REPORTS, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD, NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY, AND HEWITT INQUIRY, WITH ENDORSEMENTS

During the second week of November, 1941, Commander [1183] W. G. Taylor  USNR, was, by Admiral Kimmel, detailed to the Army Interceptor Command  for duty in an advisory capacity, in connection with the setting up of  the Army air warning system. Commander Taylor had had experience with  the British air warning system and was familiar with radar in the stage  of its development that existed at that time.

On 24 November, 1941, he called a conference for the purpose of  determining how quickly the Information Center could be made fully  operative on a war-time basis, and to decide what additional personnel and equipment would be needed. Two naval officers and 6 Army officers  were present at this conference.

The minutes of the conference, concurred in by all present, included an exhaustive statement of deficiencies and the steps to be taken for their remedy. Copies of the minutes were furnished the conferees and copies  were forwarded to the Acting Commanding Officer of then Interceptor Command, and to the Acting Signal Officer, Headquarters, Hawaiian  Department. Steps agreed upon as necessary for the improvement of the  system had not become effective by 7 December, 1941.

The Army Interceptor Command was barely in the first stages of  organization by 7 December. Four of its officers had been sent to school  on the mainland in order to fit them for their new duties. Until 17 December, 1941, the organization was on a tentative basis only and the  actual order setting up the Command was not issued until that date. One  of the [1184] principal weaknesses of the Interceptor Command on 7 December, 1941, was that the Information Center had no provision for  keeping track of planes in the air near and over Oahu, and for distinguishing between those friendly and those hostile.

Between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, the Air Warning System operated from 0400 to 0700, the basis for these hours being that the  critical time of possible attack was considered to be from one hour  before sunrise until two hours after sunrise. On week days training in  the operation of the system also took place during working hours.

On the morning of 7 December the only officer in the Army Information  Center was 1st Lieutenant (now Lt. Colonel) K. A. Tyler, Army Air Corps. He had received no previous instruction as to his duties, had been on  duty there only once before, and on the morning in question was present  only in the capacity of an observer for training. At 0715 that morning he received a call from the radar station at Opana, located in the  northern part of the Island of Oahu, to the effect that a large number of planes, bearing approximately north, had been picked up on the screen. Assuming that these were friendly planes because he had heard  indirectly that a flight of B-17s was en route from Hamilton Field,  California, to Oahu, he did nothing about this report. These B-17s actually arrived over Oahu during the attack, and many of them were  destroyed.

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At the Opana station, where this report originated, Private Locard [sic]  (now 1st Lieutenant) and Private Elliott [1185] (now sergeant) were on  duty with instructions to observe and track flights and report them to  the Information Center. Private Locard had had some previous training but Elliott none. The station was scheduled to shut down at 0700, but as the truck had not come to take these men to their camp for breakfast, Private Locard continued to operate the radar set in order to assist in  the training of Elliott.

Shortly after 0700 there was picked up on the screen an unusually large  flight of planes, coming in from a northerly direction at a distance of  about 136 miles. Checking the equipment to make sure, Locard decided to  call the Information Center and did so when the planes had come in to  132 miles. Having reported the fact to the Army officer on duty (1st Lt.  Tyler), Locard and Elliott continued to track the planes in to twenty  miles from Oahu, when they lost them due to distortion.

For information of this flight to have been of value as a warning, it  would have been necessary for the planes first to have been promptly identified as hostile, and then their presence and their bearing and  distance immediately reported to and received by higher authority, and  disseminated throughout the Command. The organization and training, of the Information Center and Communication System at this time was not such as to permit these important requirements to be fulfilled.  Actually, the oncoming planes were not identified as hostile until the  Japanese marking on their wings came into view.

[1186] XV

The greatest damage to ships resulting from the attack of 7 December was  that inflicted by torpedoes launched from Japanese torpedo planes. These  torpedoes were designed specially for the form of attack in which they were used. Up to the time that the Japanese demonstrated the feasibility of delivering an attack from torpedo planes in relatively shallow water and under conditions of restricted length of approach, the best  professional opinion in the United States and Great Britain was to the effect that such an attack was not practicable.

After a study had been made of the problem of protecting vessels in port  against torpedo attack, the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to the  Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated 15 February, 1941, stated that  it was considered that the relatively shallow depth of water (about 45  feet) limited the need of anti-torpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor, and, in addition, that the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room  limited the practicability of the present type of baffles.

The letter further stated that certain limitations and considerations  must be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo  baffles within harbors, among which were the following:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and  fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between  120 and 150 knots. Desirable height [1187] for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the  exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

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(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a  baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of antiaircraft  batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a  large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of the congestion.

On 13 June, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to the Commandants of the various naval districts, modified limitation (a) by stating that recent developments had shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights as much as 300  feet and, in [1188] some cases, make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet with excellent runs. This letter, however, did not modify the view expressed in the letter of 15 February as to the need for anti- torpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor.

Barrage balloons and smoke were also considered as means of defense but were rejected, the barrage balloons because they would interfere with the activity of U. S. Aircraft, and the smoke because the strength of the prevailing winds would render it ineffective.

The specially designed Japanese torpedo and the technique for its use fell in the category of the so-called secret weapon, of which the robot bomb and the magnetic mine are examples. Such weapons always give to the originator an initial advantage which continues until the defense  against them has been perfected.

It is a fact that by far the greatest portion of the damage inflicted by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was due to the secret development and employment of a specially designed torpedo.

XVI

Strained relations between the United States and Japan had existed and been a source of concern to this country for many months prior to 7 December, 1941. That the Japanese policy in the Far East was one of aggression had been well known for many years. Their program of  expansion, which envisaged Japan as *the* dominating power in the Western Pacific, was in direct conflict with the policies of the United  States [1189] and Great Britain, and opposed to agreements established by treaty.

At the instigation of the Japanese, negotiations were begun by the State Department on 12 May, 1941, looking to the peaceful settlement

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of existing problems. On 17 November, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was joined by Mr. Kurusu in the capacity of special envoy.

On 26 July, 1941, Japanese assets in the United States were frozen. The order freezing these assets required a system of licensing shipments to Japan, and no licenses were issued for oil or petroleum products.

There was a feeling on the part of U. S. officials that hostilities, unless prevented by some means, would become an actuality in the not  distant future. They were familiar with the Japanese trait of attacking without declaration of war, as had been done against China in 1894, and against Russia in 1904.

The Secretary of State held numerous conferences with the Secretary of  War and the Secretary of the Navy, at which the negotiations with Japan were discussed. The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of  Naval Operations attended many of these conferences and were kept  informed of the progress of these negotiations. At the same time efforts to improve the military position of the United States were being  vigorously prosecuted.

On 16 October, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations informed Admiral  Kimmel by dispatch that a grave situation had been created by the  resignation of the Japanese cabinet, [1190] that the new cabinet would  probably be anti-American, that hostilities between Japan and Russia were a possibility, and that the Japanese might also attack the United  States and Great Britain. In the same dispatch Admiral Kimmel was directed to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not  disclose strategic intentions, nor constitute provocative action against  Japan.

On the following day, 17 October, 1941, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated "Personally I do not believe that the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I  sent you (that of 16 October) merely stated the 'possibility'".

For the purpose of viewing the events of the succeeding months in their  true relation to the events of 7 December, this date of 16 October, 1941, may well be taken as the beginning of a critical period which terminated in the attack of 7 December, 1941.

In accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16  October, Admiral Kimmel made certain preparatory deployments, including the stationing of submarines off both Wake and Midway, the reinforcement  of Johnston and Wake with additional Marines, ammunition, and stores, and the dispatch of additional Marines to Palmyra. He also placed on 12  hours' notice certain vessels of the Fleet which were in West Coast  ports, held six submarines in readiness to depart for Japan, delayed the sailing of one battleship which was scheduled to visit a West Coast Navy  Yard and placed in [1191] effect additional security measures in the Fleet operating areas.

He reported to the Chief of Naval Operations the steps taken and received written approval of his action. He continued the measures which he had already placed in effect looking to readiness for war, preparation of the Pacific Fleet for war being his assigned task.

He did not interpret the dispatch of 16 October as directing or  warranting that he abandon his preparations for war. He held daily  conferences with his subordinate commanders and the members of his  staff, all experienced officers of long service, and sought by every

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means to ascertain wherein his interpretation might be incorrect. The consensus throughout was that no further steps were warranted by the  information at hand.

On 24 November, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from the Chief  of Naval Operations, addressed also to the Commander- in-Chief, Asiatic  Fleet, and to Commandants of Naval districts with headquarters at San  Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Panama, which stated:

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiation with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and  movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addresses to inform senior Army  officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to  complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately."

The contents of this dispatch were made known to Lieut. General Short  and discussed with him.

[1192] The reaction on Admiral Kimmel and his advisers was to direct  their attention to the Far East. They did not consider that the  expression "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction" included the probability or imminence of attack in the Hawaiian area, specific  mention having been made of the Philippines and Guam with no mention of  Hawaii.

They recognized the capability of Japan to deliver a long-range surprise bombing attack and that she might attack without a declaration of war.  They reasoned that she would not commit the strategic blunder of  delivering a surprise attack on United States territory, the one course that irrevocably would unite the American people in war against Japan.  Public opinion in the United States was far from being crystallized on  the question of taking steps to curb her expansion in the Western  Pacific.

Conceivably, Japan might well have taken aggressive action against  British and Dutch possessions in the Far East, gaining the oil and other raw materials that she was seeking, without military interference from  the United States. An attack elsewhere than in the Far East seemed,  therefore, to be only a remote possibility and not enough of a  probability to warrant abandonment of the preparation of the Fleet for war.

To continue these preparations was, therefore, Admiral Kimmel's  decision, made on his own responsibility in the light of the information then available to him and in the knowledge that every precaution within  his power, compatible [1193] with maintaining the Fleet in a state of  readiness for war, had already been taken.

XVII

On 27 November, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from the Chief  of Naval Operations, reading as follows:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with  Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have  ceased and a aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few  days.  The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization  of naval task forces

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indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai  or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned. Inform  District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War  Department. Continental districts, Guam, Samoa directed take appropriate  measures against sabotage."

This dispatch was sent also to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet,  and has since become known as the "war warning message".

On the morning following the receipt of this dispatch, Admiral Kimmel  discussed its contents with Lieut. General Short, Rear Admiral Bloch, the Flag officers of the Fleet present, and the members of his staff.

After much further study, Admiral Kimmel and his advisers interpreted  the warning to mean that war was imminent, and that readiness to  undertake active operations was expected. They were unable to read into it any indication that an attack against the Hawaiian area was to be  expected, particular attention having been directed to the Japanese activities in the Far East, with objectives in that area [1194] specifically mentioned. No reference was made to the possibility of a surprise aggressive move "in any direction", as had been done in the  dispatch of 24 November.

There was nothing to indicate that defensive measures should take precedence over all others. The "appropriate defensive deployment" that  was directed was not interpreted as referring specifically to the  Pacific Fleet, in view of the deployments of the Pacific Fleet already  made in compliance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October. In addition, since that date, a squadron of submarines had been  sent to the Philippines, leaving only 5 in Pearl Harbor.

There were other considerations which no doubt influenced Admiral  Kimmel. The Navy Department's dispatch of 30 November, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and sent to Admiral Kimmel for his  information, ordered the Commander-in- hief, Asiatic Fleet, to scout for  information of Japanese movements in the China Sea. This appeared to  indicate that the authorities in Washington expected hostilities to  occur in the Far East, rather than elsewhere.

On 28 November the Chief of Naval Operations advised Admiral Kimmel that  the Department had requested, and the Army had agreed to, the relief of  Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops, and the replacement of Marine planes with Army pursuit planes. This action, involving as it did a complicated problem and the movements of sizeable U. S. Naval forces westward to effect their transfer, was an indication of the fact that the authorities [1195] in the War and Navy Departments  did not then expect a hostile movement toward the Hawaiian Islands.

On 28 November, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations repeated to Admiral  Kimmel the information contained in a dispatch which the War Department,  on 27 November, had transmitted to Lieut. General Short, and other Army addressees, to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated, that Japanese future action was unpredictable, that hostile action was  possible at any moment, and that it was desirable that Japan commit the  first overt act in case hostilities could not be avoided. Such measures as were undertaken were to be carried out so as not to alarm the civil  population or disclose intent.

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To this dispatch Lieut. General Short had replied on 27 November:

"Report Department alerted against sabotage. Liaison with Navy."

The steps taken caused the Army planes to be grouped in such manner as to afford better protection against sabotage, although militating against their taking the air promptly. In the absence of a reply from the War Department, Lieut. General Short considered that the alert he  had placed in effect was approved.

Lieut. General Short having, on 28 November, 1941, received instructions from the Adjutant General of the Army to take measures to protect military establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage, reported in detail the measures that he had taken and repeated the fact that he had placed in effect Alert (No. 1) against sabotage. He interpreted the dispatch from the Adjutant General as further [1196]  indicating that his alert against sabotage constituted complete compliance with the War Department's wishes.

There was no mention in any of the dispatches received by Lieut. General  Short, between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, of the possibility or  probability of an attack against Oahu.

As further evidence of the prevailing sentiment against the likelihood  of an immediate move toward Hawaii, it is a fact that a flight of B- 7s from the Mainland arrived over Oahu during the attack of 7 December,  without ammunition and with guns not ready for firing.

These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testifying  before the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7  December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area. There  were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere.

XVIII

From 26 November to 7 December, 1941, conversations between our  government and Japan did continue, notwithstanding the statement  contained in the war warning message under date of 27 November, 1941,  that "negotiations with Japan, looking toward stabilization of  conditions in the Pacific have ceased."

This statement was based upon the note delivered by the State Department  to the Japanese representatives on 26 November, a copy of which was furnished the Navy [1197] Department. It did not in itself discontinue  negotiations and conversations, but, on the contrary, gave an "outline  of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan."  The stipulations contained therein were drastic and were likely to be  unacceptable to Japan.

The reply to this note was anxiously awaited by the high officials of  the War and Navy Department because of the feeling that Japan would not accept the conditions presented, and that diplomatic relations would be  severed or that war would declared. The sending of the note therefore began the final phase of the critical period which culminated on 7 December.

Although it was stated in the press that a note had been delivered none of its contents was given out to the public until after the attack.  Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note nor of  its contents until many months after the attack.

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In a personal letter to Admiral Stark, dated 26 May, 1941, he had  invited attention to the importance of keeping commanders, well removed  from Washington, informed of developments and eventualities, stating:

"The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position.  He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a [1198] condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

"It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the  present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though  necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well  informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

"It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the  Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all  important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means  available."

From time to time during this critical period there was received in the  War and Navy Departments certain other important information bearing on the current situation. The testimony as to this information forms a part  of the record of this Court. The details of this information are not discussed or analyzed in these findings, the Court having been informed  that their disclosure would militate against the successful prosecution  of the war.

[1199] This information was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, nor to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. No facilities were available to them, either in the Fleet or in the Hawaiian area, which would enable them to obtain the information direct.  They were dependent solely upon Washington for such information.

With regard to not transmitting this information, the stand taken by the Chief of Naval Operations was that the "war warning message" of 27 November completely covered the situation. The fact remains however, that this message, standing alone, could not covey to the commanders in  the field the picture as it was seen in Washington.

Only three other messages were received by the Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific Fleet, from the Chief of Naval Operations between 26 November and 7 December, one informing him that the Japanese had instructed  diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London to destroy certain codes, and the other two relative to the destruction of United States codes at Guam and  outlying islands.

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In the early forenoon of 7 December, Washington time, the War and Navy  Departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break in  diplomatic relations was imminent and, by inference and deduction that  an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. This information was embodied in a dispatch by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, who, after consulting with the Chief of Naval Operations by telephone, had it encoded and sent to the Commanding Generals in Panama, Manila, and  Hawaii, with instructions that the naval authorities in those areas be  informed of its contents.

[1200] The dispatch to Hawaii left Washington at 12:17 p. m. Washington  time (6:47 a. m., Honolulu time) and arrived in Honolulu's RCA office at 7:33 a. m. (Honolulu time) . Thus there remained but 22 minutes before the attack began for delivery, decoding, dissemination, and action.  Lieut. General Short did not receive the decoded dispatch until the  afternoon of 7 December, several hour after the attacking force had departed.

Had the telephone and plain language been used, this information could  have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began.  Even in this event, however, there was no action open, nor means  available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome.  There was already in effect the condition of readiness best suited to  the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu.

XIX

It is a prime obligation of Command to keep subordinate commanders, particularly those in distant areas constantly supplied with  information. To fail to meet this obligation is to commit a military error

It is a fact that Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations and  responsible for the operation of the Fleet, and having important  information in his possession during this critical period, especially on  the morning of 7 December, failed to transmit this information to  Admiral [1201] Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of  the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington.

OPINION

Based on Finding II, the Court is of the opinion that the presence of a  large number of combatant vessels of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 December, 1941, was necessary, and that the information available  to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules.

Based on Finding III, the Court is of the opinion that the  Constitutional requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the  Congress, no blow may be struck until after a hostile attack has been  delivered. Prevented the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from taking  offensive action as a means of defense in the event of Japanese vessels  or planes appearing [in] the Hawaiian area, and that it imposed upon him the responsibility of avoiding taking any action which might be  construed as an overt act.

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Based on Finding V, the Court is of the opinion that the relations  between Admiral Husband E Kimmel, USN, and Lieut. General Walter C.  Short, U. S. Army, were friendly, cordial and cooperative, that there was no lack of interest, [1202] no lack of appreciation of  responsibility, and no failure to cooperate on the part of either. And  that each was cognizant of the measures being undertaken by the other  for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the degree required by the common interest. 

Based on Finding VI, the Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies in personnel and material which existed during 1941, had a direct  adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor on and prior to 7 December.

Based on Finding VII, the Court is of the opinion that the superiority  of the Japanese Fleet over the U.S. Pacific Fleet during the year 1941, and the ability of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial advantage not attainable by the United States up to 7  December, 1941.

Based on Finding VIII, the Court is of the opinion that the defense of  the Pearl Harbor Naval Base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the 14th Naval District, and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to  this extent. The Court is further of the opinion that the defense should  have been such as to function effectively independently of the Fleet, in view of the fundamental requirement that the strategic freedom of action  of the Fleet [1203] must be assured demands that the defense of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the base, or for that of the vessels within its limits. Based on Findings IV, VIII  and IX, the Court is of the opinion that the duties of Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U.S.N., in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor,  were performed satisfactorily.

Based on Finding IX, the Court is of the opinion that the detailed Naval  Participation Air Defense plans drawn up and jointly agreed upon were complete and sound in concept, but that they contained a basic defect in  that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of  aircraft belonging to and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the  morning of 7 December these plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of  time, which was not the case on that morning.

The Court is further of the opinion that it was not possible for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to make his Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer in view of the need for  their employment with the Fleet.

Based on Finding X, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Pacific Fleet at sea and in the operating areas, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet, and that the steps taken  were adequate and effective.

Based on Finding XI, the Court is of the opinion that, by virtue of the information that Admiral Kimmel had at hand which indicated

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