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INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAlNEES IN U.S. CUSTODY-- REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, UNITED STATES SENATE |
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III. Guantanarno Bay as a "Battle Lab" for New Interrogation Techniques (U) [Big delete] JPRA was also developing a plan to support Department of Defense interrogation operations at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO). In the summer of 2002, following a request from the Army's Special Operations Command (USASOC) to develop a training regimen for GTMO interrogation personnel, JPRA modified the training plan it had developed for [delete] [delete] to produce a plan to train the GTMO personnel. In September, JPRA sent a team of instructors, including two instructors who had discussed and demonstrated SERE physical pressures to [delete] officers in July, to Fort Bragg, North Carolina to provide instruction at a four day conference attended by the GTMO personnel. (U) Just weeks after the JPRA training at Fort Bragg, two GTMO personnel who attended the Fort Bragg training drafted a memo proposing the use of physical and psychological pressures in interrogations at GTMO, including some pressures used at SERE schools to teach U.S. soldiers how to resist interrogation by enemies that do not follow the Geneva Conventions. (U) On October 11, 2002, Major General Michael Dunlavey, Commander of GTMO's Joint Task Force 170 (JTF-170) submitted a modified version of that memo for approval by his Chain of Command. On December 2, 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld approved many of those techniques for use in interrogations at GTMO. A. GTMO Stands Up a Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) (U) (U) In June 2002, members of the Army's 85th Medical Detachment's Combat Stress Control Team deployed to Guantanamo Bay. Upon arrival, three members of the team - psychiatrist Major Paul Burney, psychologist [delete] and a psychiatric technician - were informed that MG Michael Dunlavey, the Commander of JTF-170, had assigned them to support interrogation operations as part of a newly created Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) at the JTF. This assignment came as a surprise to MAJ Burney and [delete] because, when they were deployed, the two understood that their mission would be to care for U.S. soldiers dealing with deployment-related stress. [274] In a written statement provided to the Committee, MAJ Burney described the assignment: Three of us, [the enlisted psychiatric technician], and I, were hijacked and immediately in processed into Joint Task Force 170, the military intelligence command on the island. It turns out we were assigned to the interrogation element because Joint Task Force 170 had authorizations for a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and a psychiatric technician on its duty roster but nobody had been deployed to fill these positions. Nobody really knew what we were supposed to do for the unit, but at least the duty roster had its positions filled. [275] (U) MG Dunlavey told the Committee that he was in the hospital for much of the month of June and did not know who initiated the creation of the JTF-170 BSCT. [276] (U) Prior to their arrival at GTMO, neither MAJ Burney nor [delete] had any training to support interrogations and there was no standard operating procedure in place for the team at GTMO. [277] MAJ Burney told the Committee that the team was "very aware of how little we knew about the whole spectrum of detention and interrogation, we decided we needed help. [278] (U) Shortly after arriving at GTMO, the BSCT contacted the Chief of the Psychological Applications Directorate (PAD) at the U.S. Army's Special Operations Command (USASOC), LTC Louie "Morgan" Banks. [279] At the time LTC Banks was also the senior Army SERE Psychologist. The BSCT psychologist, [delete] had met LTC Banks prior to deploying to GTMO but told the Committee that he was unaware at the time of the connections LTC Banks had with the Army's SERE School. [delete] LTC Banks told the Committee that it was apparent to him that the BSCT lacked the proper training for the mission and that, when asked to help, he felt obliged to assist. [280] LTC Banks contacted the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) for assistance in organizing training for the BSCT. [281] After speaking to Col Moulton, the JPRA Commander, LTC Banks informed the BSCT that JPRA was willing to modify its prior [delete] interrogation training sessions to suit the BSCT's needs. [282] (U) BSCT members told the Committee that they sought the training to better understand the interrogation process. [283] They also told the Committee, however, that GTMO's Director for Intelligence (J-2), LTC Jerald Phifer, approved their trip with the expectation that the BSCT would learn about and bring back interrogation techniques that could be considered for use in interrogations at GTMO; a point that the LTC Phifer confirmed in his testimony to the Department of the Army Inspector General (Army IG). [284] The Staff Judge Advocate at GTMO, LTC Diane Beaver, confirmed LTC Phifer's account, but said that MG Dunlavey told staff he had been considering a request for authority to use additional interrogation techniques and that MG Dunlavey's purpose in sending the staff to the training was to "find out what could be used." [285] (U) MAJ Burney said that he and [delete] made LTC Banks "aware that there was interest within JTF-170 to see if we could use 'SERE tactics' to try to elicit information from detainees." [286] [Delete] told the Committee that he believed that the two discussed the GTMO command's interest in obtaining a list of resistance training techniques with LTC Banks. [287] The JPRA Operational Support Office Chief Christopher Wirts, told the Committee that he believed that he and LTC Banks also talked about the need to demonstrate physical pressures used in SERE schools at the Fort Bragg training. [288] LTC Banks, however, told the Committee that he did not recall a discussion of physical pressures at the training and that he was surprised when he later learned that the BSCT had expected to become familiar with resistance training techniques used in SERE school while at the training session. [289] (D) At the time, there was a view by some at GTMO that interrogation operations had not yielded the anticipated intelligence, [290] MAJ Burney testified to the Army IG regarding interrogations: [T]his is my opinion, even though they were giving information and some of it was useful, while we were there a large part of the time we were focused on trying to establish a link between Al Qaeda and Iraq and we were not being successful in establishing a link between Al Qaeda and Iraq. The more frustrated people got in not being able to establish this link ... there was more and more pressure to resort to measures that might produce more immediate results. [291] [Delete] The GTMO Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief, David Becker told the Committee that at one point interrogation personnel were required to question [delete] [big delete] but that he was unaware of the source of that requirement. [292] Others involved in JTF-170 interrogation operations agreed that there was pressure on interrogation personnel to produce intelligence, but did not recall pressure to identify links between Iraq and al Qaeda. [293] [Delete] delete] Mr. Becker told the Committee that during the summer of 2002, the JTF-170 Commander, MG Dunlavey, and his Director for Intelligence (J-2), LTC Phifer, had urged him to be more aggressive in interrogations. [294] Mr. Becker also told the Committee that MG Dunlavey and LTC Phifer repeatedly asked him during this period why he was not using stress positions in interrogations, even though the August 2002 Standard Operating Procedure for JTF-170 expressly prohibited the use of the technique. [295] MG Dunlavey told the Committee that he did not recall asking his staff why they were not using stress positions or telling them that they should be more aggressive. [296] [Delete] Mr. Becker also told the Committee that, on several occasions, MG Dunlavey had advised him that the office of Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz had called to express concerns about the insufficient intelligence production at GTMO. [297] Mr. Becker recalled MG Dunlavey telling him after one of these calls, that the Deputy Secretary himself said that GTMO should use more aggressive interrogation techniques. [298] MG Dunlavey told the Committee that he could not recall ever having a phone call with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz or his staff. [299] C. U.S. Southern Command Seeks External Review of GTMO (U) [Delete] Just as the JTF-170 BSCT was reaching out to LTC Banks for assistance, SOUTHCOM was looking for advice to improve GTMO operations. In June 2002, Major General Gary Speer, the Acting Commander of SOUTHCOM, requested that the Joint Staff conduct an external review of intelligence collection operations at Guantanamo Bay. [300] In response, the Joint Staff directed COL John P. Custer, then-assistant commandant of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, to lead a review team. [Delete] COL Custer's team visited GTMO in August and submitted its findings to the Joint Staff on September 10, 2002. [301] Like COL Herrington's assessment six months earlier, the Custer review identified a number of issues hampering GTMO's intelligence collection mission, [Big delete] [Delete] COL Custer also noted deficiencies in interrogation approaches used by JTF-170, stating that: [Big delete] [Delete] COL Custer recommended that SOUTHCOM, in coordination with JTF-170, provide written guidance "delineating what tools and measures are available and permissible to leverage control over the detainees while providing acceptable guidelines for questioning." [304] He also recommended combining the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit and the JTF-170 BSCT to use both military and law enforcement approaches to create an environment that would be "conducive to extracting information by exploiting the detainee's vulnerabilities." [305] [Delete] In his report, COL Custer referred to GTMO as "America's 'Battle Lab" in the global war on terror, observing that "our nation faces an entirely new threat framework," which must be met by an investment of both human capital and infrastructure. [306] (U) Several witnesses expressed concerns to the Committee about using the term "Battle Lab" to describe operations at GTMO. [307] In written answers to questionnaires from Senator Carl Levin, COL Britt Mallow, the Commander of the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF), stated: MG Dunlavey and later MG Miller referred to GTMO as a "Battle Lab" meaning that interrogations and other procedures there were to some degree experimental, and their lessons would benefit DOD in other places. While this was logical in terms of learning lessons, I personally objected to the implied philosophy that interrogators should experiment with untested methods, particularly those in which they were not trained. [308] (U) CITF's Deputy Commander, Mark Fallon, echoed the CITF Commander's concern. Mr. Fallon stated that CITF did not concur with the Battle Lab concept because the task force "did not advocate the application of unproven techniques on individuals who were awaiting trials." [309] He emphasized that the CITF position was that "there were many risks associated with this concept ... and the perception that detainees were used for some 'experimentation' of new unproven techniques had negative connotations." [310] (U) MG Dunlavey told the Committee he did not think he would have used the term to describe GTMO. [311] MG Miller told the Committee that he did not recall using the term and that it would be inappropriate to apply it to an operational unit. [312] D. GTMO Personnel Attend Training at Fort Bragg (U) (U) On September 16, 2002, less than a week after COL Custer submitted his report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seven personnel from JTF-170 at GTMO, including three members of the BSCT and four interrogators, arrived at Fort Bragg for training organized by LTC Banks and JPRA They were joined by a CIA psychologist and several Army personnel. [313] Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) was formally notified on September 5, 2002 that JPRA intended to provide training support to Army psychologists, but did not mention Guantanamo Bay or interrogation. [314] (U) JPRA sent senior SERE psychologist Gary Percival, who had recently assumed that position after Dr. Jessen's departure, and two instructors to conduct the training at Fort Bragg. [Delete] Dr. Percival and one of the two trainers, Joseph Witsch, had been instructors at the exploitation training for [delete] in July, where they had discussed and demonstrated physical pressures. [315] In testimony before the Committee, the other JPRA trainer, Terrence Russell, stated that the team had designed the training to provide attendees a "familiarization with the academic or the theoretical application of exploitation from a SERE perspective." [316] A contemporaneous email from JPRA Operational Support Office (OSO) Chief Christopher Wirts, who was involved in planning the training, explained that it was intended to be "similar in nature to what we did for OGA on the last iteration." [317] None of the three instructors sent by JPRA to Fort Bragg was a trained interrogator. [318] [Delete] According to a JPRA plan of instruction dated August 28, 2002, the first day of training included instruction on the stages of [big delete] [big delete]. The next three days of training in the plan included a range of topics, including [big delete]." [319] [Delete] [delete] JPRA developed a number of presentations to support the training uncluding one called [big delete]. A slide from that presentation stated that ''the exploitation process is fairly simple but needs to be adhered to [to] be successful if the goal is to increase the likelihood of obtaining useful intelligence information from enemy prisoners..." [320] The presentation listed a number of "Critical Operational Exploitation Principles" including [big delete]." [321]. The "Principles" listed in the Fort Bragg training presentation were substantially the same as those described in the Exploitation Draft Plan, circulated by Dr. Jessen in April, which described a JPRA-directed exploitation process. [322] [Delete] Though GTMO was a facility that dealt with detainees after they had been removed from the battlefield, the presentation also included information on "Tactical Questioning," stating that tactical interrogators should [big delete] [Big delete]." [323] Mr. Witsch, the JPRA instructor who acted as Team Chief for the training, testified to the Committee: Rough handling is you would pull the person up to their feet, you would move them rapidly in the direction that you were going to take them... basically, they have no control. They would feel like the person that has them is in total control of them. That's what we mean by rough handling. [324] [Delete] Presentation slides used for the training also listed a number of other recommendations for handling detainees including [big delete] [big delete]." [325] Mr. Witsch testified to the Committee that he did not know what was meant by those statements and he could not recall any discussion about what punishments might be culturally undesirable for Arab or Islamic detainees. [326] [Delete] [delete] The presentation stated that "all daily activities should be on random schedules" and should, among other things "disrupt prisoner sleep cycles." [327] Mr. Witsch said that denying detainees the ability to predict and determine their schedules "keeps them somewhat off guard and guessing." [328] [Delete] [delete] A second JPRA presentation delivered at Fort Bragg described methods to deal with detainees who were trained to resist interrogation. [329] The presentation, entitled "Counter Measures to Defeat al Qaeda Resistance Contingency Training Based on Recently Obtained AL-QA'IDA Documents" listed several countermeasures to deal with resistant detainees including "invasion of personal space by female." [330] Mr. Witsch explained that "[i]n a lot of cases, it's uncomfortable for a male to have a female in their space. It could also be looked at as uncomfortable having a female in front of an Arab... What this is is a form of pressure in that situation." [331] He testified that lPRA might have become aware that the invasion of the personal space by a female might make an Arab detainee uncomfortable while conducting research in preparation for the training. [332] [Delete] [delete] The presentation on countermeasures to defeat al Qaeda resistance also explained that "[i]f the prisoner believes that Americans are immoral barbarians and what he sees counters those beliefs then his core beliefs have been shaken and he is more likely to cooperate.. . . If his core beliefs are reinforced by his treatment he is more likely to stick to his resistance." [333] Mr. Witsch told the Committee that it was "hard to say" what the effect of [Big delete] [big delete] would have on a detainee's resistance - whether it would make the detainee more or less likely to cooperate. [334] (U) In his testimony to the Army IG, MAJ Burney, the GTMO BSCT psychiatrist who attended the training, stated that JPRA personnel at Fort Bragg, "described some of the stuff that they would do in SERE school as far as keeping people in some sort of solitary confinement for a period of time" or "finding out what their fears were before they came so that they would try and use those against them, whether it was fear of spiders, of the dark or whatever..." [335] An interrogator from GTMO who attended the training also recalled a discussion about the use of phobias. [336] [Delete] [delete] Members of the GTMO BSCT who attended the Fort Bragg training recalled discussions with the JPRA instructors about how they administered physical pressures. [337] MAJ Burney told the Committee that instructors talked about techniques the SERE schools used to teach resistance to interrogation, such as walling, and exposing students to cold until they shiver. [338] [Delete] told the Committee that hooding and hitting in a way that was not injurious were both mentioned at Fort Bragg. [339] An interrogator from JTF-170 who attended the training also recalled a discussion about the use of physical pressures. [340] (U) That same interrogator said that the instructors spoke about using existing procedures at GTMO to enhance interrogations. [341] For example, the interrogator told the Committee that there was a discussion with JPRA personnel that military working dogs, already present at GTMO for security, could enhance detainee exploitation. Similarly, the interrogator said that the instructors pointed out that hoods, goggles, and ear muffs were already in use with detainees at GTMO for security purposes, and that existing processes utilizing those techniques could also be used to enhance interrogations. The interrogator also recalled requesting additional JPRA training for GTMO personnel on the use of physical pressures. (U) Neither LTC Banks nor any of the JPRA instructors from the Fort Bragg training could recall if there were discussions of physical pressures. [342] LTC Banks told the Committee that using physical pressures designed for students at SERE school in actual interrogations would almost always be unproductive. [343] For example, he told the Committee that slapping a person would harden their resistance. (U) Despite the apparent instruction on physical pressures, MAJ Burney told the Army IG that instructors at Fort Bragg believed that the techniques used in SERE training should not be brought back for use at GTMO and that "interrogation tactics that rely on physical pressures or torture, while they do get you information, do not tend to get you accurate information or reliable information." [344] In a written statement provided to the Committee, MAJ Burney reiterated that point, stating that "[i]t was stressed time and time again that psychological investigations have proven that harsh interrogations do not work. At best it will get you information that a prisoner thinks you want to hear to make the interrogation stop, but that information is strongly likely to be false." [345] [Delete] [delete] During the Fort Bragg training, the GTMO personnel also discussed conditions at GTMO that they felt were hampering intelligence collection efforts. In his after action report summarizing the training, JPRA instructor and training Team Chief Joseph Witsch described some of those conditions stating for example that [big delete] [big delete] " [346] Mr. Witsch also stated in his after action report that "[a] lot of interrogation techniques used in the past are no longer effective against the individual detainees because they have developed an awareness and countermeasures to deal with them." [347] Mr. Witsch added that some of the interrogators had become "frustrated over the controls placed on their ability to extract actionable information," such as restrictions on bringing detainees together in a room to confront inconsistencies or on interrogating detainees for "12-15-20 hours at a time." [348] While Mr. Witsch noted that rapport building had proved to be the most effective interrogation technique in eliciting information and that the positive treatment of detainees at GTMO was having some effect, he stated that the positive effect appeared limited to the "younger, inexperienced" detainees." [349] [Delete] [delete] In his after action report, Mr. Witsch expressed concerns about JPRA involvement in GTMO operations, writing: I highly recommend we continue to remain in an advisory role and not get directly involved in the actual operations - GITMO in particular. We have no actual experience in real world prisoner handling. The concepts we are most familiar with relate to our past enemies and we have developed our Code of Conduct procedures based on those experiences. Without actual experience with current [Designated Unlawful Combatants] we are making the assumption that procedures we use to exploit our personnel will be effective against the current detainees. [350] [Delete] A week later, Mr. Witsch prepared a follow up memo for Mr. Wirts, JPRA's OSO chief, expressing concern about JPRA's involvement with detainee exploitation, stating: What do we bring to the table? We are Code of Conduct instructors with a vast amount of experience training highly intelligent, disciplined, and motivated DoD personnel to resist captivity... We base our role- play laboratories on what we know our former enemies have done to our personnel in captivity. It is based on illegal exploitation (under the rules listed in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War) of prisoners over the last 50 years... [Delete] [delete] Mr. Witsch continued: I believe the techniques and tactics that we use in training have applicability. What I am wrestling with is the implications of using these tactics as it relates to current legal constraints, the totally different motivations of the detainees, and the lack of direction of senior leadership within the [U.S. Government] on how to uniformly treat detainees. I think we are well within our sphere of influence if we stick to providing methods to counter resistance trained [Designated Unlawful Combatants]. We are out of our sphere when we begin to profess the proper ways to exploit these detainees. We are now attempting to educate lower level personnel in DoD and OGAs with concepts and principles that are somewhat foreign to them and while it all sounds good they are not in a position nor do they have the depth of knowledge in these matters to effect change and do it in reasonable safety. The handling of [Designated Unlawful Combatants] is a screwed up mess and everyone is scrambling to unscrew the mess ... If we want a more profound role in this effort we need to sell our capabilities to the top level people in the USG and not spend our time trying to motivate the operators at the lower levels to sway their bosses. This is running the train backwards and that is a slow method to get somewhere. There are a lot of people in the USG intelligence community that still believe in the old paradigm and wonder just what we're doing in their business. [351] [Delete] The memo concluded with the warning, "[w]e don't have an established track record in this type of activity and we would present an easy target for someone to point at as the problem. The stakes are much higher for this than what you and I have done in any activity before." [352] E. Delegation of Senior Government Lawyers Visits Guantanamo (U) (U) On September 25, 2002, less than a week after GTMO personnel returned from the training at Fort Bragg, Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the Vice President David Addington, DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes, Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo, Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division Michael Chertoff, and other senior administration officials travelled to Guantanamo Bay and were briefed on future plans for detention facilities as well as on intelligence successes, failures, and problems at the JTF. [353] [Delete] [delete] According to a trip report prepared by a Deputy Staff Judge Advocate at SOUTHCOM, MG Dunlavey held private conversations with Mr. Haynes and a few others and briefed the entire group on a number of issues including "policy constraints" affecting interrogations at the JTF. [354] For example, MG Dunlavey told the group that JTF-170 would "like to take Koran away from some detainees - hold it as incentive" but that the issue was undergoing a policy determination by SOUTHCOM. [355] The trip report noted that Mr. Haynes "opined that JTF-170 should have the authority in place to make those calls, per POTUS order," adding that he "[t]hought JTF-170 would have more freedom to command." [356] MG Dunlavey told the Committee that he may have told the group during their visit that JTF-170 was working on a request for authority to use additional interrogation techniques. [357] Mr. Haynes said he did not recall discussing specific interrogation techniques or GTMO's work on a request for authority to use additional interrogation techniques. [358] F. JTF-170 BSCT Produces Interrogation Policy Memo (U) (U) According to the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) at GTMO, LTC Diane Beaver, there was discussion among senior staff at GTMO as to whether or not the JTF required explicit authorization to use interrogation approaches that had not been taught to interrogators at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. While some felt that JTF- 170 already had the authority to use additional interrogation techniques, MG Dunlavey directed his staff to draft a request for new authorities to submit to SOUTHCOM for approval. [359] (U) The JTF-170 Director for Intelligence, LTC Jerald Phifer, told the Committee that MG Dunlavey wanted to get new techniques on the table and that MG Dunlavey pressured him to draft a memo requesting additional techniques. [360] LTC Phifer asked the BSCT to draft an interrogation policy that could be formally submitted up the chain of command for review. [361] According to MAJ Burney, the BSCT psychiatrist, "by early October there was increasing pressure to get 'tougher' with detainee interrogations but nobody was quite willing to define what 'tougher' meant." [362] MAJ Burney added that there was "a lot of pressure to use more coercive techniques" and that if the interrogation policy memo that LTC Phifer had asked him to write did not contain coercive techniques, then it "wasn't going to go very far." [363] (U) According to MAJ Burney, he and [delete] wrote a memo of suggested detention and interrogation policies in the course of an evening. [364] MAJ Burney told the Committee that some of the interrogation approaches identified in the memo came from their JPRA training in Fort Bragg and other approaches were simply made up by the BSCT. [365] [Delete] the BSCT psychologist, also told the Committee that the BSCT used information from the JPRA training at Fort Bragg to draft the memo. [366] [Delete] The BSCT memo, dated October 2, 2002, began: [Big delete] [Delete] The memo identified a number of conditions at GTMO that the BSCT judged to be hindering intelligence collection and stated: [Big delete] [Delete] The October 2, 2002 memo proposed three categories of interrogation techniques ''for use in the interrogation booth to develop rapport, promote cooperation, and counter resistance." [369] Category I techniques included incentives and "mildly adverse approaches" such as telling a detainee that he was going to be at GTMO forever unless he cooperated. [370] The memorandum stated that an interrogator should be able to ascertain whether a detainee is being cooperative by the end of the initial interrogation and said that if Category I approaches failed to induce cooperation, the interrogator could request approval for Category II approaches. [371] [Delete] Category II techniques were designed for 'high priority" detainees, defined in the memo as "any detainee suspected of having significant information relative to the security of the United States." [372] Category II techniques included stress positions; the use of isolation for up to 30 days (with the possibility of additional 30 day periods, if authorized by the Chief Interrogator); depriving a detainee of food for up to 12 hours (or as long as the interrogator goes without food during an interrogation); the use of back-to-back 20 hour interrogations once per week; removal of all comfort items including religious items; forced grooming; handcuffing a detainee; and placing a hood on a detainee during questioning or movement. [373] [Delete] The memo reserved Category III techniques "ONLY for detainees that have evidenced advanced resistance and are suspected of having significant information pertinent to national security." [374] Category III techniques included the daily use of 20 hour interrogations; the use of strict isolation without the right of visitation by treating medical professionals or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); the use of food restriction for 24 hours once a week; the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee he might experience a painful or fatal outcome; non-injurious physical consequences; removal of clothing; and exposure to cold weather or water until such time as the detainee began to shiver. [375] [Delete] In addition to suggesting interrogation techniques, the BSCT memo made recommendations for the treatment of detainees in the cell blocks. Specifically, it proposed that resistant detainees might be limited to four hours of sleep a day; that they be deprived of comfort items such as sheets, blankets, mattresses, washcloths; and that interrogators control access to all detainees' Korans. [376] The BSCT memo described using fans and generators to create white noise as a form of psychological pressure and advocated that "all aspects of the [detention] environment should enhance capture shock, dislocate expectations, foster dependence, and support exploitation to the fullest extent possible." [377] [Delete] [delete] MAJ Burney and [delete] told the Committee that they were not comfortable with the memo they were asked to produce, and therefore included a statement in the memo reflecting their concerns about the techniques, including concerns about the "long term physical and/or mental impact of the techniques." [378] They wrote: Experts in the field of interrogation indicate the most effective interrogation strategy is a rapport-building approach. Interrogation techniques that rely on physical or adverse consequences are likely to garner inaccurate information and create an increased level of resistance...There is no evidence that the level of fear or discomfort evoked by a given technique has any consistent correlation to the volume or quality of information obtained... The interrogation tools outlined could affect the short term and/or long term physical and/or mental health of the detainee. Physical and/or emotional harm from the above techniques may emerge months or even years after their use. It is impossible to determine if a particular strategy will cause irreversible harm if employed ... Individuals employing Category II or Category III interrogation techniques must be thoroughly trained ... carefully selected, to include a mental health screening (such screenings are SOP for SERE and other Special Operations personnel). [379] (U) The BSCT provided a copy of their memo to LTC Banks at U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), who had helped organize their JPRA training. Upon reviewing the memo, LTC Banks praised the BSCT for their "great job" on the memo, but also raised concerns about the suggested use of physical pressures in interrogation, noting that physical pressures are used with students in SERE school to increase their resistance to interrogation, not break it down. [380] (U) LTC Banks wrote: [Delete] [delete] The use of physical pressures brings with it a large number of potential negative side effects... When individuals are gradually exposed to increasing levels of discomfort, it is more common for them to resist harder. That is one of the reasons we use it [in SERE school] - to increase the resistance posture of our soldiers. If individuals are put under enough discomfort, i.e. pain, they will eventually do whatever it takes to stop the pain. This will increase the amount of information they tell the interrogator, but it does not mean the information is accurate. In fact, it usually decreases the reliability of the information because the person will say whatever he believes will stop the pain. Now, there are certain exceptions, like with all generalizations, but they are not common. Bottom line: The likelihood that the use of physical pressures will increase the delivery of accurate information from a detainee is very low. The likelihood that the use of physical pressures will increase the level of resistance in a detainee is very high... [Delete] [delete] It is important to remember that SERE instructors use these techniques [physical pressures] because they are effective at increasing resistance ... Because of the danger involved, very few SERE instructors are allowed to actually use physical pressures ... everything that is occurring [in SERE school] is very carefully monitored and paced... Even with all these safeguards, injuries and accidents do happen. The risk with real detainees is increased exponentially. (U) My strong recommendation is that you do not use physical pressures ... [If GTMO does decide to use them] you are taking a substantial risk, with very limited potential benefit. [381] G. CIA Lawyer Advises GTMO on Interrogations (U) (U) On October 2, 2002, the GTMO Staff Judge Advocate LTC Diane Beaver convened a meeting to discuss the BSCT memo. Minutes from that meeting reflect the attendance of JTF- 170 personnel and the then-chief counsel to the CIA's CounterTerrorist Center Jonathan Fredman. [382] (U) Mr. Fredman's visit took place just a week after the acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo and DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes's September 25, 2002 visit to GTMO. Mr. Haynes did not recall discussing with Mr. Rizzo during their visit the possibility of having a CIA lawyer travel to GTMO to talk to DoD personnel there. [383] Mr. Haynes said he later found out in a discussion with Mr. Rizzo that a CIA lawyer had gone to GTMO and discussed legal authorities applicable to interrogations, but said he could not recall when he first learned of that CIA lawyer's visit. (U) While LTC Beaver could not recall what she or others said, the minutes of the October 2, 2002 meeting indicate that it began with a briefing by the BSCT on the JPRA training at Fort Bragg. [384] The BSCT briefer told the group that rapport building and the "friendly approach" were proven methods to overcome resistance, while "fear based approaches" were ''unreliable'' and "ineffective in almost all cases." [385] According to the meeting minutes, however, the BSCT did report that psychological stressors such as sleep deprivation, withholding food, isolation, and loss of time were "extremely effective." [386] The BSCT also identified "campwide, environmental strategies designed to disrupt cohesion and communication among detainees" as potentially helpful to improve the effectiveness of interrogations and explained that the detention "environment should foster dependence and compliance." [387] (U) Despite the BSCT comment on the effectiveness of rapport building, the meeting minutes reflect little discussion of that approach. In fact, according to the meeting minutes, the GTMO Director for Intelligence LTC Jerald Phifer questioned the BSCT assessment, stating that "harsh techniques used on our service members have worked and will work on some, what about those?" [388] [Delete] responded that force was "risky, and may be ineffective." [389] Nevertheless, the remainder of the meeting appears to have revolved around a discussion of aggressive interrogation techniques and how to obtain the approval to use them. (U) Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief David Becker noted at the meeting that there were many reports about sleep deprivation used at Bagram in Afghanistan. [390] According to the meeting minutes, LTC Beaver agreed but stated that "officially it is not happening." [391] Nevertheless, LTC Beaver suggested that sleep deprivation could be used on GTMO detainees ''with approval." [392] The group also discussed ways to manage the detainees' sleep cycles, i.e., by letting the detainee rest ''just long enough to fall asleep and wake him up about every thirty minutes and tell him it's time to pray again." [393] (U) According to the meeting minutes, LTC Beaver suggested that the JTF might "need to curb the harsher operations while [the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)] is around," and that it would be "better not to expose them to any controversial techniques." [394] LTC Beaver explained that "[t]he ICRC is a serious concern. They will be in and out, scrutinizing our operations, unless they are displeased and decide to protest and leave. This would draw a lot of negative attention." [395] The minutes reflect that the CIA lawyer added his view: In the past when the ICRC has made a big deal about certain detainees, the DOD has 'moved' them away from the attention of the ICRC. Upon questioning from the ICRC about their whereabouts, the DOD's response has repeatedly been that the detainee merited no status under the Geneva Convention. [396] (U) At the meeting, the minutes reflect that CIA lawyer Jonathan Fredman also discussed whether or not the techniques in the BSCT memo complied with applicable legal standards. Mr. Fredman explained: Under the Torture Convention, torture has been prohibited by international law, but the language of the statutes is written vaguely. Severe mental and physical pain is prohibited. The mental part is explained as poorly as the physical. Severe physical pain [is] described as anything causing permanent damage to major organs or body parts. Mental torture [is] described as anything leading to permanent, profound damage to the senses or personality. It is basically subject to perception. If the detainee dies you're doing it wrong. So far the techniques we have addressed have not proven to produce these types of results, which in a way challenges what the BSCT paper says about not being able to prove whether these techniques will lead to permanent damage. Everything in the BSCT [memo] is legal from a civilian standpoint. [397] (U) According to the minutes, when the participants of the meeting discussed whether or not to videotape the "aggressive sessions or interrogations," Mr. Fredman said that videotaping of "even totally legal techniques will look 'ugly.'" [398] Mr. Becker, who agreed with the CIA lawyer's assessment, added that "videotapes are subject to too much scrutiny in court." [399] (U) When an attendee at the meeting mentioned that law enforcement agents (presumably referring to CITF and FBI) had concerns about the use of aggressive tactics, the minutes reflect that Mr. Fredman responded that "[w]hen CIA has wanted to use more aggressive techniques in the past, the FBI has pulled their personnel from theatre. In those rare instances, aggressive techniques have proven very helpful." [400] LTC Beaver added that there was no legal reason why law enforcement personnel could not participate in those operations. [401] (U) While LTC Beaver testified in 2008 that she was aware that SERE training was not designed for offensive use with detainees, the minutes of the October 2, 2002 meeting reflect that she nevertheless asked about use of the "wet towel" technique in SERE school. [402] The CIA lawyer replied: If a well-trained individual is used to perform this technique it can feel like you're drowning. The lymphatic system will react as if you're suffocating, but your body will not cease to function. It is very effective to identify phobias and use them (i.e., insects, snakes, claustrophobia). The level of resistance is directly related to person's experience. [403] (U) According to the meeting minutes, ICE Chief David Becker asked whether GTMO could get blanket approval for the use of techniques or whether techniques would be approved on a case-by-case basis. [404] Mr. Fredman responded that the "CIA makes the call internally on most of the techniques found in the BSCT" memo and referenced in their meeting, but that "significantly harsh techniques are approved through the DOJ." [405] As to whether Geneva Conventions would apply, Mr. Fredman noted that the "CIA rallied for it not to." [406] (U) The meeting minutes also reflect Mr. Fredman thoughts on other interrogation techniques, such as threats of death. Mr. Fredman noted that such threats "should be handled on a case by case basis. Mock executions don't work as well as friendly approaches, like letting someone write a letter home, or providing them with an extra book." [407] (U) Weeks later, CITF Deputy Commander Mark Fallon wrote an email to CITF's Chief Legal Counsel Major Sam McCahon regarding the meeting minutes: Quotes from LTC Beaver regarding things that are not being reported give the appearance of impropriety. Other comments like "It is basically subject to perception. If the detainee dies you're doing it wrong" and "Any of the techniques that lie on the harshest end of the spectrum must be performed by a highly trained individual. Medical personnel should be present to treat any possible accidents." Seem to stretch beyond the bounds of legal propriety. Talk of "wet towel treatment" which results in the lymphatic gland reacting as if you are suffocating, would in my opinion; shock the conscience of any legal body looking at using the results of the interrogations or possibly even the interrogators. Someone needs to be considering how history will look back at this. [408] [Delete] The October 2, 2002 meeting minutes indicated that the group discussed Mohammed al Khatani, a high value detainee suspected of being connected to the September 11, 2001 attacks. A week before the meeting, JTF-170 had assumed the lead on Khatani's interrogation. [409] By the October 2, 2002 meeting, JTF-170 had already developed an aggressive interrogation plan for Khatani. [Delete] Two days after the meeting, BSCT psychiatrist MAJ Paul Burney sent an email to LTC Banks, stating that "persons here at this operation are still interested in pursuing the potential use of more aversive interrogation techniques ... Were more aversive techniques approved for use in the future by appropriate people, the operation would like to have a few task force personnel specifically trained in various techniques." [410] MAJ Burney asked whether LTC Banks knew "where task force personnel could go to receive such training" and whether he knew of "any consultants who could assist if any of these measures are eventually approved." [411] [Delete] LTC Banks replied "I do not envy you. I suspect I know where this is coming from. The answer is no, I do not know of anyone who could provide that training... The training that SERE instructors receive is designed to simulate that of a foreign power, and to do so in a manner that encourages resistance among the students. I do not believe that training interrogators to use what SERE instructors use would be particularly productive." [412] H. DoD Takes Lead on the Interrogation of Mohammed al Khatani (U) [Delete] [delete] According to the Department of Defense, Pakistani authorities captured Mohammed al Khatani along the Pakistani-Afghanistan border on December 15, 2001 and turned him over to U.S. forces on December 26, 2001. [413] He was transferred to Guantanamo Bay on February 13, 2002, where he was initially interrogated by JTF-170, CITF and FBI personnel at Camp X-Ray. [Delete] [delete] In the summer of 2002, Khatani was identified as a possible "twentieth hijacker" of the September 11 attacks. [414] From July 27, 2002 until September 19, 2002, Khatani was questioned by the FBI. [415] During this period, Khatani was held at the recently built Camp Delta until August 8, 2002 when he was transferred to the Naval Brig at Guantanamo Bay. [416] While he was in FBI custody, JTF-170 began drafting an interrogation plan for Khatani. (U) On September 23, 2002, the CITF Special Agent in Charge sent a memorandum to CITF's Deputy Commander raising concerns about JTF-170's proposed interrogation plan for Khatani. The memo stated: DoD Intelligence personnel contacted FBI [Supervisory Special Agent] in order to conduct an interview of a detainee assigned to the FBI. The DoD personnel indicated that they intend to employ the following interrogation techniques: drive the hooded detainee around the island to disorient him, disrobe him to his underwear, have an interrogator with an Egyptian accent (it is known among the detainees that Egyptians are aggressive interrogators and commonly use coercion, to include maiming) ... As a law enforcement agency, CITF is clearly prohibited from participating in these techniques and we also do not want to turn a deaf ear when we learn of these issues... [417] [Big delete] [Big delete] [Big delete] (U) While MG Dunlavey's memo stated that the request had "been reviewed by my Staff Judge Advocate and determined to be legally sufficient," the SJA, LTC Diane Beaver, told the Committee that she had not been consulted on the interrogation plan and did not recall reviewing the memo or providing the Commander with guidance regarding the legal sufficiency of the request. [425] Major General Dunlavey said that he did not recall whether or not he personally consulted with LTC Beaver, that the letter would likely have been drafted by his Director for Intelligence, LTC Jerald Phifer, and that it was possible that the statement in the letter that LTC Beaver had been consulted was based on a representation by his staff. [426] [Delete] From October 2 until October 10, 2002, ITF-170 personnel interrogated Khatani. According to multiple witness accounts, on or about October 5, 2002, military working dogs were brought into the room where Khatani was being interrogated. [427] A summarized statement of testimony provided by one of the FBI agents present at the time indicated that the FBI objected to the use of dogs and raised those objections to Mr. Becker, the ITF-170 ICE Chief. [428] In testimony to the Army IG, Mr. Becker acknowledged that he permitted the military working dog to enter the interrogation in order to raise the detainee's stress level. [429] [Delete] Mr. Becker told the Committee that he had authorized dogs entering the interrogation room on two occasions and that the dog barked but was not permitted to place its paws on Khatani. [430] Mr. Becker also told the Committee that LTC Phifer provided verbal authority for the dogs to be used in this manner. LTC Phifer recalled discussing dogs with Mr. Becker as a technique because Arabs "saw dogs as a dirty animal and they didn't like them," not because they should be "used as a fear factor." [431] LTC Phifer told the Army IG, however, that Mr. Becker never told him that he had approved the use of a dog during the Khatani interrogation. However, in written answers to questions posed by Vice Admiral Church, LTC Phifer stated that dogs were used in the Khatani interrogation and that " w]e would bring the dog around to within 10 feet [of Khatani] and he would be somewhat unnerved by it. We did it to keep him off balance as well as to enhance security." [432] Major General Dunlavey said that he did not recall being aware that a dog was used in the interrogation of Khatani. [433] [Delete] [delete] In an October 8, 2002 email to his colleague, an FBI agent described JTF- 170's interrogation of Khatani, stating that DoD had tried "sleep deprivation," "loud music, bright lights, and 'body placement discomfort,' all with negative results" and that DoD interrogators planned to stop the interrogation. [434] Mr. Becker told the Committee that the interrogation plan did not work and that JTF-170 ceased the interrogation after approximately a week and moved Khatani back to the Navy brig. [435] (U) Another FBI agent reflected upon the failed interrogation in his own email of October 8, 2002, observing that "I think we should consider leaving him alone, let him get healthy again and do something different." [436] _______________ Notes: 271. Ibid. 272. Memo from JPRA/CC (Col Randy Moulton) to JPRA J3/J7/PRA, [delete] Support to [delete] / Project 22B (August 13, 2002) at 1. 273. Ibid. 274. Committee staff interview of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007); Committee staff interview of [delete] (September 12, 2007). 275. Written statement of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007). 276. Committee staff interview of MG Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007). 277. [Delete] A standard operating procedure was drafted in November 2002, several months after the BSCT was established. It described BSCT tasks including: consulting on interrogation approach techniques, conducting detainee file reviews to construct personality profiles and provide recommendations for interrogation strategies; observing interrogations and providing feedback to interrogators on detainee behavior, flow of the interrogation process, translator and cultural issues and possible strategies for further interrogation; and providing consultation/training on specific behavioral science interviewing and observational techniques that promote productive interrogation. The November SOP also stated that the BSCT "does not conduct medical evaluation or treatment of detainees and does not participate in determining medical treatment protocols for detainees." While the Committee does not know whether the SOP was ever approved, it comports with what BSCT members told the Committee about their activities. JTF GTMO-BSCT Memorandum for Record, BSCT Standard Operating Procedures (November 11, 2002); Committee staff interview of [delete] (September 12, 2007); Committee staff interview of Paul Burney (August 21, 2007). 278. Written statement of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007). 279. Committee staff interview of [delete] (September 12, 2007). 280. Committee staff interview of LTC Morgan Banks (July 2, 2007). 281. Ibid. 282. Email from LTC Morgan Banks to MAJ Paul Burney (July 15, 2002). 283. Committee staff interview of [Delete] (September 12, 2007); Committee staff interview of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007). 284. Army IG, Interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (March 16, 2006) at 8; Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 14. 285. SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008). 286. Written statement of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007) at 4. 287. Committee staff interview of [delete] (September 12, 2007); Committee staff interview of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007). 288. Committee staff interview of Christopher Wirts (January 4, 2008). 289. Committee staff interview of LTC Morgan Banks (July 2, 2007). 290. Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 6; Committee staff interview of [delete] (September 12, 2007). 291. Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 6. 292. The ICE Chief told the Committee that interrogators identified only "a couple of nebulous links." Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007). 293. Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007); Committee staff interview of [delete] (September 12, 2007). 294. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007). 295. [delete] JTF-170 J2 Interrogation Section Standard Operating Procedures (August 20, 2002) (emphasis in original) (Detainees being interrogated will "remain seated and secured to the floor. DETAINEES WILL NOT BE PLACED IN STRESS POSITIONS"); see also Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007). 296. Committee staff interview of MG Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007). 297. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007). 298. Ibid. 299. Committee staff interview of MG Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007). 300. [Delete] COL John Custer, [delete] CJCS External Review of Guantanamo Bay Intelligence Operations (U) (September 2002) (hereinafter "Custer Report"); see also Briefing Slides, GTMO Review: Joint Staff External Review of Intelligence Operations at Guantanamo Bay. Cuba (September 10, 2002). 301. Custer's team included subject matter experts from Fort Huachuca, the Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense. 302. With respect to personnel, Custer cited a dearth of linguists, noted a lack of cultural training among interrogators, and called the entire mission "woefully undermanned." Custer Report at 2. 303. Ibid. at 11. 304. Ibid. at 12. 305. Ibid. 11-12. 306. Ibid. at 2. 307. Committee staff interviews of MAJ Sam McCahon (June 15, 2007); COL Britt Mallow (May 7, 2007); Timothy James (May 18, 2007). 308. Responses of COL Britt Mallow to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (September 15, 2006). Two other witnesses also told the Committee that the term "Battle Lab" was used by Major General Dunlavey to describe GTMO operations. Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007); Committee staff interview of Tim James (May 18, 2007). 309. Responses of Mark Fallon to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (November 15, 2006). 310. Ibid. 311. Committee staff interview of MG Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007). 312. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 5, 2007). 313. Memo from Joseph Witsch to Col Randy Moulton, Col John Atkins, Lt Col Baumgartner and Christopher Wirts, [Delete] USASOC Requirement to Provide Exploitation Instruction in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (September 24, 2002) (hereinafter "USASOC Requirement to Provide Exploitation Instruction (September 24, 2002)"). 314. JPRA to USCINCSOC, Request JPRA Support, DTG: 052135ZSEP02 (September 5, 2002). 315. [Delete] Memo from Joseph Witsch to Col Randy Moulton and Christopher Wirts, Exploitation Training for [delete] [delete] Officers (July 16, 2002); Committee staff interview of Dr. Gary-Percival (July 25, 2007). 316. Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 79. 317. Email from Christopher Wirts to JPRA Staff (August 8, 2002). 318. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2007) at 14; Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 25. 319. Memorandum from Joseph Witsch to JPRNCC, JPRNCD, JPRNCOS, JPRNOSO, Plan of Instruction (POI) for USASOC Training Support (U) (August 28, 2002). 320. [Delete] Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Exploitation of Captive, presentation to GTMO personnel at Fort Bragg (September 2002) (hereinafter "JPRA, Exploitation of Captive"). 321. Ibid. at 4. 322. Compare JPRA, Exploitation of Captive with JPRA, Exploitation Draft Plan. 323. JPRA, Exploitation of Captive. 324. Hearing to Receive Information Relating To The Treatment of Detainees, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 110th Cong. (September 6, 2007) (Testimony of Joseph Witsch) at 12, 34 (hereinafter "Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2007)"). 325. JPRA, Exploitation of Captive. 326. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2007) at 16. 327. JPRA, Exploitation of Captive. 328. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2007) at 18. 329. Ibid. at 25. 330. JPRA, Counter Measures to Defeat al-Qa'ida Resistance, presentation to GTMO personnel at Fort Bragg (September 2002) (hereinafter "JPRA, Counter Measures to Defeat al-Qa'ida Resistance"). 331. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2007) at 26. 332. Ibid. at 27. 333. JPRA, Counter Measures to Defeat al-Qa'ida Resistance. 334. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2007) at 30. 335. Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 14. 336. Committee staff interview of GTMO Interrogator (November 6, 2007). 337. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2007) at 92. 338. Committee staff interview of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007). 339 Committee staff interview of (September 12, 2007). 340. Committee staff interview of GTMO Interrogator (November 6, 2007). 341. Ibid. 342. LTC Banks added that he was not present for all of the training sessions. Committee staff interview of LTC Morgan Banks (June 15, 2007); Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3,2007) at 79; Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2007) at 99. 343. Committee staff interview of LTC Morgan Banks (June 15, 2007). 344. Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 8. 345. Written statement of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007). 346. Memo from Joseph Witsch to Col Moulton, Col Atkins, Lt Col Baumgartner, Mr. Wirts, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Requirement to Provide Exploitation Instruction (September 24, 2002). 347. Ibid. 348. Ibid. 349. Ibid. 350. Ibid. 351. [Delete] Memo from Joseph Witsch to Christopher Wirts, (U) Concerns with JPRA Involvement in Operation Enduring Freedom Exploitation o/Detained Unlawful Combatants (October 1, 2002). 352. Ibid. 353. JTF-GTMO Distinguished Visitors Roster (September 27, 2002). Col Terrence Farrell, Trip Report - DoD General Counsel Visit to GTMO (September 27, 2002). While the September 27, 2002 trip report states that the visit occurred on September 25th, Jack Goldsmith, another senior official on the trip, recounts that the visit took place on September 26, 2002. Goldsmith notes that Patrick Philbin. then-Chertoff Chief of Staff Alice Fisher, and "several Pentagon lawyers" also went on the trip. The Terror Presidency at 99-100. 354. Col. Terrence Farrell, Trip Report - DoD General Counsel Visit to GTMO (September 27,2002). 355. Ibid. 356. Ibid. 357. Committee staff interview of MG Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007). 358. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 139-42. 359. Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2007). 360. Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007). 361. Written statement of MN Paul Burney (August 21, 2007). 362. Ibid. 363. Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 11. 364. Ibid. 365. Committee staff interview of MN Paul Burney (August 21, 2007). However, in testimony to the Army IG, MAJ Burney said he did not know whether the memo incorporated tactics from the Fort Bragg training. Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 11. 366. Committee staff interview of [delete] (September 12, 2007). 367. [Delete] MAJ Paul Burney and [delete] Memorandum for Record, Counter-resistance Strategies (October 2, 2002) at 1 (hereinafter "BSCT, Counter-resistance Strategies"). 368. Ibid. at 2. 369. Ibid. 370. Ibid. 371. Ibid. 312. Ibid. 373. Ibid. at 2-3. There is evidence that stress positions were used at GTMO prior to the BSCT memo. Lt. Col. Ronald Buikema, who served at Guantanamo from January 2001 until June 2001 as the JTF-170 J2 and Commanding Officer of the Joint Interagency Interrogation Facility (JIIF) indicated in his response to a Navy IG questionnaire that stress positions were used in some interrogations at GTMO. Email from Lt. Col. Ron Buikema to Victoria Gnibus (July 21, 2004). 374. BSCT, Counter-resistance Strategies at 3 (emphasis in original). 375. Ibid. 376. Ibid. at 4. 377. Ibid. at 4-5. 378. Committee staff interview of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007); Committee staff interview of [delete] (September 13, 2007). 379. BSCT, Counter-resistance Strategies at 6. 380. Email from LTC Morgan Banks to MAJ Paul Burney and [delete] (October 2, 2002). 381. Ibid. 382. Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 2. The meeting minutes stated that questions and comments from the meeting were paraphrased. 383. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 145-47. 384. SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008); Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 3. 385. Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 3. 386. Ibid. 387. Ibid. 388. Ibid. 389. Ibid. at 2. 390. Ibid 391. Ibid. at 3. It is unclear how and when JTF-170 personnel became aware of the use of sleep deprivation at Bagram, though LTC Beaver told the Committee that she had seen a version of a standard operating procedure for interrogations in use at Bagram on a classified DoD internet system. 392. Ibid. 393. Ibid. at 5. 394. Ibid. at 3. 395. Ibid. 396. Ibid. 397. According to the meeting minutes, the CIA lawyer added "The Torture Convention prohibits torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment. The US did not sign up to the second part, because of the 8th amendment ... That gives us more license to use more controversial techniques." Ibid. 398. Ibid. at 5. 399. Ibid. at 3. 400. Ibid. 401. Ibid. 402. SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008); BSCT, Counter-resistance Strategies at 4. 403. 11 CounterResistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 4. LTC Beaver said that she had learned about the wet towel technique from a Navy doctor who had been assigned to the Hospital at Guantanamo and who described to her its use at the Navy SERE school. It is unclear, however, to whom LTC Beaver is referring. The Committee interviewed a Navy Lieutenant Commander who was deployed to GTMO and who had previously worked at the Navy SERE school at the Naval Air Station in Brunswick, Maine. The Lieutenant Commander told the Committee that he discussed with JTF-GTMO staff physical pressures used to teach students at SERE school how to resist interrogations. However, the Lieutenant Commander was not deployed to GTMO until November 2002. Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (October 11, 2007); see Committee staff interview of (August 22, 2007); Travel voucher. 404. Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 4. 405. Ibid. 406. Ibid. 407. Ibid. at 3. 408. Email from Mark Fallon to MAJ Sam McCahon et al. (October 28, 2002). 409. [Delete] LTG Joseph Inge, DEPSECDEF Inquiry Regarding Location of Interrogation Plan for ISN 063 (August 24, 2006) at 5 (hereinafter "Inge Report''). 410. Email from MAJ Paul Burney to LTC Morgan Banks (October 4, 2002). 411. Ibid. 412. Email from LTC Morgan Banks to MAJ Paul Burney (October 4, 2002). 413. Memo from COL John Hadis (JTF-GTMO Chief of Staff to SOUTHCOM Chief of Staff (March 14, 2005), attached as Tab 1 to Inge Report (August 24, 2006). 414. Khatani was identified as a possible twentieth highjacker after it was determined that he had tried to enter the U.S. in August 2001 but was detained at the Orlando, Florida airport and later deported. When Khatani arrived at the Orlando airport. Mohammed .Atta was waiting. JTF-GTMO, Analyst Support Summary (March 18, 2003), attached as Tab 22 to Inge Report (August 24, 2006). 415. Inge Report at 5. 416. Memo from COL John Redis (JTF-GTMO Chief of Staff to SOUTHCOM Chief of Staff (March 14, 2005), attached as Tab 1 to Inge Report (August 24, 2006); Inge Report at 5. 417. Memo from J. K. Sieber (CITF SAC) to CITF Deputy Commander, CITF Operations Officer, CITF SJA, DOD Interrogation Techniques Issue (September 23, 2002). 418. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007). 419. The memo was provided to the Committee as an appendix to the AR-15-6 Report completed by Lieutenant General Randall Schmidt and Brigadier General John T. Furlow into FBI allegations of abuse at Guantanamo Bay (hereinafter "Schmidt-Furlow Report''). The memo is unsigned but contains a handwritten notation "////signed on 1 Oct 02////." Committee staff requested the Department of Defense provide a signed copy or advise the Committee of any reason why the Committee should not rely on the document. The Department provided neither. 420. Memo from MG Michael Dunlavey to JTF-160 Commander, Interrogation Plan for ISN 063 (October 1, 2002), attached as exhibit 40 to Schmidt-Furlow Report. 421. Ibid. 422. Ibid. 423. Ibid. 424. Ibid. 425. Ibid.; Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (October 11, 2007); see also Memo from J. K. Sieber (CITF SAC) to CITF Deputy Commander, CITF Operations Officer, CITF SJA, DOD Interrogation Techniques Issue (September 23, 2002) ("the JTF 170 SJA had not been briefed on the plan prior to her contact with the FBI SSA. When she learned of the plan, she sought guidance from up her chain of command and also sought guidance from DOD legal and other intelligence agencies. She wants to ensure that even if these techniques are not legally objectionable, her chain of command is aware that these types of techniques are being utilized and that the personnel on the ground are properly trained to conduct these techniques.") 426. Committee staff interview of MG Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007). 427. Summarized witness statement of David Becker (March 3, 2005), exhibit 21 to Schmidt-Furlow Report; summarized witness statement of ENS Mary Travers (February 23, 2005), exhibit 33 to Schmidt-Furlow Report; summarized witness statement of Agent Robert Morton (January 20, 2005), exhibit 36 to Schmidt-Furlow Report; summarized witness statement of Agent Charles Dorsey (January 20, 2005), exhibit 41 to Schmidt-Furlow Report. 428. Summarized witness statement of Agent Charles Dorsey (January 20, 2005), exhibit 41 to Schmidt-Furlow Report. 429. Army IG, Interview of David Becker (September 20, 2005) at 30. 430. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007). 431. Army IG, Interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (March 16, 2006) at 13. 432. Responses of LTC Jerald Phifer to questionnaire of VADM Church (July 16, 2004). It is not clear from those written answers whether LTC Phifer was referring to the use of dogs in JTF-170's October 2002 interrogation of Khatani or in the subsequent interrogation of Khatani that began in late November. 433. Committee staff interview of Major General Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007). 434. Email from FBI Special Agent to FBI Special Agent (October 8, 2002). 435. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007). 436. Email from FBI Special Agent to FBI Special Agent (October 8, 2002).
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