186th, and some of them were guard companies and some of them were combat support. Q. You had the 229th, 229th MP Company's also there. It's an I and R Company. A. Some of them come up -- some of them came up because we were getting ready to -- some of the other companies to leave. Q. General Karpinski, what would you recommend for corrections of detainee abuses? A. Sir, I -- I actually started to make some of the -- I think -- I started to implement for the rotational forces coming in. I called the Battalion Commanders that were coming in behind the rotational brigades when I could get in touch with them at their mob station. I told them that they needed to, ya know, get the people involved, to give briefings to their soldiers before they deployed over here about the potential for detainee abuse. The indicators -- the processes or procedures to head off infractions, to continue to reinforce it. Umm -- and I think that soldiers need to be reminded. I -- I -- at the -- at the guard mount, at shift change, on duty. You take an example of an MP company like the 320th MP Company, which is out at Abu Ghraib. They were down at Talil, they're a combat support company, but their First Sergeant and the Company Commander were very much involved in the Company and the operations. Talked to soldiers all the time, gathered them in small groups. The First Sergeant was fully engaged. Q. Is that Captain Masterangelo? A. It is. Q. Would it surprise you that he was the one who is saying it is not utilized as a Company up there today? That he is being used a filler Company. A. He's not being used as a filler Company, sir. Q. How do you know that? A. Well, I know what they're doing. They were the -- they were -- they're not doing a combat support MP mission, because that's how they -- they weren't deployed to do that mission. They -- couple of the teams, the driving teams were tasked to the TOC to do my PSD. My two vehicles were from the 320th MP Company. He had some MP units that were doing the escort missions down to CPA or down to Bucca if we were transporting prisoners. He would -- so he's got a variety of missions, but they're not filler personnel. He may have used some of his MPs to do some of the force protection towers. But there isn't a Company that's doing only force protection. I wish I had the luxury, I'm sure the battalions do too. Q. His comment to me was, when I asked him, "What specifically is your mission set?" And-- then he mentioned something about I have compounds boom, boom, boom, boom. I don't recall those compounds, and I said, "So you're directly responsible for those compounds then?" He said, "No, that's relegated to Headquarters and Headquarters Company 220th MP Battalion. So what is your extent of your responsibility?" I said, "I just provide personnel." So in essence ---- A. Well that's not what his support form said, and that's not how he was rated, and that was never my impression when we walked to the different compounds that were under his control. Q. Well, the support form -- the support form doesn't really, and you mentioned that that everybody should have -- could have mistaken your support form for that of command philosophy? Basically ---- A. Sir, I never focused on that. ---- Q. Well, I'm just making a comment to the comment you made. A. Yes, sir. But ---- Q. ---- And so, basically, the Company Commander is given a mission and the Company Commander felt that he's got a capability to provide. And the Company Commander felt that he's not -- his capability's not being utilized. Cause I asked him directly, "What is your mission?" And his response to me was, "I'm a filler Company, sir." Today, I said, "How long has it been going on?" He says, "From the time I arrived until last week." A. Well, that's not true. He was down at Talil, they didn't have a vigorous mission down at Talil, they went out and did the same thing. They did law enforcement, patrols, down to the prisons in Najaf. Q. Do you know what the 229th MP Company's mission is? A. They're responsible for the URF and for the compounds at Ganci. Q. So, basically they're being utilized as a guard company? A. They are. All of our MP units are being utilized as an escort guard or guard company for this confinement mission. Q. Would it surprise you that Captain Jones trained himself and nobody ever validated him prior to deployment? A. That does not surprise me. Q. Did you know that he had prior experience as an MP, prior to taking command of that Company from the Virginia Army National Guard? A. I did not. Q. Did you know that he had to provide support to the canine unit, both Army and Navy, but he does not have command and control of those canine units? A. That's with the HHC or with the Headquarters of the 320th? Q. Somehow, somebody's yet to find a house where those dogs were. That's what I mean. It's knowing what each of those Companies do, because it's their capability that you want to utilize. Okay, what other recommendations would you make? A. I think that the -- the span of control covering the whole country of Iraq is too big without the additional assets, either aviation assets, or transportation assets, engineer. General Wodjakowski did tell me several times that they did not do a good job of supporting us. We were running 15 civilian jails and 5 internment facilities, and he said, "You're running three internment facilities, how hard can that be?" He didn't know what we were doing. Q. How often did -- you had the SUAs. I guess in the separate unit updates provided it depicted at least number of detain- detention centers you were -- you were operating; number of Iraqi prisons that you were overseeing or providing training for; number of other things that you were missioned for; number of detainees that were accounted for, based on the last report; and personnel situation and your operational revenues to accomplish that mission. Umm -- when those were posted, to include your maintenance capabilities, what was the -- what was the percentage -- what would you -- what would you consider as your C rating would be? A. Overall? Q. Overall. A. C-3 at best. Q. And that was amplified, you mentioned repeatedly to the Battalion, to the CJTF-7? A. It was. I -- I said to -- now when Colonel -- General West came in, he wasn't there originally, I don't remember who his predecessor was who was the 4. But General West was -- and -- and General Davis who was the Engineer Commander at the time, both of them gave me tremendous support, but it was after we had found another way, another mechanism to do it. Q. Sure. Which was network with your fellow general officers. A. General. Q. Networking with your fellow general officers, you know. Was that helpful to you? A. They -- General West was very helpful. General Davis was very helpful. The CA guy who is General Kern, and said several times "I don't know anything about detention operations, but, ya know, tell me what else is going on." We couldn't get CA support. We could not get CA support. I spent time with General little bit of time with General Hahn and uh -- and really the only time General Sanchez or even General Wodjakowski spent any time or showed any interest in anything I was doing was when there was a problem. Q. You -- previously you appeared very critical of General Sanchez or General Wodjakowski for their lack of concern or lack of support on behalf of your mission and on behalf of your soldiers. Would you kind of draw conclusions as to why that is? Your perception why that is? A. I think that General Sanchez is (pause) I think that his ego will not allow him to accept a Reserve Brigade, a Reserve General Officer and certainly not a female succeeding in a combat environment. And I think he looked at the 800th MP Brigade as the opportunity to find a scapegoat for anything that his active component MI Brigade or his active component MP Brigade was failing at. And if I was not capable, why didn't he tell me? Why didn't somebody tell me sit down and let me give you some suggestions because when DEPSECDEF Wolfowitz came into the theater, the first time he came out to Baghdad Central he stayed an extra hour and forty-five minutes because he was so proud of me and what the MPs were doing. And he told General Sanchez that, and one night when he got behind schedule on another visit, he asked specifically if he could see General Karpinski before he left because he wanted to hear how the prisons were coming. And on the headphones in the helicopter, General Sanchez and General Fast, who was briefing him, he said, "Am I going to have an opportunity to see General Karpinski? Because she always does a good job for me." And I thought at that time, this is not a good thing. It is never good to be more popular than your boss. If I was not doing my job, I wasn't aware of it. And I'm sorry, but I took care of those soldiers, I took care of those detainees. We provided support beyond what anybody expected to the CPA to keep Ambassador Bremer out of trouble. Because when Major Pifrim and Colonel Spain were trying to push all the jails off on us in a briefing to General Sanchez, Major Pifrim said, "Well we don't care if they're eating or not, sir, that's the Iraqi's responsibility." And he corrected them. And we made sure that they were eating and that they did have water. They didn't. Because in spite of what General Sanchez was telling them, they were doing the easy thing. And I think General Sanchez has no use for Reserve component or National Guard soldiers. And he has little use, would not see it as time well spent, mentoring me. How dare I succeed as a female, as a Reservist, as an MP, in his combat environment? How dare I. And I became determined to show him that I would. Q. Who would you pin the responsibility on the actions of those individuals at Abu Ghraib? A. The MPs that were involved. That's who I'd pin it on and I'd pin it on Snyder, the Platoon Sergeant, and the First Sergeant, Captain Reese. Q. You wouldn't pin it on anybody else but them? A. I would -- it was Colonel Phillabaum's domain but it was Colonel Pappas' FOB. And he was the one who established the limitation for those cell blocks. He was the one, and Colonel Jordan was the one, whether he's here to say it or not, he was the one who set the rules. Major Sheridan limited them and influenced them to the extent he could by taking the MPs out of unhealthy and inappropriate settings. But they were still the guards in those cell blocks. And they were still the ones who did those things that they did to those detainees. Q. Do you think proper training, supervision, and effective leadership, not just for that Battalion, but throughout the entire Brigade would have sufficed, could have prevented it? A. No sir, no sir. Because it's not typical. Q. Given the fact that that same Battalion was involved in the Bucca incident back 1n May? A. Sir, I talked to -- was a different Company -- no that's not an excuse, I talked to Phillabaum and I talked to Dinenna, and I talked to them ---- Q. It's your Brigade.--- A. Yes sir, yes sir. ---- I talked to them the next day when I found out about it, when I was out there. I talked to all the Company Commanders and the First Sergeants. And -- and they asked good questions. And they raised the issues again about fair and decent treatment and when were they going to see magistrates, and when were they going to be able to give answers, and how can you say dignity and respect and then not give them anything that they're -- even the basics that they're entitled to: clean clothes, decent food, bed or a mat to sleep on. These are bad people and people who were led by bad people in that situation. But, once again, it was a good MP, a good soldier who turned them in. I talked to Phillabaum about the consistency in these events. And that isn't something you would put in an attribute column when you say, what did I do right or what did I do wrong in this situation. "Did you exploit the opportunity?" I asked him. "Did you exploit the opportunity to talk to soldiers if they were assigned to the Battalion and tell them, 'This is what happened at Bucca and this is not tolerated here.'?" And, no he didn't. Did he use the lessons learned? No he didn't. Did he know how to do it? I don't even know if he did. Q. You think possibly a command policy memo from you or General Hill would have stipulated lessons learned at Bucca that it not be repeated? A. 1 think that would have been extremely helpful. The other -- the other ---- Q. But none of those memos fell out and you didn't follow up on that memo? A. No sir. And when the incident down at Bucca was resolved, we spent months working on it and -- and I don't wanna say me, because I don't wanna -- I can't take credit for the hard work that was done. The 32, the CID investigations, the supervision of them at Bag -- at -- down at Arifjan. I think it was the first time they were effectively supervised when Colonel Coulter got them under control. But the system failed us. And it was because the tenure had changed. And at about the same time when those incidents were taking place out of Baghdad Central, the decisions were made to give the guilty people at Bucca plea bargains. So, the system communicated to the soldiers. the worst that's gonna happen is, you're gonna go home. Q. Where would you place them if they were not going to be remanded to go home? A. It was supposed to go to a court martial, and it didn't. And Suggestion by a Company Commander out there at Baghdad Central, was that -- in front of everybody else, was that "Ma'am, everybody knows the reason it didn't go to a court martial was because they were protecting that Lieutenant Colonel who took a prisoner out to the clearing barrel and cleared his weapon into the clearing barrel right next to his head. And they wanted to be able to forgive him." So that was the change in attitude. And I said, ---- Q. Do you think that was associated in that? A. Yes, sir. He said it there in front of a group of people and nobody turned around like they were shocked by this revelation. So I knew that that was what was permeating. What I told them during that meeting was, "Look, let me tell you something, the UCMJ system in my opinion is fair and impartial. And people who make decisions to go to court martials or take other actions, do so with extensive advice and study and everything else, whether you believe that or not, okay." This took seven months to complete. But, let's talk about results, okay? There were four cases. One that was considered a relatively weak case, was plea bargained out, and the individual signed a statement saying that this was planned, it was orchestrated, and there was definitely collusion or whatever that word is that they use. Q. But did you know that the events actually happened since you were not there? A. Alright, well, I only know it from the Article 32 from reviewing that case and then for recommending it go to court martial. But I do know the results and I know why they -- they gave that plea bargain, or the plea package to the first individual. And that individual signed statements saying this was planned, it was by design, Master Sergeant Girman orchestrated the plan. She told us exactly what to do, etc. etc. So, she gets an other than honorable and goes home, yes. And she understands her responsibility to come back in case it goes to a court martial. I said, "Do you realize that if we went to a court martial on any one of those cases, any of them if there were four or ten or twelve whatever the original number was, the were all going to be tried individually because that's your right under UCMJ. And do you realize that if we went to a court martial and the board said or the panel said, "Not guilty," those individuals come back as MPs and maybe back to the same unit or the same battalion. And is that a factor, considering your options? Absolutely. And I got a lot of stares that time, because there's another side to the story there, there's another perspective. Q. I don't think unless they get a bar to re-enlistment that they'll ever make it back to wear the uniform. A. Well, they won't now because they are permanently barred from coming back in. They are reduced. They are -- all of their benefits and privileges from this deployment are suspended. So, we get what we want from that action. And rather than take the risk -- I mean, I -- I didn't like it at first, but I understood it, after conversation with Captain Ray and Colonel Johnson. But, I wanted to make sure that the leadership element out there at Baghdad Central understood it because that seemed to be their concern that these guys knew that all they would get would be a trip home. Q. Well, put in that perspective, then General Karpinski, when everything is put before the courts, and I have no reason why you will not be placed before the military court system, and the revelations of all these inhumane treatment of detainees. You think for one moment that those MPs that were accused of those allegations were not made complicit of those -- the unit that they served under, the battalion that they served under, the brigade that they served under, that they will reveal all sorts of things that will put your entire command under the microscope. A. Absolutely. Q. The fact of the matter is that that will be the second incident to which the 800th MP Brigade would be associated with potentially war crimes? A. Yes, sir. Q. How would you deal with that? A. The same way I've dealt with other situations in this Theater of Operation. Tell the truth. And we were spread throughout the theater of Iraq with a mission and the MPs have countless examples of how well they performed and how professional they were and are. And do you get, out of 3,400 people; do you get some bad MPs? Yes. And do some of them have a history of this in their civilian job? Yes. And does their civilian employer have a responsibility to report these infractions to the military? No. Now were there mistakes made? Yes. And are we taking actions to make sure that they don't occur again? Yes. Can we guarantee they won't? No. Because we've never forged this road before. Q. Nobody has. A. Yes, sir. So we have to rely on values and those people have none, at least if the pictures tell the story. I don't care what their specialty is; it's just more offensive because they're MPs. What they did was vulgar and abusive. And I hope it -- it never reaches the media's attention. I can't -- I can't -- I didn't get a vote. Nobody said, "Okay, you're taking over command of the 800th MP Brigade now, and what happened before doesn't count." Because it does. And -- and all I can hope to do, is to make it better. Not on the run, not on the fly, but with conscientious -- conscientious effort and -- and leadership. I am a good leader. And taking all of this out of context, and using this example of what the 800th MP Brigade is capable of doing, is what is typical, I say, of what Sanchez is all about. I told my soldiers this morning when they were leaving, "You go home with your heads held high, because you did everything and more that was asked of you, expected of you, and you did it better than anybody else. You're all heroes to me, so no matter what is said, nobody can take it away from you." And I believe it, and I want those 19- and 20- and 35-year old soldiers to believe it, because it's true. And Sanchez doesn't give a flip about a soldier. And I never said that before. And he cares less about a Reservist and a Guardsman. Q. You think in your heart that that's true. A. Yes, yes, sir I do. Q. Did you spread any of these thoughts with any of your civilians? A. Never. Because what I said to them was, "General Sanchez has an enormous job. He was a division commander before." I used all the right expressions. Q. Do you shift all this blame? A. No I'm not. I'm not shifting all of anything. I'm taking responsibility, but the situation accurately is a shared responsibility. And they failed us and trying to cover their failures it's going to cost the 800th MP Brigade or me? Okay. Because it'll give me an opportunity to tell the truth. I know what they were doing and we kept finding a way to succeed. So they'd give us some more. When I took the -- when I briefed General Sanchez on the condition of the civilian jails and why the progress was so slow. He turns on me, and he says, "What's wrong with you Karpinski, you were briefing me just a month ago or five weeks ago that, you know, they were going to be on track and we were going to have capacity for 3,100 by now." And I said, "Sir, because the construction is not taking place. And I've been to every one of the facilities and I see no evidence of appropriate expenditure of funds; millions of dollars." I said, "I'm not a contractor, but I know what $25,000 worth of work should look like, and I know what $2 million worth of work should look like. And there's no evidence of it anywhere." "And what have you done?" "I went to the finance office at CPA. I looked for the IG's office at CPA. I looked for the GAO office at CPA. I talked to finance officer at Arifjan at the 377th. I talked to Colonel Warren. I talked to General Wodjakowski." "Well what happened to the money?" I said, "I don't know, sir. It was a cash operation and I suspect that the two subject matter experts borrowed some of it permanently." "Are you suggesting that they misappropriated funds?" "Yes sir, I am. If the evidence of the construction of the facilities is -- is what I have to go by, because there is no GAO and there's no IG at CPA. And they wouldn't show me the contracts that they let for all these places. But I do know that the only place where construction is taking place is at Abu Ghraib, because my MPs are there. They're not the contracting officer representatives." And he turned to his SJA and said, "Since this has been dumped in my lap, tell me the next step I take." He never came back and asked for information. He never came back and asked for the information I had, or the evidence I had accumulated. Nobody ever came back to me and said this is what took place. As a matter of fact, Colonel Warren said to me, "You want to steer clear of the issue." I'm not blaming General Sanchez or General Wodjakowski. I just want them to take responsibility for what they didn't do. And I don't ever expect a person like General Sanchez to change his personality or his way of thinking or his way of succeeding or anything else. I have only ever asked for a fair chance. And, no sir, he did not give it me or anybody in the 800th MP Brigade. Q. Fair enough. Do you have any closing comments you want to make? A. No, sir. Q. Thank you General Karpinski. Witness was warned and excused. [Session completed at 2035 15 February 2004.]
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