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INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY-- REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, UNITED STATES SENATE |
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XI. Development of Interrogation Policy in Afghanistan (U) [Delete] After the start of Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001, [big delete] deployed a Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) to Afghanistan with a mission [big delete] [1150] While SMU TF operators conducted a limited amount of direct questioning, or, "screening" of detainees while on the battlefield, it appears that they did not conduct interrogations until at least October 2002. (U) Prior to that point, SMU personnel had observed interrogations conducted by Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180), which had assumed control of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan at the end of May 2002. [1151] In addition to tactical questioning and screening on the battlefield, CJTF-180 personnel conducted more thorough interrogations at detention facilities at Kandahar and Bagram. Between October 2001 and January 2003, the only written guidance for interrogators operating in Afghanistan appears to have been Army Field Manual 34-52. There were no Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), however, to guide the implementation of the doctrine outlined in the Field Manual. [Delete] In fall 2002 the SMU conducted assessments of interrogation operations at GTMO and [delete] at Bagram Airfield. Those assessments generated discussion about whether the SMU TF should conduct its own interrogations, separate and apart from CJTF-180, and which interrogation techniques should be permitted. A. Assessment Team Visit to Guantanamo Bay (U) [Delete] [delete] From October 8 through October 10, 2002, an SMU TF assessment team from Afghanistan visited JTF-170 at Guantanamo Bay. [1152] The visit occurred just as JTF-170 personnel at GTMO were finalizing a request, submitted to SOUTHCOM on October 11, 2002, to use interrogation techniques including stress positions, removal of clothing, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, hooding, use of detainee phobias such as dogs, exposure to cold weather or water, and non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking and pushing. [1153] [Delete] [delete] A trip report prepared by the SMU TF assessment team, dated October 11, 2002, summarized the visit to GTMO. The report stated that the SMU TF team met with members of the JTF-170 Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT). [1154] Members of the BSCT had recently attended training conducted by SERE instructors from JPRA and in the week prior to the SMU TF team's visit, two of them had written the first draft of GTMO's request for new interrogation authorities. [1155] [Delete] [delete] According to the SMU TF assessment team's trip report, GTMO "interrogation team psychologists" discussed interrogation approaches, including use of "religious oriented superstitions, varied schedules, shame, various disruptions of daily routines, and using ethnic interrogators." [1156] The SMU team's trip report also suggested that the team discussed with the JTF-170 Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief David Becker, the need for interrogators to have "SERE instructors' training for legal aspects of prisoner handling" and stated that a "JPRA [Mobile Training Team] appears to be the best option" for the training. [1157] [Delete] [delete] On October 26, 2002, after the SMU TF assessment team returned to Afghanistan, a proposal was briefed to the SMU Commander. [1158] [Big delete]. [1159] The briefing stated that [big delete] with detainees, that "current interrogation methods are not producing actionable intelligence," and that "mainstream interrogation [tactics, techniques, and procedures] have limited success against [at Qa'ida] resistance techniques." [1160] The briefing proposed new interrogation techniques such as the use of strip searches for "degradation;" hoods for "sensory deprivation;" "sensory overload" through lights, darkness, noises, and dogs; and manipulation of the detainees' environment through "cold, heat, wet, discomfort, etc..." [1161] Stripping detainees, the use of hoods, the use of dogs, and environmental manipulation were among the interrogation techniques requested by GTMO. [1162] [Delete] A memo entitled "Detainee Operations," dated October 27, 2002 (the day after the SMU TF proposal was briefed), described the SMU team's visit to GTMO as well as the team's assessment of interrogation operations at Bagram. [1163] With respect to operations at GTMO, the memo stated that "Due to a lack of effective national-level guidance, the GTMO staff is analogous to a weak set of parents unsure of their role and parental skills who get manipulated by clever and strong-willed children." [1164] The memo stated that the SMU TF team "assisted the [GTMO] staff in seeking advice and training from the JPRA staff regarding effective interrogation techniques." [1165] [Delete] The October 27, 2002 memo described some interrogators at Bagram as "outmatched" and stated that the SMU TF team's observations of both GTMO and Bagram led to the conclusion that [big delete]. [1166] [Delete] The October 27, 2002 memo also outlined a rationale for the SMU to conduct its own interrogations. [Big delete]. [1167] The memo recommended the "imaginative but legal use of non-lethal psychological techniques (i.e., battlefield noises/chaos, barking dogs, etc.)" as well as stress techniques such as "sensory deprivation (hoods, silence, flex cuffs), sensory overload (shouting, gun shots, white noise, machinery noise) and manipulation of the environment (hot, cold, wet. windy, hard surfaces)." [1168] [Delete] A slide presentation dated the following week, described a concept of operations (CONOP) for SMU TF detainee exploitation. [1169] [Big delete]." [1170] The presentation argued that actionable intelligence might be produced ''via psychological/physical stress" and listed "sensory deprivation," "sensory overload - lights darkness, noises, and dogs," "environment - cold, heat, wet and discomfort" and "psychological deception leading to learned helplessness and increase compliance." [1171] [Delete] The SMU TF also developed a "Decision Briefing" with the goal of gaining the CJTF-180 Commanding General LTG Dan McNeil's approval for the SMU TF to construct and operate its own interrogation facility for high value detainees co-located at the Bagram Collection Point. [1172] The briefing stated that CJTF-180 was focused on the detention mission rather than the interrogation mission, that "no advanced interrogation techniques" including "sensory deprivation/overload, sleep deprivation, psychological manipulation" were employed by CJTF-180, and that current procedures were having only "limited success[es]. [1173] [Delete] While the SMU briefing noted that "advanced interrogation techniques" were not in use at Bagram prior to November 2002, Army investigations into the deaths of two detainees at Bagram in early December revealed that, by early December 2002, at least one of the techniques, sleep deprivation, was apparently in wide use there. B. The Deaths of Dilawar and Habibullah (U) (U/ [delete] In December 2002, two detainees were killed while detained by CJTF-180 at Bagram. Though the techniques do not appear to have been included in any written interrogation policy at Bagram, Army investigators concluded that the use of stress positions and sleep deprivation combined with other mistreatment at the hands of Bagram personnel, caused or were direct contributing factors in the two homicides. [1174] In the wake of the deaths of Habibullah and Dilawar, CJTF-180 and the SMU TF began developing written standard operating procedures (SOPs) for interrogations. C. Questions Raised About Task Force Participation in OGA Interrogations (U) [Delete] November 1, 2002, a month before the two detainee deaths at Bagram, the SMU TF Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) analyzed legal authorities and constraints relevant to SMU TF personnel's participation in interrogations [Big delete]. [1175] The SJA's analysis is reflected in a memo which was provided to the Committee in redacted form. Although the particular interrogation techniques in use [delete] were redacted from the version of the memo shared with the Committee, unredacted portions of that memo discuss the SMU TF's concerns about those techniques. [1176] [Delete] Although the memo stated that while, in the author's opinion, "none of the interrogation techniques used or observed by [redacted] personnel constitutes 'torture,'" it also stated that "another observer might disagree." [1177] In addition, the memo stated that one of the [redacted] [delete] techniques "could rise to the level of torture if applied in such a way and for such a period of time that it rises to the level of severe physical pain or suffering." [1178] It also said that "although the interrogation techniques may not constitute 'torture' they may rise to the level of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment proscribed by international law." [1179] [Delete] The November 1, 2002 memo assessed the risks that SMU personnel might face by participating in interrogations [big delete], particularly if there is media scrutiny." [1180] The memo referenced applicable DoD policies and Department of the Army (DA) regulations requiring the humane treatment of detainees and noted that although they might not apply to [delete] operating in a non-DoD facility, "U.S. military personnel remain subject to those authorities if [military personnel] participate in or run the interrogations." [1181] According to the memo, "these requirements arguably extend to military personnel even if 'detailed' to [delete]." [1182] [Delete] The memo warned that "we are at risk as we get more 'creative' and stray from standard interrogation techniques and procedures taught at DoD and DA schools and detailed in official interrogation manuals." [1183] [Delete] In a June 18, 2004 memorandum to the Naval Inspector General, [Big delete] said that after the SMU TF SJA wrote his opinion, the Commander of the SMU TF "restricted personnel from further involvement [delete] except for information sharing." [1184] D. January 2003 Task Force Interrogation SOP (Afghanistan) (U) [Delete] [delete] On January 10, 2003 the SMU Task Force Commander in Afghanistan approved the first interrogation standard operating procedure (SOP) for the SMU Task Force. [1185] In addition to identifying approaches from the Army Field Manual 34-52, the SOP approved four additional interrogation '"techniques" for use by SMU interrogators: isolation, multiple interrogators, stress positions, and sleep deprivation. [1186] Three of the four techniques approved by the SMU TF - isolation, stress positions, and multiple interrogators - were among those authorized by the Secretary of Defense for use at GTMO on December 2, 2002. [1187] The fourth technique - sleep deprivation (defined by the SMU TF as "no less than 4 hours sleep in a 24-hour period") - was, in effect, authorized by the Secretary on December 2, 2002, when he authorized the use of 20 hour interrogations. [1188] [Delete] [delete] According to a summary of his statement to Church Report investigators, the SMU interrogator who drafted the SMU SOP reviewed GTMO's list of requested counter resistance techniques prior to drafting the SOP and discussed incorporating some of those techniques into the SMU's policy. [1189] While the interrogator told Church Report investigators that the interrogation techniques in use at GTMO "did not influence" the technique selection for the SMU SOP, an investigation completed by the Department of Defense Inspector General in 2006 concluded that the SMU SOP "was influenced by the counter-resistance memorandum that the Secretary of Defense approved on December 2, 2002." [1190] [Delete] [delete] In addition, the SMU TF Legal Advisor who served in Afghanistan from late November 2002 until early January 2003 (just before the SMU TF SOP was issued) said that the Secretary of Defense's December 2, 2002 authorization generated discussion at the SMU TF and influenced his thinking about interrogation techniques. [1191] A legal review of the SMU TF's January 10, 2003 interrogation SOP, conducted by the SMU Legal Advisor who took over that job in early January, supports the DoD Inspector General's conclusion that the SOP was influenced by the Secretary's December 2, 2002 authorization. [1192] In his legal review, the SMU TF Legal Advisor referred to the techniques authorized by the Secretary of Defense for GTMO, including stress positions, isolation, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, hooding, 20 hour interrogations, removal of clothing, and the use of dogs to induce stress, and stated: SECDEF's approval of these techniques provides us the most persuasive argument for use of 'advanced techniques' as we capture possible [high value targets] or those that are enablers and have intelligence value of [high value targets] ... the fact SECDEF approved use of the [CAT I/II/III] techniques at GTMO, subject to the same laws, provides an analogy and basis for use of these techniques [in accordance with] international and U.S. law. [1193] [Delete] The SMU TF Legal Advisor concluded that the interrogation SOP proposed for use by the SMU was in accordance with their "guidance and constraints," and therefore, "legally sufficient." [1194] In addition, the Legal Advisor recommended that the SMU "continue to approach CENTCOM for clarifying guidance on whether the techniques apparently approved for use at GITMO by SECDEF ... are applicable or can become applicable for use in the CENTCOM AOR [area of responsibility]. If so incorporate those Category II techniques that are deemed necessary for [the SMU's] success." [1195] E. CJTF-180 Produces Memorandum on Interrogation Techniques (U) [Delete] Following his January 15, 2003 rescission of authority for GTMO to use the interrogation techniques he had previously authorized in December 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld directed the establishment of the DoD Working Group on Interrogations. [1196] As discussed above, the Working Group requested that the Joint Staff provide a list of interrogation techniques "currently in effect or previously employed in CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM, techniques the combatant commanders have found to be effective, and techniques the combatant commanders desire to implement with accompanying rationale." [1197] CENTCOM sent the Working Group's request to CJTF-180 and, in response, the CJTF-180 Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) LTC Robert Cotell produced a January 24, 2003 memo describing "current and past" interrogation techniques used by CJTF-180 interrogators. [1198] LTC Cotell's memo was sent to the Working Group and to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. [1199] [Delete] In his January 24, 2003 memo, LTC Cotell identified interrogation techniques used by CJTF-180, including up to 96 hours of isolation; the use of female interrogators to create "discomfort" and gain more information; sleep adjustment, defined as "four hours of sleep every 24 hours, not necessarily consecutive;" use of individual fears; removal of comfort items; use of safety positions; isolation; deprivation of light and sound in living areas; the use of a hood during interrogation; and mild physical contact. [1200] [Delete] LTC Cotell's January 24, 2003 memo also recommended use of five additional techniques, including "deprivation of clothing" to put detainees in a "shameful, uncomfortable situation;" "food deprivation;" "sensory overload - loud music or temperature regulation;" "controlled fear through the use of muzzled, trained, military working dogs;" and ''use of light and noise deprivation." [1201] (U) LTC Cotell's memo included techniques that were among those Secretary Rumsfeld had authorized for use at GTMO in December 2002. CJTF-180 had obtained a list of those techniques prior to LTC Cotell drafting his January 24, 2003 memo. [1202] (U) JTF-GTMO's Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief Lt Col Ted Moss stated that sometime in January 2003, CPT Carolyn Wood, the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Intelligence Section at the Bagram Collection Point asked JTF-GTMO about their "parameters" for interrogation. [1203] According to Lt Col Moss, the GTMO Operations Officer faxed the Secretary of Defense's December 2, 2002 memo authorizing interrogation techniques to CJTF-180. CPT Wood said that, in early January, she saw a "secret power point presentation" containing the techniques authorized for use at GTMO but did not recall where she had obtained the power point presentation. [1204] Lt Col Moss did not know if JTF-GTMO had also sent CJTF-180 the Secretary's letter that rescinded the use of those techniques. [1205] [Delete] In his January 24, 2003 memorandum, LTC Cotell, the CJTF-180 Deputy Staff Judge Advocate acknowledged that the Secretary of Defense had rescinded authority to use similar interrogation techniques at GTMO, stating that "[p]rior to their rescission, CJTF-180 used selected techniques contained in SOUTHCOM's Cat II & III techniques ..." [1206] Notwithstanding that knowledge, however, the Church Report concluded that "in the absence of any contrary guidance from CENTCOM, JCS, or OSD," CJTF-180 "considered the techniques in their [January 24, 2003] memo as available for use." [1207] A summary of an interview with the Deputy SJA at CENTCOM stated that ''the methodologies approved for GTMO... would appear to me to be legal interrogation processes. [The Secretary of Defense] had approved them. The General Counsel had approved them... I believe it is fair to say the procedures approved for Guantanamo were legal for Afghanistan." [1208] (U) In 2004, the Deputy Commander (Forward) U.S. Central Command LTG (later GEN) John Abizaid stated that the January 24, 2003 memorandum had been '"thoroughly reviewed" by the Working Group. [1209] [Delete] Within three weeks of the January 24, 2003 memo, the SMU TF in Afghanistan added the use of dogs to its interrogation policy. [1210] Just over two months after the Secretary had authorized dogs for use in interrogations at JTF-GTMO, the technique had become part of interrogation SOPs for both the conventional forces and the SMU TF in Afghanistan. F. CENTCOM Raises Concerns About Interrogation Techniques (U) [Delete] A week after the DoD Working Group on interrogations completed its report and just five days before the Secretary issued his April 16, 2003 guidance for SOUTHCOM, Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command Lt Gen Michael DeLong sent a memorandum to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, requesting assistance in obtaining the Secretary of Defense's approval of interrogation techniques requested by CJTF-180 in their January 24, 2003 memo. [1211] [Delete] The request came shortly after CAPT Jane Dalton, Legal Counsel for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed Barry Hammill, CENTCOM's Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), that the Secretary of Defense's guidance on interrogation techniques would likely apply only to GTMO. [1212] CAPT Dalton had been informed by DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes that he would only concur in providing the techniques to SOUTHCOM, not to CENTCOM. [1213] CAPT Dalton recalled that CENTCOM had requested techniques in their January 24, 2003 memo and told CENTCOM's lawyers that she could ask the Chairman to engage with the Secretary of Defense on their behalf, if they were interested in using the techniques authorized for GTMO. [1214] [Delete] In his memorandum to Gen Pace, dated April 11, 2003, LTG DeLong said that CENTCOM understood that "OSD may be close to making a decision that would be unfavorable to the use of the requested interrogation techniques at the [Bagram Collection Point]" and was concerned that disapproval of the techniques requested by CJTF-180 would "lead to mission degradation." [1215] The memo noted that the Commander of JTF-180, LTG McNeill, had "specifically endorsed" the CJTF-180 request to use aggressive techniques, including individual fears, black out goggles, deprivation of light and sound, sleep adjustment, threat of transfer to another agency or country, and safety positions. [1216] Lt Gen DeLong requested the assistance of VCJCS Gen Pace "in ensuring OSD approval" for the requested techniques. [1217] _______________ Notes: 1150. [Delete] Department of Defense, Interrogation Special Focus Team Report on Special Mission Unit Interrogation Practices in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (October 28, 2004) at 3 (hereinafter "Church Special Focus Team Report"). As part of his investigation of detention operations and detainee interrogation techniques, Vice Admiral Albert Church examined interrogation techniques used by SMU in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. VADM Church's main report, released in March 2005, did not discuss the SMUs. Rather an Interrogation Special Focus Team, under the auspices of VADM Church's review, issued a separate, classified annex that discussed SMU interrogation practices in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Though completed in October, 2004, the SMU annex was not provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee until July 26, 2006. 1151. [Delete] Church Special Focus Team Report at 6-7. [Big delete] 1152. Memo for the Record, GITMO Assessment Visit (October 11, 2002) 1153. Ibid at 3; LTC Phifer to MG Michael Dunlavey, Request/or Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies. 1154. Memo for the Record, GITMO Assessment Visit (October 11, 2002). 1155. USASOC Requirement to Provide Exploitation Instruction (September 24, 2002); BSCT, Counter-resistance Strategies. 1156. Memo for the Record, GITMO Assessment Visit (October 11, 2002) 1157. Ibid. LTC Beaver, the GTMO SJA, specifically recommended in her review of the October 11, 2002 techniques memo submitted by JTF-170 (GTMO) to SOUTHCOM, that "the interrogators be properly trained in the use of the approved methods of interrogation," which included techniques similar to those used in SERE programs. LTC Beaver, Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies at 5. 1158. Church Special Focus Team Report at 6. 1159. [Delete] Battlefield Exploitation Proposal (undated) at 2. 1160. Ibid at 4. 1161. Ibid at 5. 1162. LTC Phifer to MG Michael Dunlavey, Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies. 1163. Memo, Detainee Operations (October 27, 2002) at 1. 1164. Ibid. 1165. Ibid. at 1-2. 1166. Ibid. at 2. 1167. Ibid. at 3. 1168. Memo, Detainee Operations (October 27, 2002) at 3. 1169. [Delete] Battlefield Detainee Exploitation CONOP (November 3, 2002). 1170. Ibid. at 5. It is not clear from the slides whether any of the interrogation training was formal or informal training. There is no indication that any of the SMU personnel available for the mission had any formal DoD interrogation or debriefing training. 1171. [Delete] Battlefield Detainee Exploitation CONOP (November 3, 2002) at 7-8. 1172. [Delete] Interrogations Operations Decision Briefing (undated). 1173. Ibid. 1174. U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Bagram Branch Office Memo, CID Report of Investigation - FINAL-0134-02-CID36923533 (October 8, 2004). 1175. Memorandum for [Redacted], Legal Analysis of [Redacted] Personnel Participating in Interrogation [delete] Detention Facility [Redacted] (November 1, 2002) at 1 (hereinafter "Personnel Participating in Interrogation at [delete] [delete] Detention Facility"). 1176. Personnel Participating in Interrogation at [delete] Detention Facility. 1177. Ibid at 4. 1178. Ibid. at 5. 1179. Ibid. at 2. 1180. Ibid. at 1. 1181. Ibid. at 4. 1182. Ibid. 1183. Ibid at 6. 1184. Memo from USSOCOM Staff Judge Advocate for the Naval Inspector General, Response to Questions for the Record (U) (June 18, 2004). 1185. Department of Defense [delete] Battlefield Interrogation Team Standing Operating Procedures (10 January 2003). Church Special Focus Team Report at 7. 1186. Two of those techniques - stress positions and sleep deprivation - were already in use by CJTF-180 interrogators prior to the approval of the SMU TF SOP. Church Special Focus Team Report and Committee staff interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (February 8, 2008). 1187. Church Special Focus Team Report at 8. 1188. Church Special Focus Team Report, Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002). 1189. Summary of Statement of SMU Member with Church Special Focus Team Report Investigator (September 15, 2004). 1190. Ibid; DoD IG Report at 15-16. 1191. Committee staff interview of SMU TF Legal Advisor 1 (May 29, 2008). 1192. Memo from [delete] Legal Advisor for COMJTF-5, Legal Review of [delete] Battlefield Interrogation Team & BIT SOP (January 11, 2003) at 11 (hereinafter "Legal Review of [delete] Battlefield Interrogation Team & BIT SOP (January 11, 2003)"). 1193. Legal Review of [delete] Battlefield Interrogation Team & BIT SOP (January 11, 2003) at 11. 1194. Ibid 1195. Ibid. at 16. The SMU TF Legal Advisor also stated presciently that, "we are at risk as we get more 'creative' and stray from standard interrogation techniques and procedures taught at DoD and Service schools and detailed in official interrogation manuals." 1196. See section VIII. 1197. [Delete] Memo, Proposed Detainee Interrogation Working Group Responsibilities (Initial) (undated) at I. 1198. Church Report at 197; Memorandum from CJTF-180-OPS LAW for CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 1 (hereinafter "CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003)"). 1199. U.S. Central Command Action Processing Form, Approval for the Use of Certain Interrogation Techniques in CJTF-180's AOR (April 4, 2003). Memo from Deputy Commander (Forward) U.S. Central Command, Responses to Request for Information from VADM Church (August 6, 2004). 1200. CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 8. The Church Report called the distinction between stress positions and safety positions at the Bagram Collection Point "largely academic." Church Report at 200. 1201. CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 4-5,9. 1202. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002); CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003). 1203. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Ted Moss (October 17, 2007). 1204. Army IG, Interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (August 15, 2006) at 15; Committee staff interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (February 11, 2008). 1205. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Ted Moss (October 17, 2007). 1206. CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 10. 1207. Church Special Focus Team Report, see also Church Report at 6 for an unclassified accounting of the January 24, 2003 CJTF-180 memorandum for CENTCOM and the Joint Staff. 1208. Summary of Church Report interview of CENTCOM Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (July 15, 2004). 1209. Memorandum from Deputy Commander (Forward) U.S. Central Command, Responses to Request for Information from VADM Church (August 6, 2004). 1210. Church Special Focus Team Report at 11. 1211. Memo for the Vice Chairman Joint Chief of Staff (April 11, 2003). 1212. Email from CAPT Jane Dalton to William Hammill, CAPT Shelley Young, William Gade (April 2, 2003). 1213. Memo from CAPT Jane Dalton to VADM Church, Request for Information (August 10, 2004) at 5. 1214. Email from CAPT Jane Dalton to William Hammill, CAPT Shelley Young, William Gade (April 2, 2003). 1215. Ibid. 1216. Ibid. 1217. Ibid.
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