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		by Democracy Now!, Amy Goodman 
      March 30, 2010 
      [Anjali Kamat] President Obama 
		returned to the United States Monday after making his first trip to 
		Afghanistan since taking office. In just a six-hour visit, President 
		Obama met Afghan president Hamid Karzai and other top Afghan officials 
		before addressing a group of U.S. soldiers at Bagram Air Base. Echoing a 
		theme often echoed by former president George W. Bush, Obama said the 
		U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was not a war of choice. 
      [Barack Obama] We can’t forget why 
		we’re here. We did not choose this war. This was not an act of America 
		wanting to expand its influence, of us wanting to meddle in somebody 
		else’s business. We were attacked viciously [by we don’t know who] on 
		9/11. Thousands of our fellow country men and women were killed. And 
		this is the region where the perpetrators of that crime – Al Qaeda – 
		still base their leadership. Plots against our homeland, plots against 
		our allies, plots against the Afghani and Pakistani people, are taking 
		place as we speak right here. And if this region slides backwards, if 
		the Taliban retakes this country, and al Qaeda can operate with 
		impunity, then more American lives will be at stake. The Afghan people 
		will lose their chance at progress and prosperity, and the world will be 
		significantly less secure. As long as I’m your commander in chief, I am 
		not going to let that happen. That’s why you are here. I’ve made a 
		promise to all of you who serve, I will never send you into crime’s way 
		unless it’s absolutely necessary. I anguish in thinking about the 
		sacrifices that so many of you make. And that’s why I promise you I will 
		never send you out unless it is necessary. 
      [Anjali Kamat] – comes four months 
		after he ordered 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan, bringing the total 
		to 50,000 since he took office. It’s one of several decisions that have 
		led anti-war critics to accuse Obama of adopting a foreign policy much 
		in line with President Bush’s second term. 
 AMY GOODMAN: Well, we’re joined now by a man who played a major role in 
		efforts to end the Vietnam War in the ’70s. In 1971, the then-RAND 
		Corporation analyst Daniel Ellsberg leaked to the media what became 
		known as the Pentagon Papers, a 7,000-page classified history outlining 
		the true extent of US involvement in Vietnam. After avoiding a life 
		sentence on espionage charges, Daniel Ellsberg has continued to speak 
		out against US militarism until the present day. He joins us now from 
		the University of California at Berkeley.
 
 Welcome to Democracy Now!, Dan Ellsberg. In the wake of the surprise 
		visit by President Obama to Afghanistan, your thoughts?
 
 DANIEL ELLSBERG: President Obama is taking every symbolic step he can to 
		nominate this as Obama’s war, just as the Vietnam War became Nixon’s war 
		in November of 1969, just about the time I was copying the Pentagon 
		Papers in hopes of forestalling that, and Johnson made Vietnam his war, 
		Johnson’s war, and McNamara’s war in June of 1965, when I was working 
		for him, when he decided to escalate, an open-ended escalation there, 
		following the previous commitment of Eisenhower and of Kennedy that made 
		it an open-ended war, just as Obama is doing there now, and, I think, 
		with very much the same results in the end, tragic results, especially 
		for the country involved and for the Americans, and with probably the 
		same kinds of pressures on him, actually, as Johnson faced.
 
 AMY GOODMAN: I saw you speak, Dan Ellsberg, here in New York after a 
		production of Top Secret, a very interesting play about not the New York 
		Times and the Pentagon Papers—they were the first to begin to print them 
		but were then enjoined by the Nixon government, and then the Washington 
		Post started to print the Pentagon Papers, and that’s what this was 
		about. But afterwards, you talked about the US ambassador to Afghanistan 
		and how important what Ambassador Eikenberry had to say in these memos 
		and cables that were made public. Can you talk about those?
 
 DANIEL ELLSBERG: Yeah. Well, for years now, really since we set out to 
		go into Iraq on much the same kinds of lies in 2002 that sent us into 
		Vietnam when I was in the Pentagon, since then, I’ve been saying to 
		officials in the government, “Don’t do what I did. Do what I wish I had 
		done in ’63 or ’64, before we had entered the war, before the bombs had 
		fallen. Don’t wait, as I did, ’til we were in the war and the war was 
		essentially unstoppable, before telling the truth about the 
		hopelessness, understood within the government, and the 
		impossibility—the unlikelihood of any kind of victory there. But do it 
		now.”
 
 Actually, almost as I—in recent times, that call has been answered. I 
		don’t know whether it was direct or not, but some government official 
		who is now the most dangerous man in America in the eyes of President 
		Obama, I’m sure—I’m sure there’s a Plumbers operation going on right now 
		to find out who leaked the cables, the secret cables, of our ambassador 
		in Kabul, Lieutenant General, retired, Karl Eikenberry, who had been in 
		charge in Afghanistan, and first in charge of training Afghan troops and 
		then in charge of all of our operations in Afghanistan, before 
		McChrystal, and is now our accredited ambassador to Karzai, the head of 
		the so-called government that we’re supporting there now.
 
 And in those cables, secret cables, which someone leaked in January, 
		after the President had announced his decision, I’m sorry to say—I wish 
		he had done what I most called for, and that is, send the cables, the 
		truth that he was telling, in before that decision had been announced. 
		Still, the decision hasn’t been fully implemented, especially by 
		Congress, in terms of appropriation. And they would do well to read what 
		it is they’re appropriating money for.
 
 Eikenberry’s cables now, at this stage, read like a summary of the 
		Pentagon Papers of Afghanistan. And that’s the first installment of 
		papers that we need right now. Just change the place names from “Saigon” 
		to “Kabul” and the Afghan national forces serving as the surrogate of 
		our mercenary ARVN of Vietnam, and they read almost exactly the same. 
		He’s describing the President, Karzai, to whom he’s accredited and who 
		he just visited with President Obama. And Karzai has presumably read 
		Eikenberry’s assessment of him as—that he is not an adequate strategic 
		partner for the United States, and for reasons of corruption and 
		inefficiency.
 
 Allegedly, we hear that Obama’s reason for going seventeen hours over to 
		Afghanistan was to convey in person our desire that he clean up his 
		government. I’m really reminded of when Kennedy and Johnson decided to 
		enlist our Mafia in an effort to get Castro. I don’t think they spent 
		time telling the Mafia, “By the way, it’ll be helpful to us, if you’re 
		going to be our partner, to clean up your act, get out of the drug 
		business.” In Karzai’s government, as in the Mafia, corruption are us, 
		drugs are us. Corruption is his government. That’s his constituency, his 
		source of income. There is no chance whatever that he’ll, for instance, 
		root out his brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, from Kandahar, which is our 
		next base of operations, despite the fact that our chairman of the Joint 
		Chiefs of Staff says no success is possible in Kandahar while corruption 
		is still the heart of that, while drug dealing is the heart of that, so 
		long as Wali, the President’s, Karzai’s brother, is in charge there.
 
 It’s obviously—it’s not just a symbolism. It’s the fact that we have a 
		government there that has no prospect of achieving legitimacy in the 
		eyes of the people we’re supposedly appealing to in Afghanistan. And 
		that’s symbolic of the whole effort. There is no prospect of any kind of 
		success in Afghanistan, any more than the Soviets achieved in their ten 
		years there, just as in Vietnam we really had no realistic prospect of 
		more success than the French. But countries find it very hard to learn 
		from the failures of other countries.
 
 ANJALI KAMAT: And Dan Ellsberg, what’s your assessment of the 
		counterinsurgency strategy that the Obama administration is pushing, 
		that General Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal are pushing?
 
 DANIEL ELLSBERG: I’m very familiar with that theory, because that’s what 
		I was working in in Vietnam for so many years, the counterinsurgency 
		theory, strategy theory. My job was to evaluate its, quote, “progress,” 
		which meant lack of progress, total stalemate, total lack of progress in 
		Vietnam. And to that end, I visited thirty-eight of the forty-three 
		provinces of Vietnam and reported stalemate, which McNamara heard and 
		understood, even while the word “progress” was the word to be used, just 
		as Obama was talking about progress.
 
 What it ignores is that the recruiting tool of our adversaries there is 
		predominantly the presence of foreign troops. And when we add more 
		foreign troops, we are sustaining that recruiting tool. And for every 
		enemy trying to eject foreigners from his country that we kill, and 
		especially his families, the wedding parties, and the funeral parties 
		after we’ve hit the wedding parties, all of those recruit more people in 
		a way that will—assures us that, contrary to what President Obama is 
		saying, we will not prevail. When he does say we aren’t going to quit, 
		in the short run, at least, he’s right, unfortunately. We have many 
		years ahead of us.
 
 I believe, by the way, that that applies to Iraq, as well, that I 
		believe that our president is deceiving the American public—I don’t say 
		that lightly—in the same way that all of his predecessors deceived us 
		with respect to Vietnam, including the ones I served, which included 
		Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon. Specifically, when he says in his State of 
		the Union message that we will—he will get all troops, not just combat 
		troops, but all troops, out of Iraq by the end of 2011, I believe that’s 
		false and that he knows that’s false, and he has no real plan or 
		intention of removing American bases manned by American military 
		personnel, not just mercenaries, ever. By his second term or the second 
		term of his successor, whoever that is, I think we have a future of 
		30,000 to 50,000 Americans in Iraq indefinitely. And I’m talking about 
		the lives of our children, in terms of actual planning.
 
 And in Afghanistan, in the same State of the Union address, when he 
		implies that this first installment of extra troops in Afghanistan, 
		which Ambassador [Karl] Eikenberry specifically recommended against to 
		the President, saying that it would make the situation worse, not 
		better, make the Karzai government more dependent on us and postpone any 
		possible date of our withdrawal, rather than shorten it—that’s just the 
		first installment. He implies that by the end of next year—or this year, 
		rather, when we have those extra 30,000 to 40,000 troops there and are 
		up to the level of 100,000, which, with NATO troops, will bring us up to 
		the level at which the Soviets occupied Afghanistan and failed after ten 
		years, the thought that that’s the last request by McChrystal is simply 
		absurd. McChrystal himself was asking for 80,000 troops at this point, 
		and that, too, was a first installment.
 
 My knowledge of counterinsurgency doctrine, which is, from what I read 
		of McChrystal and Petraeus’s doctrine statements, is as good as theirs, 
		or as bad as theirs, says that in a country of that size, hundreds of 
		thousands of troops are needed. That is not going to come from the 
		Afghan troops, who desert about as fast as we recruit them and who are 
		not very highly motivated working for foreigners, like the government of 
		Vietnam soldiers we worked with. They are not going to fill that gap. As 
		troops do come out of Iraq, bringing us down from 130,000, or perhaps 
		90,000 now, down to 30,000 to 50,000, that extra 100,000 troops will 
		have a short time at home with their parents and their spouses and their 
		kids and then go to Afghanistan. I believe that four years from now we 
		will have more troops in Afghanistan than we have two years from now. 
		The public doesn’t seem to understand that, and when they look at cost 
		estimates, they come up with figures like a trillion dollars for our 
		effort in Afghanistan eventually. Try doubling that. It’s going to be 
		more troops. Those estimates are based on the notion—in Iraq, as 
		well—that we’re getting all troops out of Iraq. That’s not going to 
		happen.
 
 AMY GOODMAN: Dan Ellsberg—
 
 DANIEL ELLSBERG: So those estimates are illusory. You could double them.
 
 AMY GOODMAN: Military officials in Kabul have admitted US and NATO 
		troops have killed thirty Afghans and wounded eighty others in or near 
		military checkpoints since last summer. In no instance did the victims 
		prove to be a danger to troops. In a recent videoconference, military 
		commander General Stanley McChrystal said, “We have shot an amazing 
		number of people, but to my knowledge, none has ever proven to be a 
		threat.” Your response to this?
 
 DANIEL ELLSBERG: That’s an amazingly, amazingly candid assessment by 
		McChrystal. I’ll give him credit for saying that. He also, for the first 
		time, talks about wanting to reduce civilian casualties. But by 
		increasing the number of US troops over there greatly and increasing the 
		number of engagements, even if you reduce the rate of civilian deaths 
		per engagement, the overall effect is going to be that you’re killing 
		the relatives of people who are going to enlist in the insurgency.
 
 You’re talking about a country, like Vietnam, that has 2,000 years of a 
		tradition, and not just of self-image, but of actual success, in 
		ejecting foreign invaders. They aren’t organized for much there. You 
		could say it’s a state of disorganization, valley by valley and tribe by 
		tribe. They’re ideally organized for ejecting control by foreigners, and 
		even control by a central government—that’s somewhat unlike 
		Vietnam—controlled by Kabul, even if Kabul were to clean up its act, 
		which is—means to transform its nature altogether.
 
 One of Eikenberry’s points is that there is no basis for assuming that 
		Karzai, at this point in his life, is going to change his nature or the 
		nature of his government. By the way, that was in secret cables to the 
		President. That’s like the Pentagon Papers. In public testimony, what we 
		heard from Eikenberry in front of Congress was, “Oh, I fully support 
		McChrystal’s program,” which he had just demolished in secret. “I fully 
		support the program. I have every confidence.” In short, like any 
		official working for the President, after the President had made his 
		decision, Eikenberry lied, or, at any rate, he contradicted his secret 
		testimony. And what Congress should do is simply bring him back and let 
		him clarify the difference between his secret cables, which were 
		published on the New York Times archive, which anyone can get, and his 
		public testimony and give him a chance to tell the truth and resign.
 
 ANJALI KAMAT: Dan Ellsberg, your leaking of the Pentagon Papers helped 
		bring the Vietnam War to an end. What do you think needs to happen now 
		to end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?
 
 DANIEL ELLSBERG: Congress, somehow, has to be brought to have the 
		courage to follow its convictions and cut off the funding for the wars, 
		for escalation, in particular. Barbara Lee, the one congressperson who 
		had the guts to vote against the Tonkin Gulf Resolution with respect to 
		Afghanistan back in 2001, pointing out that it had been done 
		without—like the Tonkin Gulf Resolution years before, without hearings, 
		without debate, without evidence, just a blank check to the 
		President—one person in Congress who did that, now has a bill—I think 
		it’s 3966 3699, something like that—calling for cutting off 
		appropriations for further escalation in Afghanistan. And that bill, 
		that appropriations lie ahead.
 
 The head of the Appropriations Committee, David Obey, Nancy Pelosi, 
		Speaker of the House, Harry Reid in the Senate have all said they oppose 
		further escalation, just like Eikenberry, the general who is our 
		ambassador in Afghanistan. But does that mean they will vote against the 
		appropriations that send those people over there to die and to kill? No, 
		very, very unlikely. But some of their colleagues will.
 
 AMY GOODMAN: We have ten seconds.
 
 DANIEL ELLSBERG: And if we press our colleagues that that’s what we 
		want, ultimately that’s the way the war can be ended. The only way the 
		Vietnam war could have been ended was by Congress cutting off the money. 
		It’s the only way this war will be ended, and it will take a very long 
		time—
 
 AMY GOODMAN: Dan Ellsberg, we have to leave it there.
 
 DANIEL ELLSBERG: —in what I call Vietnamistan.
 
 AMY GOODMAN: We have to leave it there, but we will continue the 
		conversation and put it online at democracynow.org. Dan Ellsberg—Henry 
		Kissinger called him “the most dangerous man in America.”
 
		
		[Amy Goodman] Daniel Ellsberg, when you talk about a new whistleblower 
		coming out with the Pentagon Papers of the wars in Iraq and 
		Afghanistan, what ultimately turned you?  What made the difference 
		between you being right there, an analyst for the war, with top-secret 
		clearance, to asking questions, which a lot of people do, to actually 
		taking the step that you took? 
		
		[Daniel Ellsberg] A key thing was meeting, face-to-face, young Americans 
		who were choosing to go to prison rather than to participate in what 
		they saw as a wrongful war.  But reading the earliest part of the 
		Pentagon Papers, going back to 1945, a period that many people didn’t 
		imagine as being part of U.S. decision-making on Vietnam, was crucial to 
		my seeing the war as having been unjustified from the very beginning.  
		It’s having been an effort to help the French reconquer a former colony 
		which had declared its independence.  And that made all of the deaths in 
		Vietnam, on both sides, that we had encouraged and facilitated, made 
		all of them seem unjustified and essentially murder.   
		The 
		corresponding part right now would be this:  The Pentagon Papers of 
		Afghanistan, the decision-making in Afghanistan, would have to begin 30 
		years ago, in 1979, as Zbigniew Brzezinski was the national security 
		adviser to President Carter revealed in 1998, he had recommended to 
		Carter, and Carter had followed, arming extremist fundamentalist warlord 
		type fanatic Muslim fanatics in the countryside against a Communist 
		government in Kabul at a time when there was no war going on.  He’d 
		encouraged arming them through Pakistan with the intent of hoping to 
		provoke the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.   
		Now that was six months 
		before I and others in the public learned that there had been an 
		unprovoked invasion by the Soviet Union.  And when that invasion did 
		occur after six months of these efforts, Brzezinski reports that he 
		wrote to the president, “Now we have the opportunity to present the 
		Soviets with their Vietnam.” And that was a good prediction. He saw 
		Afghanistan as a trap for the Soviet Union empire, and indeed, ten years 
		later, after losing 15,000 dead, the Soviets did retreat. And it did 
		contribute to the break-up of their empire, which Brzezinski was very 
		proud about.  But the aspect of doing that is it gave the Afghans their 
		Vietnam: a million Afghans died.  And that’s what’s happening now.  
		Barack Obama’s Vietnam will be a Vietnam much more lethally for the 
		Afghans. 
		
		[Amy Goodman]  But that moment for you when you decided to take one of 
		the few copies of the Pentagon Papers – 
		
		[Daniel Ellsberg] I can imagine other people reading that history in the 
		area that I now think of as Vietnamistan, if they were to read it and 
		realize how deceived they had been as to the nature of the struggle 
		there, and how hopeless it really was, as well as illegitimate, would 
		decide that this was a process of murder with which they really could 
		not cooperate.  And that they were obligated, even at risk to themselves, 
		to do what they really could to stop it.  And that could very well mean 
		simply telling the truth. 
		
		Matthew Hoh, for example, chose to do what Eikenberry did not do when he 
		and Eikenberry discussed in Kabul, with great agreement according to 
		Matthew Hoh, the infeasibility of our efforts there. 
		Eikenberry 
		proceeded to express those feelings secretly to the President, but to 
		deny them in public.  Hoh did the opposite.  He resigned his position, 
		came back, refused a position under Holbrooke, which would have kept him 
		silent, and said that he’s spent the months since then saying at every 
		opportunity exactly what Eikenberry was saying in private: that the more 
		Taliban we kill in the province he represented in Afghanistan,  the more 
		there would be.  They would not quit.  They in the end would prevail.  
		The people who spoke the language who were Afghans, who were neighbors, 
		and family of the people we were killing – they would be there when we 
		left. 
		
		[Amy Goodman]  What about the Eikenberry cables.  
		He released them -- he didn't release them, he sent them on to 
		Washington, to the White House – 
		
		[Daniel Ellsberg] No, no, no, he sent them secretly to the President in 
		November, and someone else admirably released them, someone who was 
		quoted by The Times as saying he thought the public deserved this 
		history.  That person was acting in the same spirit that I did when I 
		released the Pentagon Papers. 
		
		Let’s say there was a difference in the way they were handled.  They 
		were presented in The Times' computerized version, the online version, 
		verbatim.  I hadn’t seen verbatim.  No Distribution.   Secret cables 
		with all the modifiers on them.  Quite interesting.  I hadn’t seen 
		anything like that since the Pentagon Papers.  I’m not on the 
		distribution list anymore, but they look really familiar.  There was not 
		a single story about those cables in the Post that I saw.  Conversely, 
		when Matthew Hoh resigned, there was 
		a story about that in the 
		Washington Post, on the front page, but not a mention of it in the New 
		York Times.  In neither case was there a follow-up story.  And I found 
		with audiences, even in Washington D.C., almost no one in an audience 
		that comes to hear me or see the film The Most Dangerous Man, has heard 
		of Eikenberry or Hoh or the cables.  Apparently, if something isn’t on 
		the nightly news night after night after night, it just hasn’t happened; it hasn’t penetrated American consciousness at all. 
		
		[Amy Goodman] Congress could call Ambassador Eikenberry back since the 
		cables are there. 
		
		[Daniel Ellsberg] Absolutely.  And there’s no excuse for their not doing 
		that, for their having accepted testimony that he fully supported McChrystal’s plan, that the President’s plan had every prospect of 
		success, when they now can be aware, if they read those cables, that his 
		private thoughts, which were highly authoritative, more authoritative 
		than McChrystal’s I would say, were entirely to the opposite of that.  
		They should not follow the tradition of Congress, of allowing officials 
		to perjure themselves  in support of a president’s position, without 
		facing any requirement of clarifying their testimony, that is of 
		correcting it. 
		
		[Amy Goodman] We’re talking to Daniel Ellsberg, who released the 
		Pentagon Papers.  Again, let me ask you one more time, and I know 
		Angelou has a question for you about a major New York Times piece that 
		ran on Sunday, but that moment where you switched from well, you became 
		anti-war, but actually pulling the Pentagon Papers top secret out of 
		your safe and knowing that you could go to prison for life for treason. 
		
		[Daniel Ellsberg] Well, if you speak of a moment, it was when I realized 
		that the people who were going to prison, Randy Keeler, Bobby __ that I 
		had just met, had done the right thing.  And that hit me very 
		emotionally, that the best thing that young men like that could do for 
		their country was to go to prison and face charges of being unpatriotic, and unmanly, cowardly, and nevertheless to 
		-- I felt the power of their 
		act on my own life. 
		
		Now, the process of actually removing the Papers from Rand was not a 
		single moment, but it was something that extended over the course of a 
		year, really, taking them out night after night, spending nights copying 
		them, and ultimately taking them to senators, like Fulbright or Mathias 
		or McGovern, and having each one of them, by the way, say initially that 
		these should be out, they would do it, had every right to do it under 
		the Constitution, could not be questioned as to their source, and then 
		think better of it within days or a week, and privately decide in effect, 
		“Let’s let Dan Ellsberg do it.” 
		
		[Anjali Kamat] Dan Ellsberg, I want to switch topics a little bit and go to 
		another country that’s in the cross-hairs of U.S. foreign policy:  
		Iran.  The New York Times in the Weekend Review ran a major piece by 
		David Sanger this weekend called “Imagining an Israeli strike on Iran,” 
		and talks about the simulation of what would happen among top policy 
		makers in Israel, the United States, and Iran were Israel to strike 
		Iran. 
		
		[Daniel Ellsberg] I found that headline and the story accompanying it, 
		and the diagrams of the scenarios of attacking a country that has not 
		threatened the United States, is no threat to the United States, a 
		despicable piece of journalism in its failure to address the simple fact 
		that such an attack would be against the U.N. Charter, which is the 
		highest law of this land, it would not be justified by the Security 
		Council, or by any needs of self-defence of this country -- the U.S. 
		would be totally complicit in it -- and it would not serve Israeli self-defence 
		in any respect, either.  There was not one mention in the article in 
		talk of consequences of the almost incontrovertible fact that the effect 
		of such an attack would be to expel all IAEA, International Atomic 
		Energy Agency, inspectors from Iran, and to go underground with a crash 
		program that would probably speed up the attainment of a nuclear weapon, 
		which may not be at this point the clear objective of the nuclear energy 
		program at all, but would certainly be such after that program. 
		The 
		article begins with a description of the 1981 Israeli attack on the 
		Osirak reactor, a reactor that was not intended for nuclear weapons 
		production.  It doesn’t mention that the effect of that attack was to 
		drive the program underground and speed it up to a point where it was 
		almost ready for a nuclear bomb, unknown to us by the time of the Gulf 
		War.  There’s not a mention in that of the civilian casualties that 
		would be involved both in the initial attacks and in the escalation that 
		would surely follow.  The premises assume that there will be no 
		retaliation directly against the U.S.  That is a very optimistic 
		assumption, although it does premise that the people there are rational 
		enough to be deterred from such an attack, which puts in context the 
		urgency of the whole operation.   
		But in any case, I find that this bland 
		war-game scenario, the kind of wargame I had participated in when I was 
		in the Pentagon in connection with the Berlin crisis, was describing a 
		legitimate military operation which would actually be an aggressive 
		attack.  We can imagine in Germany say, a headline of imagining an 
		attack on Poland, for example, which would be pretty much corresponding 
		to the wargames that preceded our attack on Iraq, I guess, exactly as 
		aggressive.  It really made me wonder what it would look like in The 
		Times to see we’re wargaming the shooting of prisoners.  That would be 
		one of the few war crimes that the U.S. has not committed lately in 
		addition to torture and suspension of habeus corpus and aggressive war.  
		Shooting prisoners, gassing, hanging, shooting, all options that has to 
		be on the table. 
		
		[Amy Goodman] Well, Daniel Ellsberg we want to thank you very much for 
		being with us.  Daniel Ellsberg, called The Most Dangerous Man in 
		America by Henry Kissinger.  In fact, that is the name of the film that 
		tells the story of Daniel Ellsberg’s life, The Most Dangerous Man in 
		America.  And it’s going around all over this country now.  Dan 
		Ellsberg’s book, his memoirs, called Secrets.  Dan Ellsberg, thanks so 
		much. 
		
		[Daniel Ellsberg] Thank you for having me. 
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