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Site Map REPORTS, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD, NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY, AND HEWITT INQUIRY, WITH ENDORSEMENTS |
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Page 330 do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication." This message left the War Department at 11:52 a.m., Washington time, was sent out over R.C.A. at 12:17 p.m. (6:47 a.m. Honolulu time) and arrived in Honolulu's R.C.A. office at 7:33 a.m. Honolulu time. There remained but 22 minutes before the attack for delivery, decoding, dissemination, and action. Lieut. General Short did not receive the decoded dispatch until the afternoon of 7 December, several hours after the attacking force had departed. Had the telephone and plain language been used, this message could have been received in Hawaii before the attack began. Even in this event, however, there was no action open to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome. There was already in effect the condition of readiness best suited to circumstances attending vessels within the limits of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the Fleet planes in their air bases in Oahu. Orin G. Murfin, Edward C. Kalbfus, Adolphus Andrews, [1] FIRST ENDORSEMENT [Stamped:] Nov. 2, 1944. To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. Subj: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July, 1944. 1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation. 2. The weighing of conflicting evidence and testimony is peculiarly the function of a Court of Inquiry or Board of Investigation, and not that of the reviewing authorities. Where the testimony is such as will reasonably support either two or more different conclusions, it is not within the province of the Judge Advocate General to attempt to substitute his evaluation of the evidence for that of the Court. But where there is no creditable evidence in a record to support a finding or opinion, or where the weight of evidence is so preponderantly on one side that it appears unreasonable to reach a contrary conclusion, the Judge Advocate General must hold, as a matter of law, that such a finding or opinion is not supported by the evidence adduced. See CMO 9 of 1928, P. 8; CMO 12 of 1937, P. 8; CMO 5 of 1936;, P. 11. 3. Attention is invited to the following portion of Finding of Fact XVIII: "In the early forenoon of 7 December, 1941, Washington time, the Army and Navy Departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, *by inference and deduction, that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon*." 4. This Finding, standing alone, may be misleading, in the sense that it may convey an impression that the Court concluded that responsible officials of the War and Navy Departments did in fact make the inference and deduction underscored above. The fact that the Court, in phrasing this Finding, used the past tense of the verb "appear", and used the expression "appeared to indicate rather than "should have indicated" lends support to this construction. Such Page 331 an [12] impression would not be supported by the record, as the great preponderance of the evidence before the Court refutes any such conclusion. It is quite clear from the evidence that the responsible officials of the Navy Department had evaluated the information available to them in Washington to mean that a hostile move by the Japanese could be expected, not in the Hawaiian area, except by submarines, but rather against Guam, the Philippines, and British and Dutch possessions in the Far East. 5. Those witnesses who, on 7 December, 1941 held positions in the Navy Department which qualify them to speak authoritatively as to the prevailing opinion there just prior to the attack, are all in substantial accord that the Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants had not deduced or inferred that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. On the contrary, the consensus in the Navy Department was that any attack would probably come in the Far East, and the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was given a comparatively low probability rating. Those witnesses who stated that the information available to the Navy Department clearly indicated, by inference and deduction, that an attack on Hawaii could be expected, were all officers who were not on duty in the Navy Department at that time, or occupied subordinate positions. Their testimony is opinion evidence, undoubtedly unconsciously colored by hindsight, and arrived at by a process of selecting, from the great mass of intelligence reports available to the Chief of Naval Operations, those which in the light of subsequent events proved to be hints or indications of Japanese intentions. Therefore, any finding, opinion or inference that the responsible officials the Navy Department knew, prior to the actual attack, that an attack on Hawaii was impending, is not supported by the evidence. The Court recognizes this fact, as shown by its finding last paragraph of Finding XVII) that); "These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testifying before the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere." [3] 7. The foregoing remarks apply equally to the underscored portion of Opinion expressed by the Court (P. 1207) that: "Admiral Harold R Stark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation, and especially in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that a message had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon." As been previously pointed out, the message herein referred to was not construed by the Chief of Naval Operations and his principal advisers as indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area. 8. It is noted that the Court finds (Finding of Fact XVIII) that the time at which the War and Navy Departments had information indicating a break in diplomatic relations on 7 December 1941, and the possibility of hostile action by the Japanese on that date, was in the early forenoon of 7 December, Washington time. It is not considered amiss to comment in further detail on this finding, in view of a widespread misconception in some quarters that this information was known in Washington on 7 December, 1941. The evidence before this Court establishes, beyond any doubt, that the information referred to was not available to any responsible official in Washington prior to approximately 10 a. m., the morning of 7 December 1941. 9. The Judge Advocate General feels constrained to comment on the apparent contradiction between the Opinion expressed by the Court that the Chief of Naval Operations failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in failing to transmit certain information to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the final Opinion that "no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred in the part of any person in the naval service". That this is only an apparent, and not a real, incongruity, is shown by the Opinion that had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. This statement, as well as the Finding of Page 332 Facts and Opinions taken as a whole indicate [4] that it was the conclusion of the Court, although not clearly expressed that the evidence adduced did not prove that Admiral Stark's failure to transmit the information in question to Admiral Kimmel was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by the Fleet on 7 December 1941 and that any causal connection between this failure on Admiral Stark's part and the disaster would be entirely speculative. Such a conclusion is fully supported by the testimony in this record. 10. Subject to the foregoing remarks the proceedings findings opinions and recommendations of the attached Court of Inquiry are, in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, legal. T. L. Gatch --------------------- [1] UNITED STATE FLEET 3 Nov. 1944. From: The Commander In Chief United States Fleet and Chief of Naval
Operations. 1. In compliance with Reference (a) the following comment is submitted as to how much of the record of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry bears such relation to present military operations as to require high security classification. 2. There are only two general classifications of information which, if made public, would be detrimental to the conduct of current and future operations. These are: (a) Information which directly or by inference would lead the Japanese to suspect that we have been able to break their codes. (b) Verbatim plain language reproductions of messages sent in United States Codes. The Japanese presumably have the enciphered versions of these messages and if they are given the word for word plain language version it would help them to work on our codes. This is a matter of less importance than the possible compromise of what we know about Japanese encryption but it should be guarded against. [2] 3. The really vital point is to preserve absolute secrecy as to our success in breaking Japanese codes. It is essential to keep this information to ourselves. I say this for the following reasons: (a) All Japanese intercepts considered by the Court were in diplomatic codes. Most of these are still in effect with only minor changes. They are still the sources of information of incalculable value. Furthermore, all Japanese codes, Army and Navy, as well as diplomatic, are of the same general structure. The Japanese codes of today are not basically different from those they used in 1941. Breaking one code makes it easy to break the others. The Japanese presumably are well aware of this. If they were told that we broke their diplomatic codes in 1941 there is a reasonable assumption that they will change the whole basic code structure. If they were to do this the damage would be irreparable. The information we get relates not only to the current and prospective movements of Japanese naval vessels upon which we base our operating plans but also include data as to troop strength and prospective troop movements which are vital to the Army. It also relates to the disposition of Japanese Army and Navy air forces. It is impossible to overstate the disadvantages we would suffer if there were to be a leakage direct or indirect that an alert enemy might interpret as indicating that we can and do break his codes. It is no exaggeration to state that Midway might have been a Japanese victory had it not been for the information which we obtained by intercepting his coded despatches. The risks we have Page 333 taken in advancing into the Marshall Islands and the Philippines would have been far greater than they actually were had we not been able to obtain information of Japanese dispositions and movements from Japanese sources. (b) In view of the foregoing I strongly recommend that there be no public release of any information which would alert the Japanese as to the possibility that we were breaking their codes. [3] (c) It is a pertinent question as to just what part, if any, of the record of proceedings can be made public, without resulting in a leak of vital information. (c) I can say unequivocally that Volume 5 (the Top Secret volume of proceedings) must not be made public. With regard to the other volumes of the record I find there are certain paragraphs which do point quite clearly to the fact that we have information which could only be obtained by reading Japanese coded messages. I have listed these in Annex (A) of the report, which also includes certain references which might be damaging to the security of our own codes. (e) I am not any too certain of the effectiveness of the deletions recommended in Annex (A). There are statements of a border-line nature concerning which it is difficult to tell whether or not an alert enemy might find a clue as to what our knowledge of his codes really is. However, if the record is also abridged by deletion of the matter enumerated in Annex (A), it would be devoid of any direct reference to information which we must keep from becoming public. (f) The foregoing should not be interpreted to mean that I am in favor of making public the parts of the record not referred to in the Annex. On the contrary, I am of the opinion that publication of a weeded record or of abridged Findings would have the following undesirable results: (1) The picture presented would be disjointed and full of unexplained gaps. I think this would lead to a demand of Congress and by the Press for more information, on the ground that the part made public was incomplete, and that withholding of any information is indicative of a desire on the part of the Navy to whitewash high naval officers. A situation such as this might well lead to discussions that would inadvertently disclose just the information that we feel is vital to keep secret. [4] (2) Admiral Kimmel's principal contention is that he was kept in the dark as to certain information which the Navy Department had obtained from various sources, including the breaking of Japanese codes. This is a matter which cannot be made public without irreparable damage to the conduct of the war. It is not unlikely that if there is a public release of some of the Facts and Opinions, but no release concerning matters in which Admiral Kimmel is particularly concerned, he may take further action to protect his own reputation. The potentialities are particularly dangerous, because Admiral Kimmel's civilian lawyers have now been informed, so I understand, of the existence and content of the many Japanese messages in question. I know of no means of keeping these lawyers from talking in public, except such ethical views as they may have concerning their responsibility for not doing anything that would jeopardize war operations. It is a question just how far they could be restrained by ethical considerations, if the Navy Department were to make public the part of the record which is unfavorable to Admiral Kimmel, while suppressing that part which he regards as a main element of his defense. (3) I also invite attention to the fact that the Findings include certain Facts and Opinions critical of Army efficiency, ascertained by proceedings to which the Army was not a party. The publication of this part of the record might well result in an inter-service dispute, which would tend to bring out the very information which it is essential to conceal. 4. In regard to the requirements of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, I note that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify. This law does [15] not obligate the Secretary of the Navy to make any public statement of what the Court of Inquiry has ascertained. Furthermore, as I understand it, the President has definitely expressed himself as opposed to any act which might interfere with the war effort. I, therefore, conclude that there is no necessity for making anything public, except on the ground that something should be done to suppress the rumors and irresponsible accusations that are now current. I do not believe that such considerations in any way warrant jeopardizing the war effort by publicising all or any part of the record. Page 334 5. With regard as to whether or not there should be any public statement, I offer the opinion that no steps should be taken without consulting the Secretary of War, and arranging for parallel action. The two Departments should not issue conflicting statements, nor should one keep silent while the other one makes a statement. Assuming that the War Department would take parallel action I recommend that there be no public release whatsoever. However, if the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War decide that there must be some report to the public, I recommend a statement to the Press in substance as follows: "The Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed which warrant court martial proceedings against any person or persons in the naval service. The Secretary of the Navy approves the Findings. The record of the Court will not be made public while the war is in progress." 6. If you should find it advisable, at a later time, to issue a further statement it seems to me that it would also be desirable to make public in some manner the fact (see page 1160 of the record) that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were personal friends, that they met frequently, that their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect, and that they [6] invariably conferred on matters bearing on the development of the Japanese situation and their several plans in preparing for war. This would refute the statements and rumors that have been prevalent to the effect that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were at odds with one another. Of course, no such statement could be made unless the Secretary of War concurs. If the Secretary of War does concur you might find occasion to make informal comment on the matter at a press conference. /S/ E. J. King, TOP SECRET ANNEX "A" To COMINCH SERIAL 003191 1. The following portions of the Record of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry should not be made public, because they convey information which the enemy could use to the detriment of United States war operations. (a) Volume 5 (the "Top Secret" volume). (b) The following paragraphs of Volumes 1, 2,3, and 4: (1) Volume 1 Page Paragraph Page Paragraph 166 683 255 174 (2) Volume 2 Page Paragraph Page Paragraph 315 25 470 3 Page 335 (3) Volume 3 Page Paragraph Page Paragraph 805 176 889 16 (4) Volume 4 Page Paragraph 938 34 (c) Also the following parts of the "Findings" in Volume 4: Page 1191. Third paragraph (beginning with words "on 24 November") and the despatch quoted therein. Page 1192. Entire page. Statement of Admiral Stark: Paragraph 7. Statement of Admiral Kimmel: Page 21. Last paragraph. (d) All "Top Secret" exhibits, and the following exhibits listed in the index to Volume 1: 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 40, 57, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 76, 76, 77. NOTE The Top Secret Second Endorsement to Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 6 Nov. 1944 by the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, was not published, however a paraphrased copy of this endorsement was published. [1] TOP SECRET FF1/A17-25. 6 Nov 1944. SECOND ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. To: The Secretary of the Navy. Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor. Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941. Page 336 1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the Judge Advocate General in the first endorsement and to the following remarks. 2. (a) As to Facts I and II (page 1156), the routine practice of rotating units of the Fleet, so that each vessel had approximately two- thirds of its time at sea and one-third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely scheduled upkeep periods in port were required, not only for keeping the ships in good mechanical condition, but, also, for giving the personnel sufficient recreation to keep them from going stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified in having one task force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter which I discuss later on. (b) In Fact III (page 1158) the Court points out that, because of constitutional requirements, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, unless there has been a declaration of war by Congress. The great advantage which this gives an unscrupulous enemy is obvious. This requirement made it impossible for Admiral Kimmel and General Short to employ the offensive as a means of defense, and, therefore, was a definite handicap. [2] (c) Fact IV (page 1159) sets forth that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Admiral Kimmel) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and was charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval measures concerned with local defense. (d) Fact V (page 1160) sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were personal friends; that they met frequently, that their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect; that they frequently conferred, and invariably conferred when messages were received by either which bad any bearing on the development of the United States- Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing for war. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes. This is important, in that it refutes the rumors which have been prevalent since the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not cooperate with one another. (e) Part VI (page 1160) sets forth the information that the Navy Department and the War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of the defensive installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to cope with a carrier attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that the Secretary of War, on 7 February 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet a hostile attack. It is made clear that Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that the base at Pearl Harbor should be capable of defense by local Army and Navy forces, leaving the Fleet free to operate without concern as to the safety of the base. It is further made clear that both the War and the Navy Departments had given full consideration to this matter and had been unable, during 1941, to augment local defenses to an adequate degree, because of the general state of unpreparedness for war. [3] (f) Fact VII (page 1165) sets forth that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the President on 5 November 1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time, and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the United States Pacific Fleet. The Court, also, points out that owing to security policies in the two countries, it was easy for Japan to conceal her own strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed a free opportunity to obtain information as to our own strength and dispositions. My comment is that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement that United States forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration of war, or actual attack, must always place the United States distinctly at a disadvantage during the period of strained relations. (g) Fact VIII (page 1167) stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base were necessary for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided, and opportunity given for repair and replenishment and for rest and recreation of personnel. The Court points out that it is foreign to the concept of naval warfare to require seagoing personnel to assume responsibility for security from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks that this concept imposes upon the Army responsibility for base defense, and that the United States Army fully understood this responsibility. My comment Page 337 is that this principle is sound enough but it cannot be carried to an illogical extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because, in principle, this is not normally a Fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor *should* have been strong enough for self defense. The [4] fact that it *was not* strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the employment of the Fleet, but nevertheless, he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for, employing the Fleet in defensive measures. (h) Fact IX (page 1169). This section of the Findings outlines the plans made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor. It points out that the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned responsibility for distant reconnaissance, that no planes were assigned to him, but that the 69 patrol planes belonging to the Fleet were to be made available to him in case of necessity. The Court remarks that the basic defect of this section of the plan lay in the fact that naval participation in long range reconnaissance depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this circumstance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the fundamental requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must be independent of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks that the effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, that it was not possible for Admiral Kimmel to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base (because of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My comment is that the Court seems to have over-stressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was sound policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of Admiral Kimmel, whose responsibility it was to allocate all the means at his disposal as best he could between the Fleet and the base defense forces. [5] (i) Facts X and XI (page 1171) set forth the states of readiness of the forces at Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of readiness was predicated on certain assumptions, which included the assumption that a declaration of war might be preceded by surprise attacks on ships at Pearl Harbor or surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, or by a combination of these two. The measures prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local patrols, daily search of operating areas by air, certain extensive anti-submarine precautions, the netting of the harbor entrance and the maintenance of augmented Condition 3 on board vessels in port. Condition of readiness No. 3 provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and anti-aircraft batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court points out this state of readiness did permit ships to open fire promptly when Japanese planes attacked. Local Army forces were in Alert No. 1 which provides for defense against sabotage and uprisings, with no threat from without. With respect to this phase of the matter I offer the comment that condition of readiness No. 3 is normally maintained in port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this condition enjoy a considerable measure of protection by reason of adequate local defense forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was not enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was well known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was not aware of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I discuss further later on. I also note from this section of the Findings that Army and Navy aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes moored on the water were not in condition to take the air promptly. Some patrol plane squadrons were in "day-off for rest" status; some patrol planes were in the air for local patrol and exercises: 50% were on 4 hours notice (page 669). This is further indication of the lack of appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the destruction of large [6] numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the Findings, also points out that there were no longer range reconnaissance in effect on 7 December a matter which I will refer to again later on. It will be noted that the last paragraph of Fact XI (page 1176) reads: "The Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything, to their defence." Page 338 This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur, for reasons set forth later on. (j) Fact XII (page 1176). The Court sets forth that attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launching of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a carrier before she can launch her planes, her location must be known and sufficient force must be at hand. The Court points out that in this instance Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown port, and that it is an established fact that no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December 1941. The Court deduces, and states as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7 December, under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and unpredictable as to time. I concur that there was no direct and positive knowledge that the Japanese attack force was en route to the Hawaiian area. However, as discussed later on, there was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits. [7] Fact XIII (page 1178) discusses the difficulty of long range reconnaissance with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel, and points out that Admiral Kimmel, after weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no routine long range reconnaissance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to have been Admiral Kimmel's feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were used for routine reconnaissance they would have been rapidly worn out and, therefore unavailable for Fleet purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter. There were many factors to be considered, and it is not easy to put one's self in his place. However, after considering all of the information that was at his disposal, it seems to me that he was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means available did not permit an all-around daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched. However, there were certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent. And it would appear that such partial cover would have been logical in the circumstances as known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. A pertinent matter in this connection is that when Admiral Richardson was Commander in Chief he provided for distant reconnaissance by patrol planes using the few at his disposal to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation. He considered the arc between 170 and 350 to be of primary importance, and believed the most probable direction of attack was from the southwest. These patrols were discontinued when, or shortly before, Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson (pages 683, 1053, 1055). (l) Fact XIV (page 1182). This section sets forth the fact that the Army had assumed responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process of installing radar and other [8] elements of the air warning system, but that the whole system was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not in condition to function. The system was partially in use for training and it so happened that a mobile radar station did pick up the approaching Japanese planes when they about 130 miles away, and reported this fact to the Information Center, where the only officer present was an officer under training, who assumed the planes to be a flight of Army bombers known to be en route from the United States. He made no report of the matter. My comment is that this is indicative of the unwarranted feeling of immunity from attack that seems to have pervaded all ranks at Pearl Harbor-both Army and Navy. It there had been awareness of the states of tension that existed in Washington, and awareness of Japanese potentialities, it appears that the air warning system, embryonic as it was, could have been used to give at least an hour's warning before the air attack struck. (m) Fact XV (1186) states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The Court points out that, though the harbor entrance was well protected against break-through by enemy submarines or small craft, there were no anti-torpedo baffles within the harbor for the protection of individual ships, because it had been assumed that aircraft torpedoes could not be made to run in the extremely shoal water of Pearl Harbor. The decision not to install baffles appears to Page 339 have been made by the Navy Department (page 1187). Proposals to use barrage balloons and smoke were considered but rejected for technical reasons. It is evident, in retrospect, that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated. (n) Fact XVI (page 1188). In this section of the Findings the Court traces the deterioration of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain information given to Admiral Kimmel on the subject. The more important items are as follows: [9] (1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for the Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action against Japan. (2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that the Japs would attack the United States. (3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO stating that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful and that indications were that a *surprise aggressive movement in any direction*, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility. (o) Fact XVII (page 1193). In this section the Court sets forth certain in, formation, which was known in Washington and which was transmitted to Admiral Kimmel, which the Court holds to have established the fact that the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere. The summary of the information on which this is based is as follows: (1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO beginning with the words, "This despatch is to be considered a war warning," and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days: [101] [sic] that there were indications of an amphibious movement against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo; and directing Admiral Kimmel to execute an appropriate defensive deployment. (2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War Department Message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated; that Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any time and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act, in case hostilities could not be avoided. (3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information Addressee in a despatch to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, directing him to scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea. (4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been decided to relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops. (5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the Department was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the time. (p) Fact XVIII (1196). This section of the Findings deals with information that became available in Washington during the period beginning 26 November. It is set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which had been in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued, coming to all end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information as to Japanese intentions during this period came to the attention of the Navy Department are set forth as follows: [11] (1) A number of messages were received from informers during and prior to this period in the Navy Department but were not sent to Admiral Kimmel. These messages are summarized in the Addendum to the Court's Finding of Facts at the back of Volume 5 of the record. The test of the messages is set forth at length in Volume 5, beginning at page 692. These messages indicate definite Japanese interest in dispositions at Pearl Harbor, and mention, in some cases, a desire to know where United States ships were berthed. Admiral Stark testified that he considered it undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel these despatehes, because to do so might jeopardize the secrecy which it was necessary to main as to the ability of the Navy Department to obtain them. This contention as some merit, in my opinion. It was Admiral Stark's responsibility to protect the sources of this information. However, it was equally his responsibility to give |