Deregulation: Plusses and Minuses
Many industry representatives and specialists believe that market forces
can eventually initiate many of these changes without government
interference. They even argue that consumers can foster cleaner fuel
preferences through the marketplace and market mechanisms. There is merit
in these arguments in favor of market solutions. But energy sector
deregulation and reliance on market solutions and consumer preferences can
only go so far because they do not take into account critical "public
goods" aspects of energy supply and environmental protection.
In the 1970s, virtually all governments in the
industrial and developing worlds directly administered the prices of key
energy components, both at the primary level (crude oil, natural gas) and
at the consumer level (petroleum product prices, residential natural gas,
and electric power). Governments were also involved in major purchase
contracts for internationally traded energy commodities (oil and natural
gas primarily), and often tied these contracts to other trade and national
security issues (barter of oil for construction projects, soft loans,
arms).
Today governments have largely retreated from the energy
sector. There is a widespread global consensus that administered policies
and regulations that fly in the face of market fundamentals are
inefficient, impede smooth adjustment to rapidly changing times, and
infuse energy issues with other political issues (in short, politicizing
energy issues unnecessarily). Markets have been deregulated and
liberalized; and government companies have been privatized. Wherever
governments still own significant energy assets, the state-owned
enterprises are generally run on commercial terms. Moreover, governmental
monopolies in the energy area have been broken, and national preferential
considerations have been reduced.
Generally speaking, liberalization has facilitated
efficiency and smooth allocation of resources to users who most require
these resources. But rapid deregulation of the oil, natural gas, and power
sectors have also reduced the incentives for specific businesses to invest
in large inventories or excess capacity that can help smooth markets
during times of disruption or unexpected volatility in demand growth.
Tightening environmental regulation for construction of new energy
facilities has also discouraged investment in some locations. These
changes have placed more pressure on how to achieve the public benefits of
inventory and spare production and generation capacity without
discouraging investment in energy resources. It has also changed the
nature of the debate on strategic stockpiles and government-controlled
assets.
The IEA has provided an important institutional
mechanism for coordinating international preparations for such a
disruption, and its members have instituted strategic stockpiles that
have, in turn, served as a major deterrent against producer countries
individually or collectively using their "oil weapon" to pressure or
"blackmail" individual oil-importing countries. However, deregulation has
brought some unintended consequences about strategic stockpiles. By and
large, deregulation of energy markets has meant that the establishment of
inventories and the determination of their size have been left by
governments to the market to decide, except in the case of government-held
emergency stores. But markets do not always send fully accurate signals.
That is in part a result of lack of market transparency and the realities
that with imperfect information market participants tend to take the short
view.
More recently, the lagged interplay between supply and
demand in several energy commodities this year has caused market
disruptions. It is possible that for some of these commodities, the market
may, over time, provide its own solution, through increased refinery runs,
increased gas drilling/production, and greater stimulus for investment to
increase capacity. But interventions may occur that hasten this process or
ease constraints more quickly.
Inventories serve as a premier tool in preventing market
failures and in managing supply dislocations. Spare petroleum or natural
gas production and deliverability capacity or redundancy in power
generation capacity are ultimately inventory and inventory management
issues. Spare capacities reflect an inventory of available supply in case
of market dislocation or unexpected disruption. Similarly, more
conventional references to stores of natural gas or of petroleum products
or of crude oil are also inventories. Energy markets are constantly
challenged by unexpected events—from severe weather to sudden
technological changes that undermine forecasts of supply and demand.
Without inventory or spare capacity, such events can create extreme price
volatility, sometimes for short periods of time but also sometimes for
extended periods of time. Moreover, severe price volatility can become
self-generating by discouraging investment by industry players who cannot
properly assess future market potential.
The unanticipated consequence of deregulation, industry
consolidation and restructuring, and of environmental policies on
inventories is now raising new challenges for policymakers. It is also
redefining the debate on the appropriate role of government intervention
in energy markets. That’s because of the political impact from supply
shortfalls and price volatility on classes of consumers and on the general
economy, when supplies are effectively auctioned to the highest bidder in
times of shortage.
The Task Force’s action program for implementing a
coherent U.S. energy policy is framed in the context of the fundamentally
changed circumstances in today’s energy sector. For the two decades
following the energy price spikes of the 1970s, the main opportunities and
challenges for governments and consumers were based on the sometimes
extraordinarily large surplus capacities that defined the energy system.
These surplus capacities have now disappeared, or have been reduced to
such low levels that there is only a limited cushion available to meet
growth in demand or to buffer economies against disruptions. As demand
moves against and away from capacity limits, the result is price
volatility.
Over the past three years, the prices of most core
energy sources—electricity, natural gas, and oil—have been more volatile
than at any time in recent history. At a global level, crude oil prices
hit their highest and lowest levels since the price collapse of the
mid-1980s between 1998 and 2000, with the exception of a brief price spike
after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. In North America, natural gas prices
this winter set all-time record highs, and may well do so again a year
from now, while electricity prices have reached unprecedented peaks in
California and other pockets of the United States. Other regions of the
country are likely to suffer the same fate this summer.
Under these circumstances, history demonstrates that the
main tasks of energy policy are the following:
- To assure that markets operate efficiently so as to
develop the infrastructure necessary to meet growing requirements of
demand;
- To facilitate orderly growth in demand;
- To ensure the well-being of the human habitat and
ecosystem; and
- To guarantee that mechanisms are in place for warding
off and, if necessary, for managing disruptions to energy supply.
FINDINGS
This report is motivated by the belief—shared by many
energy specialists—that pervasive shortages in the energy sector will not
go away of their own accord, other than through a sharp economic downturn.
Market solutions are fundamental to providing the kind of stable and
predictable energy prices that are needed to sustain the economy and
safeguard security over the long term, and they should be embraced. But
market solutions go only so far, especially at a time when inventories of
all sorts are so low as to result in price surges that harm consumers and
cause political backlash. A more comprehensive strategic approach is
needed.
Implementing this reinvigorated energy policy will take
time. Quick fixes can alleviate supply bottlenecks or conserve energy use,
but the energy sector is capital intensive and, with few noteworthy
exceptions, involves projects that can unfold only within a three- to
five-year horizon, or even one that is even longer.
Energy issues need to be brought before the public to
counter some widespread misconceptions. There are no easy, overnight, and
politically attractive solutions to the country’s or the world’s
infrastructure and supply problems. There is no existing technology that
can quickly replace oil in the crucial transportation sector. There is no
place at home or abroad where enough oil or gas can be developed fast
enough to moderate prices in the next six to twelve months. There is no
cost-free way to allow unrestricted energy use and simultaneously
safeguard the environment. But neither is the world running out of energy
resources.
The Task Force acknowledges that energy policy starts at
home. But any attempt to reframe U.S. energy policy must take into account
the fact that the energy sector has become extremely interdependent
internationally. The United States cannot achieve energy independence
without the emergence of new technologies that are not yet on the horizon.
Increasing domestic supplies will therefore not necessarily reduce U.S.
vulnerability to disruptions to any substantial extent, and artificial
ceilings or targets for imports will contribute little to security and
could create unwanted distortions. An oil shortfall anywhere in the world
will produce an equal price rise in every country, irrespective of the
level of national import dependence, as long as markets are allowed to
clear without government interference.
The United States must face up to this energy
interdependence squarely and pursue new paths to assure that neither its
economy nor policies are excessively vulnerable to foreign influence. For
the foreseeable future, the Gulf will remain the world’s base-load
supplier and least expensive source of oil to meet growing demand. The
global nature of oil trade and pricing means that it matters little if
Gulf oil flows to Asia or to the United States. Middle East Gulf pricing
and supply trends will affect energy costs around the globe regardless. If
the United States wishes to change this reality, it must start now to
deploy new energy technologies that will lessen this dependence in the
long run.
The Task Force determined ten broad findings:
- The U.S. government has not for a long time
adequately integrated the security, energy, technological, financial,
and environmental policies that make up a comprehensive energy policy.
It has relied on overlapping commercial and political interests with key
oil-producing countries to meet the needs of its own economy and those
of the international economy. A surplus in energy supplies during the
past two decades convinced policymakers that other objectives could take
precedence over energy security and that the costs of neglect would
remain low. That period has ended. In today’s tighter energy markets,
the costs of leaving energy security unattended could become extremely
high. These costs, and the means of reducing them, need to be evaluated
in a more purposeful, strategic fashion.
- There are no overnight solutions to the energy
supply and infrastructure bottlenecks facing the nation and the world.
Success will require long-term investments. It will also require the
revocation of failed, outmoded, or simply less important policies, which
interfere with the pursuit of energy security. Economic sanctions that
limit energy investment and environmental policies that increase the
costs or availability of energy sources require a fair-minded review. A
few concrete short-term actions are available; but many of these clash
with other policy objectives, which may need to be compromised or even
scrapped.
- Continuous governmental review is needed of the
tradeoffs between energy security and other national goals.
The articulation of a coherent energy policy requires the integration of
foreign, national security, and trade policy with numerous domestic
environmental, tax, and investment programs. Energy policy should play a
significant role in diplomatic discourse, especially where bilateral
relations with major powers are concerned. (See Appendix B.)
- Environmental issues affecting energy policy
require new approaches at home and abroad. The
American public cares as much as the citizens of other countries about
such issues as greenhouse gases and other atmospheric emissions,
underground leakage of noxious substances, and other environmental
dangers. Sensible energy policy must take this into account. But it is
important that the public understands that enhanced environmental
standards come at a price to the availability and cost of fuels. It is
equally important that the public understand the environmental and
public-health consequences of unfettered energy consumption. The
government should take a leadership role in fostering such
understanding. Also, better coordination of fuels standards is needed,
both inside the United States and with U.S. trading partners.
- Energy infrastructure can be rebuilt and expanded
rapidly only if the government actively facilitates private-sector
decision-making and investment. The government
should pave the way by removing unnecessary jurisdictional and other
obstacles to construction and enlargement of pipelines, power plants,
the electricity grid, and other infrastructure. It also needs to weigh
the desirability of incentives to accelerate the development of spare
infrastructure and the accumulation of inventory to alleviate supply
disruptions.
- U.S. energy independence is not attainable. Policy
must therefore focus on increasing the number of energy suppliers, the
kinds of energy consumed, and the efficiency with which energy is used.
The effort should include renewable and non-conventional forms of
energy, as well as conventional fuels, while recognizing that even a
doubling of renewable fuel supplies by 2020 could result in renewables
having a lower share of the market than today. Oil supply-side policy
should take into account the danger of relying on Middle East producers
for all of the world’s spare capacity without also bolstering strategic
stockpiles and reviewing rules for their use.
- Persistently tight crude oil markets highlight the
concentration of resources in the Middle East Gulf region and the
vulnerability of the global economy to domestic conditions in the key
producer countries. The Gulf nations have one
major asset—their oil and gas reserves. They, like Russia, Mexico,
Indonesia, Nigeria, Venezuela, and some other oil-producing nations,
depend heavily on hydrocarbons to support their citizens. If the current
regimes in the Gulf cannot deliver a better standard of living for
rapidly increasing populations, social upheaval could result, and
anti-Western elements could gain power. Similar concerns exist with
respect to some other oil-producing countries outside the Gulf.
- Energy policy has underplayed energy efficiency
and demand-management measures for two decades.
It is clear that vigorous demand management could significantly lower
the volume of energy required for economic growth. Demand curbs could
apply to residential, commercial, and industrial uses, but they are
likely to bring the greatest and fastest benefits in the core
transportation sector.
- The instruments available to deal with
energy-supply disruptions are increasingly inadequate to the tasks they
need to manage. To date, the keystone to
managing emergency supply disruptions has been the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve. The International Energy Agency and its policies, including
building of strategic reserves of crude oil and petroleum products and
mechanisms to share available supplies in times of disruption, play an
important role, as well. But this program addresses yesterday’s needs.
IEA members’ oil consumption has stagnated, while demand has grown
rapidly outside, causing the agency to lose the critical mass necessary
for managing a future shortfall. The size and effectiveness of the
ninety-day cushion mandated by the IEA also needs to be reexamined, as
does management of the SPR, particularly by bringing in modern financial
tools to help build the reserve with minimal impact on government
budgets. Finally, what constitutes an energy supply shortfall needs to
be redefined in light of changes in the structure of the global oil
market.
- The United States needs to articulate a new vision
of how best to manage international energy interdependence, one that
promotes market transparency and fair distribution of gains from
increased trade and investment. Fundamental
information about market trends is often unavailable. Energy producers
and consumers need to find ways to build common institutions. Unless the
U.S. government provides leadership in modernizing market and investment
structures, there is a clear danger that others will take the reins and
develop institutions that run counter to U.S. interests.
STRATEGIC POLICY CHOICES
For two decades, the United States has gone without a
serious energy policy. In the past, such complacency about energy could be
justified because world supplies appeared to be indefinitely ample. The
myth of plenty was reinforced by the enormous gains that were made as
market forces were allowed to work, as regulations and controls were
eliminated, and as energy prices fell in real terms across the world.
These gains, in turn, allowed U.S. leaders—both Republican and
Democratic—to take a minimalist approach supported by the comfort of
consensus politics that reflected an avoidance of strategic choices. From
the perspective of this Task Force, there is no escaping the fact that we
are reaching the beginning of an extensive period of sporadic supply
shortages and periodic price hikes in the United States and in other parts
of the world. This new situation requires a reevaluation of U.S. policy
approaches. The United States faces three policy paths: first, continue
the easy approach of "muddling through" with marginal Strategic Petroleum
Reserve management and complete free market solutions; second, take a
near-term, narrow approach by expanding supply to ensure cheap energy
while enduring conflict with interest groups; or third, develop a
comprehensive and balanced energy security policy with near-term actions
and long-term initiatives addressing supply-side and demand-side policy
instruments and diversification of energy supply resources that enables
the United States to escape from a pattern of recurring energy crises.
Taking the Easy Approach
Clearly the path of maintaining the status quo of no
energy policy is by far the easiest short-term option. This is obviously
the path of least resistance. Under such an approach, very little
initiative would be needed and could be limited to a very circumspect
focus: reviewing the size and mechanisms associated with the SPR and its
coordinated use with other countries in the International Energy Agency.
This limited policy would dictate that the United States simply muddle
through any portending crisis that might occur by reducing the pain of
such an actual event through the use of emergency measures at the time of
the event.
It is a path that could readily be chosen for two
reasons. First, there is the ever-present hope that the market, left to
its own devices, will eventually correct itself and overcome current
supply problems. Secondly, history seems to justify this approach. Major
oil disruptions with serious consequences seem to occur only every decade
or so, it can be argued, seemingly limiting the costs of doing nothing.
Electric power shortages will eventually get sorted out, and in any case
states rather than the federal government bear the brunt of citizens’
claims. This approach obviates the need to tackle the difficult political
issues that would have to be resolved to forge an energy policy consensus
in Congress. No comprehensive policy means Congress does not have to make
the compromises required to enact the legislation to backstop a more
effective, comprehensive approach.
One clear benefit of this approach is that the
short-term costs to the consumer would be limited and that no hard
sacrifices would have to be made. The costs to U.S. taxpayers seem minimal
and indirect and in any event they can be postponed. Consumers have the
prospect of the market assisting them yet again in achieving low energy
costs. Some of the real costs, such as the high-cost U.S. military
presence in the Middle East, are already accepted and forgotten by the
public.
But the problem is that there is overwhelming evidence
that there will be no "free lunch" for taxpayers. A disruption might well
occur at a time when the mechanisms for dealing with it have become
outmoded, too narrowly confined to too narrow a segment of the world
community to make a difference. And meanwhile, the market volatility of
the past few years may be a precursor of much worse to come—a roller
coaster of prices confusing the investment climate and impeding the
marshaling of capital required to overcome supply obstacles whose
emergence triggered the new critical state to begin with.
Under this scenario, the United States remains a
prisoner of its energy dilemma, suffering on a recurring basis from the
negative consequences of sporadic energy shortages. These consequences can
include recession, social dislocation of the poorest Americans, and at the
extremes, a need for military intervention. Moreover, this approach leaves
festering the conflict between rising energy demand and its potentially
devastating impact on the global environment.
Taking a Supply-Side Approach
Another easy-to-digest approach would be one that
focuses predominantly on supply-side solutions. A supply-side perspective
is attractive because it offers some eventual reprieve from the negative
impacts of energy shortages but with little or no direct cost or sacrifice
to the average American. A supply-side approach would aim to increase the
amount of land available in the United States and around the world for
resource exploration and exploitation and offer whatever tax or other
incentives would be needed to stimulate greater investment in energy
assets. The Task Force agrees that the supply side is an essential focal
point of any workable policy solution. Indeed, the Task Force
recommendations incorporate a number of supply-side options, including
both convention and non-conventional fuels. But the Task Force does not
endorse an exclusively supply-side approach for a number of reasons.
To begin, the costs of this policy are that it almost
certainly will bring its designers into conflict with public interest
groups, especially those that support environmental protection and land
management. This will create an atmosphere where the American people might
feel forced to make a difficult choice between a cleaner environment or
ample energy supplies. Partisan politicians are already driving this
perception by comments in the media or through partisan bills in Congress.
But no such choice might be required over the long term if a more
integrative, comprehensive approach were to be chosen. Environmental
protection and energy policy do not have to be de-coupled, but they can be
integrally linked through smart policy choices.
Another problem with a supply-side approach is that it
creates the impression that cheap energy is an inalienable right and is
available in the very near term. This creates an incentive to greater
consumption that is not likely to be sustainable and will eventually net
us back to shortages and price volatility once again.
Taking a Comprehensive Approach to Energy Security
Thus, it is the view of this Task Force that only by
forging a comprehensive energy policy can the United States escape from a
pattern of recurring energy crises. It is a tenet of the Task Force that a
workable and comprehensive energy policy requires a balance of supply-side
and demand-side policy instruments if it is to attract a practicable
operating congressional majority in the United States. Such a policy would
favor diversification of energy supply by fuel and by source.
The recommendations of this Task Force represent its
best attempts to outline a more coherent and comprehensive outlook for a
long-term policy initiative that also takes into account immediate steps.
Thus, the recommendations contained in this report are intended to be
considered as a whole. Outlined supply-side options require simultaneous
pursuit of the demand-management instruments enumerated by the Task Force.
Combining them provides a powerful mechanism for enhancing the energy
security of American citizens.
By way of one simple example, it might well be the case
that enhancing exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources of
the North Slope of Alaska might well uncover new resources that could
substantially reduce U.S. dependence on imports. But the Arctic National
Wildlife Reserve is unlikely to achieve needed support for permitting the
access of companies to its exploitation in the absence of strong
demand-side measures. As the report indicates, demand-side measures could,
alone, have even greater and less costly an impact on America’s
medium-term balance of fundamentals than a supply-side only policy. And a
combination of the two, of new supplies and of lower demand, in all
likelihood provides a more durable solution.
A truly comprehensive policy may well provide the kind
of balance and compromise that are consistent with much of America’s
political history. However, any comprehensive plan is likely to require
confrontation with other policy objectives that have deep constituencies.
In some measure, concessions will have to be made that will impinge on
certain local environment goals, states rights, Middle East policy,
economic sanctions policy, Russia policy, and hemispheric and
international trade policy. Making compromises could be politically
painful and will require sustained leadership from the highest levels of
government.
But the benefits will be quite real. The comprehensive
approach could minimize the negative consequences of a disruption in any
particular fuel and help shield the American consumer from the painful
effects of the cyclical nature of the energy business. It might allow us
to reduce military spending down the road and to create export
opportunities for American firms through the development of clean energy
technologies. It might also allow us to experience sustained economic
growth but without perilous environmental consequences.
The Task Force offers a detailed discussion
of the components of a comprehensive approach with elaboration about the
policy tradeoffs required for such an initiative.
STRATEGY,
RECOMMENDATIONS, AND ACTION PLAN
A Strategic Vision For The Future
To ensure America’s well-being and economic prosperity
in this new era of energy constraints, the United States must have a
strategic energy policy predicated on a clear vision of the requirements
of energy security. This vision must reflect domestic economic and
environmental considerations, as well as geopolitical trends and security
imperatives. It is vital for the United States to assure stable and
transparent international energy markets that provide prices which foster
economic growth. It is also in the strategic interest of the United States
to assure that appropriate national and international mechanisms are in
place to prevent disruptions in energy supplies where possible, and to
manage efficiently and equitably any disruption that might occur. To this
end, the United States should promote a global network of arrangements
that protects against disruption, while securing equitable mechanisms for
burden-sharing if required.
Given the magnitude of the potential threat represented
by global climate change, it is equally in the strategic interest of the
United States to identify and implement cost-effective measures at home
and abroad to stabilize the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases
at levels that will not lead to catastrophic climatic change.
Many different constituencies within the U.S. government
will need to work together to develop a unified and integrated energy
policy framework with well-defined and orchestrated goals—a policy that
will address not only today’s energy bottlenecks, but also will seek to
provide affordable, clean, and reliable energy supplies five to fifteen
years into the future, in order to underpin long-term economic growth in
an environmentally acceptable manner and to promote the security of the
United States and its allies.
Strategy is about making choices among competing goals.
In reaching the appropriate balance, U.S. energy policy must take into
account the fact that the vigor with which environmental goals are pursued
will affect the costs of energy supplies. Equally, the policy needs to
consider that the vigorous pursuit of market-oriented solutions can
diminish the level of consumer and general economic protection from the
negative effects of price volatility. Finally, the goal of affordable,
clean, and reliable energy supply places some constraints on and is
influenced by U.S. diplomacy and strategic policy.
The Task Force developed a broad consensus on the
following strategic goals for the nation’s energy policy:
- Protecting and promoting long-term diversity of
affordable energy supply for sustained global economic growth. Diversity
refers both to the mix of energy sources and the geographic origin of
that energy. The priorities established among fuels should take into
account environmental objectives, fuel efficiency, and national security
considerations.
- Promoting energy end-use efficiency as a near-term
approach to meeting economic, security, and environmental goals.
- Providing adequate safeguards, both at home and
abroad, against energy supply disruptions and against manipulation of
markets by any party, state or private.
- Promoting market forces wherever and whenever
possible, while acting to ensure order in case of market failures or
severe shortfalls or accidents. Market failures can involve interference
in trade flows by private or state-owned entities and actions by
adversaries. They can also involve flaws in regulatory structures,
including environmental regulations.
- Creating a stable, competitive, and predictable
investment climate to ensure that energy resources and infrastructure
expand to meet the growing needs of the world’s population in a manner
that safeguards the environment, promotes consumer needs, and enables
U.S. companies to operate on an even playing field.
- Encouraging competition in the United States and
abroad, both to the benefit of U.S. consumers and U.S. companies.
- Ensuring that all citizens, and particularly less
affluent Americans, have access to reliable and affordable basic heating
fuels and electricity when markets fail to serve this critical function.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations of the Task Force are divided into
two sections: The first comprises actions to be considered in the very
short term to assure that appropriate mechanisms are in place to deal with
potential supply disruptions and to buffer the economy from adverse
impacts of price volatility. The second set of recommendations is longer
term in nature. The first set of recommendations concerns action items
designed to provide the government with "breathing space" in case of
shortfalls or emergencies. The second set concerns a framework for dealing
with the challenges of creating new supplies and ample capacities along
various linked global energy supply chains, while also preserving and
enhancing the human habitat.
Immediate Steps
1. Deter and Manage International Supply
Shortfalls
Recent oil market-price volatility has been driven by a
number of complex factors. However, three key drivers continue to fuel
upward pressure on prices: OPEC policy and the organization’s lack of
spare productive capacity; the policies of Iraq and concerns about the
reliability of its U.N.-monitored oil exports; and fears of a possible
flare-up in the Arab-Israeli conflict. These factors have created
uncertainty in markets that has at various times outweighed considerations
of immediate market supply availability, fueling speculation and pushing
prices above $30––$35 a barrel at various times in recent months. Although
these situations cannot be solved overnight, certain steps could be
considered to ameliorate their negative impact on oil market stability.
- Develop a diplomatic program ensuring GCC allies
remain prepared and willing to maintain stable prices to promote global
economic growth and also to fill any unexpected supply shortfalls in
times of turmoil in the oil markets, whether created by accident or by
the adverse political actions by any producing nation.
The vast majority of all unused, spare oil productive capacity is
located in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It appears that
Kuwait might soon be added to that list. Saudi Arabia has over 1 million
b/d of spare sustainable capacity and considerably more surge capacity
that could be brought online for several weeks in a crisis. The UAE has
some limited spare capacity of several hundred thousand barrels a day.
Kuwait might soon have a similar amount. These are all very important
countries for the United States, with a fundamentally positive attitude
toward cooperation and support, and with the only meaningful spare
production capacity in the world. They all deserve being cultivated as
special priorities of U.S. policy.
Over the past year, Iraq has effectively become a
swing producer, turning its taps on and off when it has felt such action
was in its strategic interest to do so. Saudi Arabia has proven willing
to provide replacement supplies to the market when Iraqi exports have
been reduced. This role has been extremely important in avoiding greater
market volatility and in countering Iraq’s efforts to take advantage of
the oil market’s structure. Saudi Arabia’s role in this needs to be
preserved, and should not be taken for granted. There is domestic
pressure on the GCC leaders to reject cooperation to cool oil markets
during times of a shortfall in Iraqi oil production. These populations
are dissatisfied with the "no-fly zone" bombing and the sanctions regime
against Iraq, perceived U.S. bias in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and
lack of domestic economic pressures. A diplomatic dialogue that
emphasizes common U.S.-GCC goals and programs should be pursued at the
highest levels to minimize the potential for tension over these other
issues. Goodwill efforts such as a U.S. offer to buy oil from spare
capacity for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve when market circumstances
warrant and a willingness to discuss coordinated response to supply
emergencies can be used to offset anti-American sentiment among elite
groups in these countries.
There are, however, some trade-off issues. Working
together with the GCC could restrict some of the U.S.’ freedom of
movement on security and foreign policy actions that might be desirable
with regard to Iraq or the Arab-Israeli conflict from a U.S. point of
view.
- Prepare for contingencies and gain agreement on
coordination in the IEA in efforts to deal with any attempts by
adversaries to remove oil from international markets.
Some European country positions on economic sanctions against Iraq
differ from the U.S. position, most notably France but also some other
IEA countries including Japan. Still, the IEA must be assured of
efficient joint decision-making in the event of a supply disruption
under tight market conditions. This includes any possibility that Saddam
Hussein may remove Iraqi oil from the market for an extended period of
time and that Saudi Arabia will not or cannot replace all of the
barrels. (This is a contingency that hangs over the market given the
ability of Baghdad to continue to earn revenues through smuggling and
other uncontrolled oil exports, even if it officially cuts off exports
that are permitted through U.N. procedures.) IEA member countries should
be in agreement in advance of such an event on what joint actions it
will take. The IEA has been very successful in recent years in providing
definitive and forceful statements of its intentions, and these
statements have improved the maintenance of orderly markets. The
administration needs to ensure that recent events do not derail this
past success.
- Minimize public conflicts with OPEC and other
independent oil-exporting countries but emphasize importance of market
factors in setting prices. The previous
administration engaged in public exchanges with OPEC over the producer
organization’s decisions to push oil prices higher. This fueled
anti-American sentiment among certain sectors of the population in the
Middle East, lent support to the claims of Saddam Hussein, and brought
pressures on some U.S.-friendly regimes in the region. The United States
needs to prevent aggravation of this situation by avoiding public
discussion of the targeting of particular price goals and emphasizing
common interests of promoting and protecting growth in the global
economy. Such growth maintains demand for OPEC’s oil. Rather than
specify a price level that is "good for the United States"—which creates
an "us-against-you" mindset on oil-pricing policy—the United States
should emphasize as a first line of policy its position that market
forces should be left to set the price of oil. Specific discussion of
price should be kept to private diplomatic discussion whenever possible.
Although short-term political gains can be garnered at home in the
United States for jawboning OPEC, longer term this activity is likely to
stimulate more entrenched positions within that organization, leading to
higher oil prices and eventually wearing down any short-term public
relations benefit inside the United States.
- While moving to defuse tensions in the
Arab-Israeli conflict through conflict resolution and negotiations,
maintain energy and political issues in U.S.–Middle East relations on
separate tracks. The timing might not be
appropriate for a major initiative to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict in
a comprehensive manner, but it is important to reduce immediate tensions
and violence in that conflict. While this is a tenet of U.S. foreign
policy for other reasons, it can also be helpful to the oil situation in
ensuring that the two issues do not become linked and are kept on
separate tracks. Iraq has been engaged in a clever public relations
campaign to intersect these two issues and stir up anti-American
sentiment inside and outside the Middle East. The bombing of Iraq by the
United States led coalition in February 2001 spurred anti-U.S.
demonstrations in support of Iraq in traditional U.S. allies such as
Egypt. Moreover, Saddam Hussein is trying to recast himself as the
champion of the Palestinian cause to some success among young
Palestinians. Any severe violence on the West Bank, Gaza, or Southern
Lebanon will give Iraq more leverage in its efforts to discredit the
United States and U.S. intentions. A focus on the anti-Israeli
sympathies of some Arab oil-producing countries diverts attention from
the repressive nature of the Iraqi regime. Instead it rewards Iraq in
its claim to Arab leadership for "standing up to the United States for
ten years." Israel will assert its right to defend itself from terrorist
or other attacks, so it is important that both sides of the Arab-Israeli
conflict are given a stake in avoiding conflict and violence. Creating
an atmosphere where both sides are willing to show restraint can be an
important goal for U.S. diplomacy on this issue.
- Review policies toward Iraq with the aim to
lowering anti-Americanism in the Middle East and elsewhere, and set the
groundwork to eventually ease Iraqi oil-field investment restrictions.
Iraq remains a destabilizing influence to U.S. allies in the Middle
East, as well as to regional and global order, and to the flow of oil to
international markets from the Middle East. Saddam Hussein has also
demonstrated a willingness to threaten to use the oil weapon and to use
his own export program to manipulate oil markets. This would display his
personal power, enhance his image as a "Pan Arab" leader supporting the
Palestinians against Israel, and pressure others for a lifting of
economic sanctions against his regime.
The United States should conduct an immediate policy
review toward Iraq, including military, energy, economic, and
political/diplomatic assessments. The United States should then develop
an integrated strategy with key allies in Europe and Asia and with key
countries in the Middle East to restate the goals with respect to Iraqi
policy and to restore a cohesive coalition of key allies. Goals should
be designed in a realistic fashion, and they should be clearly and
consistently stated and defended to revive U.S. credibility on this
issue. Actions and policies to promote these goals should endeavor to
enhance the well-being of the Iraqi people. Sanctions that are not
effective should be phased out and replaced with highly focused and
enforced sanctions that target the regime’s ability to maintain and
acquire weapons of mass destruction. A new plan of action should be
developed to use diplomatic and other means to support U.N. Security
Council efforts to build a strong arms-control regime to stem the flow
of arms and controlled substances into Iraq. Policy should rebuild
coalition cooperation on this issue, while emphasizing the common
interest in security. This issue of arms sales to Iraq should be brought
near the top of the agenda for dialogue with China and Russia.
Once an arms-control program is in place, the United
States could consider reducing restrictions on oil investments inside
Iraq. Like it or not, Iraqi reserves represent a major asset that can
quickly add capacity to world oil markets and inject a more competitive
tenor to oil trade. However, such a policy will be quite costly as this
trade-off will encourage Saddam Hussein to boast of his "victory"
against the United States, fuel his ambitions, and potentially
strengthen his regime. Once so encouraged and if his access to oil
revenues were to be increased by adjustments in oil sanctions, Saddam
Hussein could be a greater security threat to U.S. allies in the region
if weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sanctions, weapons regimes, and the
coalition against him are not strengthened. Still, the maintenance of
continued oil sanctions is becoming increasingly difficult to implement.
Moreover, Saddam Hussein has many means of gaining revenues, and the
sanctions regime helps perpetuate his lock on the country’s economy.
Another problem with easing restrictions on the Iraqi
oil industry to allow greater investment is that GCC allies of the
United States will not like to see Iraq gain larger market share in
international oil markets. In fact, even Russia could lose from having
sanctions eased on Iraq, because Russian companies now benefit from
exclusive contracts and Iraqi export capacity is restrained,
supporting the price of oil and raising the value of Russian oil
exports. If sanctions covering Iraq’s oil sector were eased and Iraq
benefited from infrastructure improvements, Russia might lose its
competitive position inside Iraq, and also oil prices might fall over
time, hurting the Russian economy. These issues will have to be
discussed in bilateral exchanges.
2. Remove bottlenecks and other obstacles to
energy supply, both domestically and internationally
There are few options available to United States to
expand supply in the short run whether or not there are energy supply
shortfalls. There are even fewer options available to reduce short-term
demand. Fortunately, in the area of petroleum, the government has a fairly
robust strategic reserve. But beyond petroleum, the options are severely
limited. It is in this context that the Task Force recommends that the
government consider all possible means of de-bottlenecking supplies and
removing obstacles to delivery of supplies, both domestically and
internationally. Options need to be considered that are unilateral as well
as those that are bilateral, regional, and international or multinational
by nature. In addition, the government needs to establish permanent
machinery for integrating energy policy with economic, environmental, and
foreign policy on a sustained basis.
Virtually all domestically available raw-material energy
resources are being produced that can be. In fact, there are virtually no
actions that can be taken in the short term to increase these home-grown
supplies. However, there are significant obstacles to the production and
distribution of certain petroleum products, gasoline in particular and
distillates to a lesser extent, that have come about due to localized
differences in regulations concerning petroleum product-quality
specifications. These differences are related in some cases to the
implementation of the Clean Air Act in areas with particularly troublesome
pollution levels or because of regional preferences as discussed in the
introduction to this report. These boutique fuels and the "Balkanization"
that they create in the market hinders efficiency and promotes shortfalls
in local markets even when surplus products of other specifications might
be available nearby.
What can be done to deal with Market Balkanization?
In general, the federal government should attempt to find ways to increase
its flexibility in dealing with market anomalies that stem from product
specifications and to increase product standardization so as to reduce the
pernicious impacts of lack of standardization.
Such actions involve steps to be taken both at home and abroad (see
below).
- Streamline procedures for waiving product
specifications. A permanent interagency task
force needs to be created involving, at a minimum, officials from the
Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
review the impact of boutique product specifications on regional markets
within the country. It should be empowered to take action expeditiously
to waive or ease mandated specifications for limited periods of time so
that market dislocations can be managed.
There are a number of tradeoffs that need to be
considered. Clearly, the suspension of mandated standards could set back
the achievement of national, regional, or state environmental goals.
Waivers of product standards that are issued in order to enhance supply
should explicit address the continued commitment to the environmental
objectives in the original regulations as well as the temporary nature
of the waiver. In addition, there are potential inequities to industry:
waiving certain standards could "punish" companies that had invested in
new equipment and technology to meet product specification requirements
and who stand to benefit from any increase in prices for their rare
product. Such inequities could be remedied in the longer term through
tax policy favoring those who complete costly investments
- Establish procedures to grant Jones Act waivers
without adversely affecting U.S. ship owners or U.S. labor.
As discussed in the introduction to this report,
U.S.-manufactured petroleum products are transported mainly by domestic
pipeline or by ship but under federal mandate only U.S.-flagged ships
can be used for these deliveries. For a long time the Jones Act tanker
fleet was in long-term decline, but U.S. flag owners and operators have
invested significant amounts of money to build vessels in the United
States to comply with the Jones Act. When the pipeline is fully utilized
and when imports are inadequate as was experienced last winter in New
England, there is a potential need to waive the Jones Act requirements
on the U.S. product tanker fleet to enable non-U.S.-flagged vessels to
carry cargoes between U.S. ports. As long as the current law exists, the
government needs to send a strong signal that under no circumstances
will it provide a Jones Act waiver on purely economic grounds. This is
needed to give U.S. tanker owners the ability to recover costs
associated with U.S.-built tankers and remove any investment
uncertainty. But when the U.S. government is concerned with logistics
issues, officials could signal that waivers would be granted for
foreign-flagged vessels to enter the trade on an emergency, case-by-case
basis when no vessels could be made available on the spot market by U.S.
owners. Similar issues concern labor, which has an interest in both the
manufacture and manning of the Jones Act fleet. While Jones Act waivers
are available, the procedures to accomplish this are cumbersome and the
waivers are rarely granted. Streamlining procedures for issuing waivers
to the Jones Act would facilitate the elimination of this market anomaly
and free up supply within the U.S. market during severe logistics
crises.
- Enact legislation for federal primacy over state
regulations, especially with respect to product specifications and
pipeline right of way. Ways need to be created
to simplify the nation’s total petroleum product slate in order to
reduce Market Balkanization and therefore ease localized product-supply
shortages and related price volatility.
There is little doubt that establishing the primacy of
federal regulations would remove a significant bottleneck to future
regional supply glitches in this as in other areas. For example, it
would enable the federal government to override the objections of
individual states to exploration and development in offshore acreage. It
could also expedite procedures involved in the siting of new or expanded
energy infrastructure, including new pipelines, refineries, or power
plants.
If the federal government wants to make a serious
effort to foster market transparency, facilitate the development of new
supplies, and expedite permitting for new energy infrastructure,
legislation mandating federal primacy over state legislation and
regulations in specific areas should be a very high priority. However,
there are major obstacles to enacting this legislation.
- Federal legislation would almost certainly be
opposed by many states, whose legislatures and elected governors have
enacted product specifications that are different from and at times
more stringent than federally mandated specifications.
- Federal legislation could be challenged as
unconstitutional.
- In the case of some boutique fuels, local
authorities have mandated them in order to help their urban areas meet
national Clean Air Act targets or targets of their own that are even
more stringent. Such conflicts would have to be managed by structured
cooperation among the EPA, federal agencies responsible for product
standards, and local officials.
- In efforts to mandate federal primacy, the
administration might well feel compelled to find a middle ground for
quality specifications that are significantly less stringent than what
many state governments would find acceptable. Conversely, if the
federal standards were to be strict enough to assist the most polluted
urban areas, product quality standards and compliance costs would be
unsuitably high and unnecessarily costly for regions with less severe
air quality problems.
- Enact legislation to facilitate regional solutions
to a variety of energy challenges. Mechanisms
that would be far less intrusive of the authority of state governments
and regulatory bodies could be created via regional approaches. Unlike
legislation mandating the primacy of federal regulations, the federal
government could urge and facilitate collaborative approaches that would
provide federal incentives for states that decide to work together on
regional solutions. Regional approaches would be far preferable to
state-only approaches in a variety of areas, including larger regional
frameworks for mandating fuel specifications, emissions limits, and for
establishing siting requirements for new energy infrastructure. Regional
Councils should be established and mandated to work in a streamlined
manner with federal agencies including the EPA, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, and the Departments of Energy and Commerce on a
variety of permitting issues.
While regional solutions would be less efficient than
national solutions in eliminating bottlenecks to supply, they may in the
end be more readily acceptable, since they would lend the appearance of
greater local control.
- Investigate whether any changes to U.S. policy
would quickly facilitate higher exports of oil from the Caspian Basin
region. Generally speaking, all oil-producing
countries outside of OPEC are producing at maximum rates. There are a
few exceptions where political problems block immediate shipments, such
as pipeline problems in Colombia, where guerrilla warfare against the
government extends to attacks on oil installations. Also included in
this category are labor unrest and investment disputes that slow the
progress of developing and producing oil in Nigeria—or Norway, for that
matter. The U.S. government should assist with resolution of these
problems, but a quick resolution is unlikely.
However, the exports from some oil discoveries in the
Caspian Basin could be hastened if a secure, economical export route
could be identified swiftly. It is unclear how much oil could be thereby
released: estimates range from a relatively insignificant 10,000 b/d to
well over 100,000 b/d. To this end, the administration should review
policies toward this region. The option exists to downplay diplomatic
activities that dictate certain geopolitical goals for specific
transportation routes for Caspian oil in favor of immediate commercial
solutions that may be sought by individual oil companies for short-term
exports of "early" oil, including exports through Iran. These
geopolitical goals can later be articulated for longer-term pipeline
routing questions into the next decade.
The administration, of course, needs to take into
account the tradeoffs of this policy shift. Some European companies
might choose to send more oil via Iran. U.S. companies may seek
case-by-case waivers to send oil through Iran that would otherwise not
be produced, thus effectively forcing the United States to consider
signaling a change in its policy toward Iran. In any event, the United
States might find other reasons to improve relations with Iran. For
example, Iran could serve as a regional counterweight to Iraq. A shift
in pipeline strategy to favor commerciality might also encourage some
regional Caspian players to seek a closer relationship with Russia in
order to facilitate the movement of oil through Russian routes. Russia
may interpret this policy as one showing weakness of resolve and a green
light to press Georgia and other neighboring states to compromise their
sovereignty in favor of Moscow’s interests. Still, it remains unclear
whether these potentially adverse developments might occur regardless of
U.S. policy toward pipeline routes. In general, for strategic reasons
related to U.S.-Russian relations, the United States might want to move
the Caspian region into a zone of cooperation with Russia, instead of a
zone of competition or confrontation. (It might seek this, for example,
in order to jointly counter the rise of radical, Islamic militant
elements in the region). This arena of discussion could thus start with
energy issues and later move on to other issues. Finally, U.S.
insistence on the longer and costly Baku-Ceyhan pipeline route could
jeopardize a more comprehensive approach toward the export of the
Caspian Basin’s resources and would put at risk a more commercial
approach.
3. Take a Fresh Approach to Building and
Maintaining National Strategic and Commercial Crude Oil and Petroleum
Product Inventories
There is no doubt that the most important mechanisms for
dealing with supply shortfalls are inventories of crude oil and petroleum
product held both by the government and by commercial enterprises.
Inventories, especially strategic stores, provide the nation’s first line
of defense against a supply shortfall and therefore warrant immediate
attention. Nor is there any doubt that the level of crude oil and seasonal
product inventories has become a significant domestic political issue. For
example, there was a strikingly widespread consensus nationwide when the
Northeast Heating Oil Reserve was created last year, although there were
questions raised about whether this should be managed by government or by
industry (with the latter through tax incentives). With respect to
inventories, the Task Force has a series of recommendations.
- Review the size and financing of the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve. The SPR represents the best
means of replacing lost barrels of crude oil. Its ideal size relative to
the size of imports has not been officially reviewed in two decades.
Meanwhile, the SPR has declined both as a share of imports and in
absolute size since the mid-1990s. At its peak, the SPR covered more
than eighty days of imports; today it covers under fifty days. The
administration should, as a high priority, review what the ideal size of
the reserve should be, given the fundamental changes in the nature of
disruptions that the country confronts. The review should take place
both as a national, stand-alone issue and in conjunction with an
international review. (See the section on longer-term issues, below.)
For example, the administration may choose to make its decision about
the ideal size of the SPR in consultation not only with other IEA
members, but also in consultation with key OPEC producer countries. The
administration should also review how it should finance reserve
additions. Ideally this might be accomplished through direct budgetary
allocations. At a minimum the government should aim to fill all of the
nearly 700 million barrels of capacity it currently has available.
It should be recognized that one problem with trying
to refill the reserve at this time when markets are strong is that any
purchases made by the U.S. government (or other consuming countries)
would add to the current tight supply of international oil markets.
Also, critics of the reserve may argue that it hasn’t been necessary to
tap a full draw-down since its creation, arguing against the need for a
full ninety-day supply. Thus, other, more creative measures might be
advised for filling the reserve during times of temporary market
weakness. One option would be to make such purchases through a bilateral
arrangement with a key oil supplier of the United States, again at a
time when markets soften. The purchases could be designed to help an
oil-producing ally maintain oil sales during a time of market weakness.
Another would entail buying oil that an OPEC country might otherwise
have held back from the market as part of its market-maintenance,
production-quota agreement. Such arrangements would have the benefit of
demonstrating U.S. support for positive consumer-producer relations.
Such a signal might improve relations between the United States and
important foreign oil suppliers.
Efforts have been made in the past to "lease" unused
production from Saudi Arabia at prices below the fair market value for
the oil to be put in cheaper storage in the United States. These
initiatives were rejected by Saudi Arabian officials who did not want to
produce the resources and "lease" them for nominal amounts such as $2 a
barrel. A plan that provided funds for the United States to pay "fair"
market value to acquire unused Saudi or other producer-country oil for
the SPR in times of market weakness would highlight the commitment of
the United States to reciprocal relations, potentially easing tensions
regarding conflicting oil price goals.
- Establish professional criteria for managing the
SPR. A significant amount of controversy arose
last year concerning President Bill Clinton’s use of his discretionary
authority to lease oil to the market on a time-swap or exchange basis in
order to address winter heating-oil inventory concerns. The criticism
was threefold: (1) The exchanges reduced the size of the SPR, making
less prompt oil available to manage a future disruption. (2) The SPR
should not be used as a buffer stock but rather to manage severe
accidents or supply emergencies; and (3) The time-swap was badly
managed, thus earning the government far less in interest than it should
have. Unfortunately, perhaps, the government’s use of its swap authority
in the autumn of 2000 became associated with a policy that appeared to
advocate that the SPR should be used as a market buffer stock to damp
prices and price volatility. In reality, proactive use of the swap or
exchange authority actually provides the government with an ability to
build the SPR over time and to improve its quality through prudent use
of market structures. It also enables the government to monetize its
crude oil reserves, which otherwise sit idly and unproductively. The
government should look into ways to improve management of the SPR
through the following types of actions:
- Take advantage of the market’s forward price
structure to make sure the strategic reserve is strengthened
efficiently over time. Thus, if the market
structure were backwardated, with future prices lower than current
prices, the government would be able to replenish the reserve with
more oil than it had leased on an auction basis. If the market
structure were in contango, with future prices higher than prompt
prices, the government could lease its cheaper spare storage capacity
to industry, thereby also providing revenue to build government-owned
reserves at a later time. (Leasing spare tankage should also be
considered separately by the Department of Defense.) If a government
agency did this on a regular basis, as a standard operating procedure,
it would earn far more than it did in its initial efforts in the fall
of 2000 and would have a means to finance a larger reserve.
- There are two objections that can be raised to
this, however. First, there are potential physical limits to using
underground natural salt caverns (salt domes) for storage in this
manner without the need to leach them anew. Second, there are
objections—as there were in 2000—on the ground that using the SPR oil
in this manner reduces theoretically the amount of oil available in an
emergency should one occur. That is a clear trade-off to be taken into
account in policymaking.
- Seek legislative authorization to expand the
government’s latitude in implementing SPR exchanges.
Professional management of the SPR would require an expansion of the
current limits on the authority of the government to undertake
time-swaps of SPR crude. Current authority limits such swaps to 30
million barrels within a specified time frame, but the reserve isn’t
permitted to drop below 500 million barrels. The authority for time
swaps could be increased by several-fold.
- Establish Clear Policy for Use of the SPR.
The administration should as an early priority define publicly its
general policy for using SPR crude. It is especially important during
times of lost supply and uncertainty about future supply for the
government to damp speculation that breeds price volatility. For
example, in August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the government
delayed an announcement about use of the SPR until January 1991. Had the
SPR been used by September of 1990, if for no other reason than to calm
markets until supplies could be fully made up from other sources, the
price spike of that autumn could have been reduced and the likelihood of
a recession in 1991 also reduced. The administration should therefore
define its position on the SPR soon. It should provide general criteria
for determining when strategic stocks might be tapped under the
President’s authority, defining more generally what will be considered
an emergency and what conditions might prompt the President to authorize
a time-swap. The administration should also determine what conditions
might prompt the Department of Energy to either accelerate purchases for
the SPR or to lease out storage space to industry when future and
forward oil price curves encourage this. Finally, the administration
should improve the operability of the SPR. Unlike commercial stocks, the
recent release of the SPR (mostly sweet) crude showed that the industry
isn’t fully educated about logistical issues involved in getting SPR oil
into the domestic refining system efficiently. Therefore it would be
prudent to review and highlight the negative experiences of those who
participated in last year’s exchange program.
It should be noted that clarification of the use of
the SPR would have a couple of additional benefits. It would eliminate
debate or trial balloons to media in the event of an interruption that
meets the clear criteria set by policy. Trial balloons or public debate
often cloud market transparency to the detriment of predictable price
formation and orderly markets. Public articulation of policy would also
eliminate the risk of holding hostage a release of strategic stocks to
the production policy of key OPEC countries.
Coordinate use of the SPR with other IEA countries.
It goes without saying that the United States should coordinate release
of the SPR in cooperation with other IEA countries. This would be
especially important either in the case of a market in which one or more
producer countries intentionally reduces or bans exports in order to
increase prices, or in case of market disruption. Nonetheless, it should
also be recognized that unilateral use of the SPR by the United States
might be criticized for giving other countries that do not cooperate a
"free ride" on the benefits of the SPR release. The free rider problem
may well be an unavoidable consequence of having and using the SPR—otherwise
the United States would have to consult and share decisions about its
use, which would also be risky and questionable.
Coordinate use of the SPR with actions by key
producer countries. One of the unnoticed and
less criticized aspects of the use of the SPR exchange by the United
States in 2000 was that it was performed in a "cooperation" rather than
a "confrontation" mode with producer countries in both OPEC and
elsewhere. Only after the OPEC secretariat and key OPEC members
repeatedly stated that "we have done our part" in easing the market and
that "it is up to the industrialized countries to do their part," was
the SPR exchange actually triggered. Its timing demonstrated that in a
cooperative mode, use of the SPR could work hand-in-hand with diplomacy
vis-à-vis producing nations. (See next section, number 4, below.)
- Review tax, accounting, and other factors
affecting industry’s incentives to hold petroleum product and natural
gas inventories, with the intent of enhancing inventories before
seasonal demand and neutralizing any adverse impact of current rules.
There has been significant bipartisan support in oil
"consuming" areas of the United States for government-controlled
stockpiles of products and even of critical product components (e.g.,
ethanol). There has also been support for state governments’ mandating
minimum stocks for fuel-switching purposes of certain categories of
consumers, including power plants. The federal government last year also
established the Northeast Heating Oil Reserve. Given the critical role
played by inventories in smoothing out supply shortfalls, the government
should undertake a wholesale review of product inventories and consider
incentives to industry to hold higher levels of inventory than has
recently been the case.
Industry inventories would be an alternative to the
federal Northeast Heating Oil Reserve. Industry generally fails to build
inventory when futures markets are in backwardation; that is, when
futures prices are lower than prompt prices. Industry builds stocks when
markets are in contango and industry expects that future prices will be
higher than prompt prices. Since industry is now managing inventories on
a just-in-time basis, there is a danger that market structure will not
go sufficiently into contango when product builds are required.
Therefore, industry will not have an incentive to build gasoline stocks
in advance of the traditional summer driving season or heating oil and
natural gas stocks in advance of the traditional winter heating seasons.
An alternative incentive could come from fiscal measures that reward
firms that carry seasonal inventory or penalize firms that do not.
Accounting rules, especially "last-in, first-out"
(LIFO) rules, create year-end changes in inventory in order for
companies to reduce their tax liabilities. The federal government should
review national and state government rules and their impacts on
corporate inventory management positions, with the intent of
neutralizing any incentive on the part of companies to reduce stocks at
year-end when markets do not require rapid de-stocking.
- Encourage states to review minimum inventory for
fuel switching where feasible and also fiscal incentives to industry to
build inventories in advance of seasonal demand increases.
Such an effort could be incorporated into incentive programs for state
governments cooperating with one another on a regional basis. (See
recommendations for immediate actions, above.) States have traditionally
made the issue of backup supplies part of their regulatory frameworks.
These requirements have generally faded in the age of deregulation and
should be reexamined.
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