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INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY-- REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, UNITED STATES SENATE |
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IX. Aggressive Interrogations at GTMO (U) A. Allegations of Detainee Mistreatment (U) [Delete] As the final Working Group report was being generated, and on the heels of SOUTHCOM and GTMO's press for additional interrogation authorities, a Commander's inquiry was initiated at GTMO following allegations that, between March and April 2003, interrogation personnel and military police had forced detainees to engage in physical training. [1019] [Delete] The resulting inquiry looked into only one of the alleged incidents of mistreatment -- an interrogation on [Big delete]. [1022] An An interrogator, two analysts, and a member of the GTMO Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) who were interviewed for the inquiry "believed that the technique was appropriate, approved, applied properly, and was common practice ..." [1023] Notwithstanding the statement that the technique was "common practice," the GTMO Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief Lt Col Ted Moss, his deputy, and the ICE operations officer said they were not aware compulsive exercise was being used. [1024] [Delete] On May 2, 2003, MG Miller directed the Director of the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG), John Antonitis, to "cease of the use of the 'Fear-Up Harsh' interrogation technique," and said the inquiry had identified a need for re-training and corrective action to "ensure [interrogators1understand the approved interrogation techniques and practices and their limitations." [1025] (U) A subsequent memorandum called "Historic Look at Inappropriate Interrogation Techniques Used at GTMO" criticized the Commander's inquiry. [1026] [Delete] The memo said the inquiry was too limited and found that the disciplinary action "did not address the command failures that allowed such activity to take place, despite apparent command sanction in of the incidents." [1027] In fact, the Commander's inquiry failed to [Big delete] [1028] Nor did the inquiry review an allegation that, on April 17, 2003, a female GTMO interrogator sat on a detainee's lap "making sexual affiliated movements with her chest and pelvis while again speaking sexually oriented sentences." [1029] [Big delete] (U) The second incident involved a female military interrogator who wiped what she told the detainee was menstrual blood on a detainee's face and forehead. [1033] [Delete] The "Historic Look at Inappropriate Interrogation Techniques Used at GTMO" memo found that there was "no clear information indicating disciplinary action for the 'lap dance' and simulated blood incidents." [1034] [Delete] The same memo concluded that ''the incidents occurring during the Spring of 2003 signif[ied] a consistent problem at GTMO." [1035] It stated that it was "clear" that interrogators "may use several if not all of the techniques that require SECDEF notification." [1036] The memo also concluded that "interpretation of the SECDEF approved techniques has resulted in variations on how techniques are applied (i.e., is yelling, loud music and strobe lights environmental manipulation?)" and "[d]espite these revelations by interrogators, the supervisory chain of command reports that these techniques are not used." [1037] An FBI Special Agent serving at GTMO stated that ''there was a time period where the interrogations were obtrusive enough that the interview rooms for an entire trailer were not available if one of these techniques were been utilized." [1038] [Delete] Other contemporaneous documents indicate that in addition to the use of strobe lights and loud music, techniques such as forced shaving, sensory deprivation and even implied threats of death were either used or planned for use in specific JTF-GMTO interrogations even after MG Miller's May 2, 2003 order to cease use of the "Fear-Up Harsh" interrogation technique. [Big delete] B. Special Interrogation Plans Modeled on Khatani Interrogation (U) (U) Despite their repeated objections, law enforcement had been unable to stop JTF-GTMO from proceeding with its aggressive interrogation of Mohammed al Khatani in November 2002. An FBI Special Agent told the Committee that law enforcement believed at the time that the Khatani interrogation would define the conduct of future interrogations at GTMO. [1039] Documents relating to JTF-GMTO's plans for interrogating other high value GTMO detainees substantiated the belief of the FBI Special Agent. 1. JTF-GTMO Plansfor Interrogation of Slahi (U) [Delete] A memo dated on January 16, 2003 - the day after the Secretary of Defense rescinded interrogation techniques he had previously authorized for GTMO - described a plan for the interrogation of Mohamadou Walid Slahi. While Slahi's interrogation does not appear to have begun until July 2003, the January 16, 2003 memo described specific techniques JTF-GTMO intended to use in his interrogation, many of which mirrored those used in the Khatani interrogation. For example, the memo stated that interrogations would be conducted for up to 20 hours per day on Slahi, just as they had been for Khatani. [1040] The memo said that interrogators could pour water on Slahi's head to "enforce control" and "keep [him] awake." [1041] Interrogators had also poured water over Khatani's head as a "method of asserting control." [1042] [Delete] The January 16, 2003 memo stated that "K-9 dogs can be present and made to bark to agitate [Slahi]." [1043] Similarly, military working dogs had been used in Khatani's interrogation ''to agitate the detainee and provide shock value." [1044] The presence of dogs in the Slahi memo is notable as MG Miller said that, months earlier, he had "rejected [using dogs in interrogations] as an acceptable technique" and that dogs "were not to be used during active interrogation" [1045] [Delete] The January 16, 2003 memo also described techniques directed at breaking down Slahi's ego, including ridiculing him, making him wear a mask and signs labeling him a "liar," a "coward," or a "dog." [1046] The memo stated that interrogators would also instruct Slahi to bark and performm dog tricks "to reduce the detainee's ego and establish control." [1047] Khatani had also been forced to wear a dog collar and perform dog tricks, and interrogators had placed signs on him such as "liar," "coward," and "dog." [1048] [Delete] The January 16, 2003 memo described shaving Slahi's head and beard, making him wear a burka, and subjecting him to strip search ''to reduce [his] ego by assaulting his modesty." [1049] Likewise, JTF-GMTO interrogators had shaved Khatani's head and beard and he had also been strip searched. [1050] [Delete] The memo stated that Slahi would be denied the opportunity to pray and described techniques to exploit "religious taboos," such as using a female interrogator in "close physical contact." [1051] The memo also stated that interrogators would play music to "stress [Slahi] because he believes music is forbidden" and that light in Slahi's interrogation booth would be filtered "with red plastic to produce a stressful environment." [1052] Khatani had also been denied prayer and a female interrogator touched him during his interrogation to increase his stress level." [1053] Khatani too had been isolated, a red filter was placed over the light in his interrogation booth, and music was used in his interrogation to create stress. [1054] [Delete] The January 16, 2003 memo indicated that JTF-GMTO interrogators planned to make use of a completely white room during Slahi's interrogation "to reduce outside stimuli and present an austere environment," that interrogators would use a strobe light in his interrogation booth to "disorient [Slahi] and add to [his] stress level," and that a hood would be placed on Slahi in the booth" ''to isolate him and increase feelings of futility." [1055] 2. JTF-GTMO FormaUy Submits Speciol Interrogation Plan/or Slahi (ISN 760) (U) [Delete] In July 2003, six months after the above-described memo was produced and three months after the Secretary issued new interrogation authorities for GTMO, MG Miller submitted to SOUTHCOM a formal request for approval of a special interrogation plan for Slahi. [1056] In seeming contradiction to his May 2, 2003 order that the fear up harsh approach not be used in interrogations, the plan included many of the techniques described in the January 16, 2003 memo and stated that ''the single most important aspect of these techniques is the initial shock of the treatment ... [the] detainee will have the perception that his situation has changed drastically and that life can still become worse than what he is experiencing." [1057] [Delete] The first three to five days of interrogation were planned for Camp Delta. [1058] If Slahi was not cooperative, the plan proposed that military police in full riot gear take him from his cell, place him on a watercraft, and drive him around to make him think he had been taken off of the island. In reality, Slahi would be taken to Camp Echo where the interrogation was to continue. A memo describing that part of the plan said that military police working dogs would be used during his movement to "assist developing the atmosphere that something major is happening and add to the tension level of the detainee." [1059] [Delete] Interrogating Slahi at Camp Echo was intended to emotionally and psychologically weaken him through "drastic changes in his environment." [1060] Mirroring the Khatani interrogation plan, the Slahi plan included efforts to "replicate and exploit the 'Stockholm Syndrome' between detainee and his interrogators." [1061] In his evaluation of the Khatani plan more than seven months earlier, the NCIS psychologist assigned to the CITF, Dr. Michael Gelles, had said that the idea of inducing the Stockholm syndrome implied that "the subject feels that he is to be killed and the information provided may in fact be distorted." [1062] [Delete] The GTMO plan stated that, while in the interrogation room at Camp Echo, Slahi would sit in a basic chair and "be shackled to the floor and left in the room for up to four hours while sound is playing continually." [1063] His time in the room was intended to "disorient him and establish fear of the unknown" and emphasize to Slahi that '''the rules have changed' and nobody knows he is there." [1064] The practice of shackling him to the floor and subjecting him to loud music was to be repeated over several days, interrupted by actual interrogations. Slahi was to be permitted four hours of sleep every sixteen hours. [1065] [Delete] The plan stated that an interrogation room would be "modified in such a way as to reduce as much outside stimuli as possible. The doors will be sealed to a point that allows no light to enter the room. The walls may be covered with white paint or paper to further eliminate objects the detainee may concentrate on. The room will contain an eyebolt in the floor and speakers for sound." [1066] The plan said that the "interrogation team will make detainee feel psychologically uncomfortable, emotionally uncomfortable, assert superiority over detainee, escalate stress, play loud music, and continue to condition detainee to menial tasks." [1067] [Delete] July 18, 2003, SOUTHCOM Commander GEN James Hill forwarded a copy of GTMO's interrogation plan for Slahi to the Secretary of Defense. GEN Hill's cover memorandum stated that the interrogation plan "employs techniques not previously approved in your [April 16, 2003] memorandum" and requested the Secretary's approval "to use sound modulation (at decibel levels not harmful to hearing) and sleep deprivation." [1068] The memorandum also notified the Secretary that GTMO intended to isolate Slahi and use "pride and ego down" with him. [1069] [Delete] On July 24, 2003, Marshall Billingslea, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), forwarded a memo notifying the Secretary of Defense that JTF-GTMO intended to isolate Slahi and recommending that he approve the use of "sleep deprivation" and "sound modulation at decibel levels not harmful to hearing." [1070] A handwritten note on the memo stated that "OGC concurs that this is legal. We don't see any policy issues with these interrogation techniques. Recommend you authorize." [1071] Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz approved the memo on July 28, 2003 and forwarded it to Secretary Rumsfeld, who added his approval on August 13, 2003. [1072] [Delete] The Slahi plan stated that it would "not be implemented until approved by higher authority." [1073] Despite that statement, memoranda for the record suggest techniques for which JTF-GTMO sought authority were used at least a month before the Secretary's written approval. 3. Interrogation Begins Before Special Interrogation Plan Is Approved (U) [Delete] Several memoranda for the record documenting Slahi's interrogation were written by JTF-GTMO personnel in July and August 2003. These memoranda indicate that at least one technique for which JTF-GTMO sought authority to use with Slahi, i.e., sound modulation, was used before written authority was actually granted by the Secretary of Defense. [1074] The memoranda also suggest the use of some techniques, such as forcing Slahi to stand for prolonged periods, for which no request for authority from SOUTHCOM or OSD appears to have been made by JTF-GTMO. [1075] In addition, while MG Miller had, more than two months earlier, said that interrogators were not to use the fear up harsh approach, the memoranda indicate that increasing Slahi's level of fear was an integral part of his interrogation and that one interrogator even implied to Slahi that he could be tortured or killed. [Delete] The memoranda indicate that, on several occasions from July 8 through July 17, Slahi was interrogated by a masked interrogator called "Mr. X." On July 8, 2003 Slahi was interrogated by Mr. X and was "exposed to variable lighting patterns and rock music, to the tune of Drowning Pool's 'Let the Bodies Hit [the] Floor'." [1076] On July 10, 2003 Slahi was placed in an interrogation room handcuffed and standing while the air conditioning was turned off until the room became "quite warm." [1077] The next day, Slahi was brought into the interrogation booth and again remained standing and handcuffed while the air conditioning was again turned off. [1078] After allowing Slahi to sit, the interrogator later ''took [Slahi's] chair and left him standing for several hours." [1079] According to the memo, Slahi was ''visibly uncomfortable and showed signs of fatigue. This was 4th day of long duration interrogations." [1080] (U) On July 17, 2003, the masked interrogator told Slahi about a dream he had had where he saw "four detainees that were chained together at the feet. They dug a hole that was six feet long, six feet deep, and four feet wide. Then he observed the detainees throw a plain, unpainted, pine casket with the number 760 [Slahi's internment serial number (lSN)] painted on it in orange on the ground." [1081] [Delete] On August 2, 2003 an interrogator told Slahi ''to use his imagination and think up the worst possible thing that could happen to him" and asked him "what scares him more than anything else." [1082] (U) That same day, the interrogator told Slahi that to ''use his imagination to think up the worst possible scenario he could end up in." [1083] The interrogator told Slahi that "beatings and physical pain are not the worst thing in the world. After all being beaten for a while, humans tend to disconnect the mind from the body and make it through. However, there are worse things than physical pain." [1084] The interrogator told Slahi that he would ''very soon disappear down a very dark hole. His very existence will become erased ... no one will know what happened to him and, eventually, no one will care." [1085] (U) At one point in his interrogation, Slahi was also shown a fictitious letter that had been drafted by the Interrogation Team Chief stating that his mother had been detained, would be interrogated, and if she were uncooperative she might be transferred to GTMO. [1086] The letter pointed out that she would be the only female detained at '"this previously all-male prison environment." [1087] [Delete] August 7, 2003, Slahi informed an interrogator that he had made a decision to cooperate. [1088] After questioning Slahi, his interrogator "congratulated [him] on his decision to tell the whole truth." [1089] 4. Special Interrogation Plan Approved and Implemented Despite Apparent Cooperation (U) [Delete] Five days after interrogators congratulated Slahi for his decision to '"tell the whole truth," the Secretary of Defense approved JTF-GMTO's Special Interrogation Plan. Notwithstanding Slahi's apparent decision on August 7, 2003 to cooperate with interrogators, an August 21, 2003 email described preparations made to implement the Special Interrogation Plan. [1090] The email described sealing Slahi's cell at Camp Echo to "prevent light from shining" in and covering the entire exterior of his cell with tarp to "prevent him from making visual contact with guards." [1091] [Delete] Weekly Reports from the JTF-GMTO Commander in September and October 2003 indicated that Slahi "continue[d] to be cooperative." [1092] Despite that apparent cooperation, those same weekly reports stated that that the interrogations were continuing in accordance with the approved interrogation plan. A contemporaneous document suggested that the interrogation may have begun affecting Slahi's mental state. [1093] [Delete] An October 17, 2003 email from a JTF-GTMO interrogator to LTC Diane Zierhoffer, a JTF-GMTO Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) Psychologist, stated that '"Slahi told me he is "hearing voices now... He is worried as he knows this is not normal.... By the way ... is this something that happens to people who have little external stimulus such as daylight, human interaction etc???? Seems a little creepy." [1094] LTC Zierhoffer responded "sensory deprivation can cause hallucinations, usually visual rather than auditory, but you never know... In the dark you create things out of what little you have ..." [1095] 5. FBI Concerns with Special Interrogation (U) [Big delete] [Delete] The view that the use of the aggressive techniques could affect Slahi's potential prosecution turned out to be accurate. Lt Col Stuart Couch, a military prosecutor assigned to the Slahi case wrote in March 2004 that "prosecutors in our office are very concerned about the allegations of detainee abuse at GTMO and Afghanistan, and we have individually taken steps to address this issue. The techniques employed by the intelligence community in obtaining information is a policy decision that obviously affects our prosecution efforts, yet we are powerless to influence such activities." [1100] After becoming aware of interrogations techniques to which Slahi had been subject, Lt Col Couch refused to participate in the prosecution. [1101] 6. Special Project at GTMO Uses Aggressive Interrogation Techniques (U) (U) JTF-GTMO produced written weekly updates on significant activities including certain detainee interrogations. The updates were sent to the SOUTHCOM Commander and, according to MG Miller, were forwarded to the Joint Staff and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. [1102] MG Miller said that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz was interested in the reports and his office would occasionally call GTMO to inquire about particular detainees. [Delete] On July 13, 2003, the GTMO Commander sent an email, accompanied by his Weekly Update report, stating that GTMO had "finalized [delete] plans." [1103] According to the email, the objective [delete] was to "fracture [delete] detainee resistance to cooperation and to induce detainees to be forthcoming during interrogations." [1104] The email stated that the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Psychological Applications Directorate Chief LTC Morgan Banks, who had hosted the JPRA training for GTMO interrogation personnel at Fort Bragg in September 2002, "conducted a [delete] assessment visit" and had provided "very valuable insights." [1105] The email stated that LTC Banks planned to return for a "follow-up visit in 60 days." [1106] [Big delete] [Delete] [delete] In November 2003, several months after [delete] MG Miller submitted two requests for authority to use sound modulation in interrogations [delete] [big delete] suggesting that MG Miller felt he needed authorization to use that technique in interrogations. [1108] The Committee is not aware, however, of a similar request for authority to use strobe lights, loud music, and 15 hour interrogations in connection with [delete] [delete] According to the Church report, some interrogators considered strobe lights and loud music a form of environmental manipulation which had been authorized by the Secretary of Defense in April. [1109] MG Miller's written requests for authority to use sound modulation in the [delete] [delete] interrogations are at odds with that understanding. 7. CITF Reissues Order for Agents to "Stand Clear" of Aggressive Interrogations (U) (D) In October 2003, with the Slahi Special Interrogation Plan underway, the Criminal Investigative Task Force again issued guidance to its agents to stand clear of interrogations using aggressive techniques. The guidance mirrored that issued by CITF in December 2002, stating that "detainees will be treated humanely" and that "physical torture, corporal punishment and mental torture are not acceptable interrogation tactics and are not allowed under any circumstances." [1110] The October 2003 guidance stated: [CITF personnel will] not participate in any interrogation that violates this policy. When CITF personnel are conducting a joint interrogation with another U.S. government organization, and a member of that other organization employs tactics that are, or appear to the investigator to be, inhumane or cruel and unusual, the CITF personnel will immediately disengage from the interrogation, report the incident to their CITF chain of command, and document the incident in a memorandum for record. [1111] 8. GTMO Seeks Approvalfor Two Additional Special Interrogation Plans (U) [Delete] On November 13, 2003, MG Miller sent two memoranda to GEN Hill at SOUTHCOM requesting approval of special interrogation plans for detainees [delete] [delete] [1112]. Consistent with the Secretary of Defense's April authorization, MG Miller notified GEN Hill of JTF-GMTO's intent to isolate the detainees. In addition, MG Miller requested approval to conduct interrogations up to 16 hours and use various types of sound. The plans also implied the use of other techniques, such as sensory deprivation, that were not authorized by the Secretary in April. Both memos indicated that the techniques in the plans had been previously used in the Slahi interrogation. In many ways, the techniques proposed in the two new special interrogation plans mirrored techniques used in both the Slahi and Khatani interrogations. a. Special Interrogation Plan #3 (U) [Big delete] [Big delete] [Big delete] [Big delete] [Big delete] [Big delete] b. Special Interrogation Plan #4 (U) [Big delete] [Big delete] [Big delete] [Big delete] [Big delete] [Big delete] c. SOUTHCOM and OSD Recommend Approval of Special Interrogation Plons #3 & #4 (U) [Delete] On November 19, 2003, General Hill sent the [delete] interrogation plans to the Secretary of Defense. [1130] In memoranda accompanying the plans, General Hill requested approval [big delete]. [Delete] Tom O'Connell, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), attached a cover memo to the SOUTHCOM Commander's request, recommending to the Secretary of Defense that he approve the plans. [1132] A coordination sheet attached to that memo indicated that Daniel Dell'Orto, the Principal Deputy DoD General Counsel, had approved the plan on December 31, 2003 and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Myers had approved the plan on January 2, 2004. The date of the Chairman's approval (and possibly that of the Deputy DoD General Counsel) occurred after the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the Department of Justice withdrew its March 14, 2003 legal memo upon which DoD had been relying for interrogation techniques. [1133] The OLC's notification to DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes of that withdrawal occurred between December 25 and December 31, 2003. [1134] Mr. Haynes told the Committee that "the fact that the Department didn't have that opinion to rely on... didn't mean that Mr. Dell'Orto or somebody ... could not [have] concluded that something was legal in the absence of that memo." [1135] _______________ Notes: 1019. Memo for Record from ACS Contractor, Possible Inappropriate Activities (undated). 1020. Memo from Diane Beaver to MG Geoffrey Miller, (U) Results of Commander's Inquiry, re: Allegation of Inhumane Treatment of [Big delete] (April 30, 2003). 1021. Ibid. 1023. Ibid. 1024. Ibid at 2. 1025. Memo from MG Geoffrey Miller for Commander USSOUTHCOM, Commander's Inquiry, Allegation of Inhumane Treatment of [Big delete] (May 3, 2003). 1026. Memo, Historic Look at Inappropriate Interrogation Techniques Used at GTMO (undated) (hereinafter "Historic Look at Inappropriate Interrogation Techniques"). 1027. Ibid. 1028. An April 2003 Memorandum for Record drafted by a contractor at GTMO alleged the technique was used on several occasions, including in late March 2003 as well as on April 7, 2003, and April 17, 2003. Memo for Record from ACS Contractor, Possible Inappropriate Activities (undated). 1029. Ibid 1030. Historic Look at Inappropriate Interrogation Techniques at 2. 1031. Ibid 1032. Ibid. 1033. Ibid 1034. Ibid. 1035. Ibid 1036. Ibid 1037. Ibid. at 3. 1038. Email from FBI Special Agent (July 14, 2004). 1039. Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007). 1040. Memo, Methods and Approaches to Employ (U): Special Interrogation Operation of ISN 760 [delete] (January 16, 2003) (hereinafter "Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003)''). 1041. Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003). 1042. Memo, Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 [delete] (January 17, 2003). 1043. Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003). 1044. Ibid. 1045. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (May 2, 2006). 1046. Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003). 1047. Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003). 1048. Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 [delete] (January 17, 2003); Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003). 1049. Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003). 1050. Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 [delete] (January 17, 2003) 1051. Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003), 1052. Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003). 1053. Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 [delete] (January 17, 2003). 1054. Ibid 1055. Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003). 1056. Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay, Joint Interrogation Group, ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July I, 2003) (hereinafter "ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July 1, 2003)"). 1057. ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July 1, 2003). 1058. Ibid 1059. Memo from LT Richard Zuley, Objective: Transport ISN 760 from Camp Delta to Camp Echo (undated). 1060. ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July 1, 2003). 1061. Ibid 1062. Memo from Michael Gelles, Psy.D., Review of JTF-GTMO Interrogation Plan Detainee 063 dtd November 21, 2002 (November 22, 2002). 1063. ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July 1, 2003) at 7. 1064. Ibid 1065. On April 12, 2003 MG Miller sent GEN Hill an email requesting that SOUTHCOM provide a definition of sleep deprivation. On June 2, 2003, GEN Hill sent MG Miller a letter defining sleep deprivation as "keeping a detainee awake for more than 16 hours or allowing a detainee to rest briefly and then repeatedly awakening him, not to exceed four days in succession." MG Geoffrey Miller email to GEN James Hill (April 12, 2003). 1066. ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July I, 2003) at 8. 1067. ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July 1, 2003). 1068. Memo from GEN James Hill to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Interrogation Plan (IP) for Detainee Mohamadou Walid Slahi, ISN [delete] (July 18, 2003). 1069. Ibid 1070. Memo from Marshall Billingslea to Secretary of Defense, Mohamadou Walid Slahi. (July 24, 2003). 1071. Ibid 1072. Ibid 1073. ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July 1, 2003) at 3. 1074. Memo for Record, [delete] (MOUHAMADOO OULD SLAHI// (July 17, 2003). 1075. Memo for Record, GTMO-0598 [delete] MOUHAMADOO OULD SLAHI/// (July 10, 2003). 1076. Memo for Record, GTMO-0598 [delete] MOUHAMADOO OULD SLAHI/// (July 17, 2003). 1077. Memo for Record, G1MO-0598 GTMO-0598 [delete] MOUHAMADOO OULD SLAHI/// (July 10, 2003). 1078. Memo for Record, GTMO-0598 [delete] MOUHAMADOO OULD SLAHI///(July 11, 2003). 1079. Memo for Record, GTMO-0598 [delete] MOUHAMADOO OULD SLAHI/// (July 11, 2003). 1080. Ibid. 1081. Schmidt-Furlow Report at 24. 1082. Memo for Record, GTMO-0598 [delete] MOUHAMADOO OULD SLAHI/// (August 2, 2003). 1083. DoJ IG report at 123 1084. Schmidt-Furlow Report at 25. 1085. Ibid 1086. DoJ IG report. 1087. Ibid 1088. Memo for Record, G1MO-0598 [delete] MOUHAMADOO OULD SLAHI/// (September 8, 2003). 1089. Ibid. 1090. Email from JTF-G1MO IS2 to LT Richard Zuley and Capt Sean Wilson (August 21, 2003). 1091. Ibid 1092. JTF-GTMO Weekly Thematic Focus: September 29-October 5, 2003 and October 6-12, 2003. 1093. JTF-GTMO Weekly Thematic Focus: September 29-October 5, 2003; October 6-12 2003; October 20-26, 2003; and November 3-9. 2003. 1094. Email from JTF-GTMO Interrogator to LTC Diane Zierhoffer (October 17, 2003). 1095. Ibid 1096. Email from FBI Special Agent (December 5, 2003). 1097. Ibid 1098. Ibid 1099. FBI Electronic Communication from Counterterrorism MLDU to Counterterrorism (May 18, 2004). 1100. Memo from Lt Col Stuart Couch to Brigadier General Scott Black, Office of Military Commissions Prosecution Operational Assessment (March 18, 2004). 1101. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Stuart Couch (June 21, 2007). 1102. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 5, 2007). 1103. Email from MG Geoffrey Miller to GEN James Hill (July 13, 2003). 1104. Ibid 1105. Ibid 1106. Ibid 1107. Church Report at 172. 1108. Memo from MG Geoffrey Miller to Commander, U.S. Southern Command, Request for Approval of Interrogation Plan (IP) for [big delete] (November 13, 2003) at 2-3 (hereinafter "MG Miller, Request for Approval of IP for [delete]") Memo from MG Geoffrey Miller to Commander, U.S. Southern Command, Request for Approval of Interrogation Plan (IP) for ISN [big delete] (November 13, 2003) at 2-3 (hereinafter "MG Miller, Request for Approval of IP for [delete]. 1109. Church Report at 172. 1110. DoD CITF, Memo for All Personnel Assigned to the DoD Criminal Investigative Task Force, Interrogation Procedures Guidance (U) (October 3, 2003). 1111. Ibid. 1112. MG Miller, Request for Approval of IP for [delete]; MG Miller, Request for Approval of IP for ISN [delete]. 1113. MG Miller, Request for Approval of IP for [delete] at 2. 1114. Ibid at 4. 1115. Ibid. 1116. Ibid at 2. 1117. Ibid at 5. 1118. Ibid at 6. 1119. Ibid. at 7. 1120. Ibid at 11. 1121. MG Miller, Request for Approval of IP for ISN [delete] at 2. 1122. Ibid at 8. 1123. Ibid. at 1. 1124. Ibid. at 7. 1125. Ibid. 1126. Ibid. at 9. 1127. Ibid. at 10. 1128. Ibid. at 9. 1129. Ibid. at 10. 1130. Memorandum from General James Hill to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Interrogation Plan (IP) for Detainee [delete] (November 19, 2003). 1131. Ibid. 1132. Action Memo from Thomas O'Connell for Secretary of Defense, Interrogation Plans for [big delete] (2003). 1133. Coordination, attached as Tab D to Action Memo from Thomas O'Connell for Secretary of Defense, Interrogation Plans for [big delete] (2003). 1134. Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith stated that he called the DoD General Counsel between Christmas and New Year 2003. Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency at 153. 1135. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 295.
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