| by Barbara Elias January 25, 2001 
      Richard Clarke Memo: "We urgently need . . . a Principals level review on 
      the al Qida network." Document Central to 
      Clarke-Rice Dispute on Bush Terrorism Policy Pre-9/11 National Security 
      Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 147 February 10, 2005 
      Washington, D.C., February 10, 2005 - The 
      National Security Archive today posted the widely-debated, but previously 
      unavailable, 
      January 
      25, 2001, memo from counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke to 
      national security advisor Condoleezza Rice - the first 
      terrorism strategy paper of the Bush administration. The document was 
      central to debates in the 9/11 hearings over the Bush administration's 
      policies and actions on terrorism before September 11, 2001. Clarke's memo 
      requests an immediate meeting of the National Security Council's 
      Principals Committee to discuss broad strategies for combating al-Qaeda by 
      giving counterterrorism aid to the Northern Alliance and Uzbekistan, 
      expanding the counterterrorism budget and responding to the U.S.S. 
      Cole attack. Despite Clarke's request, there was no Principals 
      Committee meeting on al-Qaeda until September 4, 2001.  The January 25, 2001, memo, 
      recently released to the National Security Archive by the National 
      Security Council, bears a declassification stamp of April 7, 2004, one day 
      prior to Rice's testimony before the 9/11 Commission on April 8, 2004. 
      Responding to claims that she ignored the al-Qaeda threat before September 
      11, Rice stated in a March 22, 2004 Washington Post op-ed, "No al 
      Qaeda plan was turned over to the new administration." Two days after Rice's March 22 
      op-ed, Clarke told the 9/11 Commission, "there's a lot of debate about 
      whether it's a plan or a strategy or a series of options -- but all of the 
      things we recommended back in January were those things on the table in 
      September. They were done. They were done after September 11th. They were 
      all done. I didn't really understand why they couldn't have been done in 
      February."  Also attached to the original 
      Clarke memo are two Clinton-era documents relating to al-Qaeda. The first,
      "Tab A December 2000 Paper: Strategy for Eliminating the Threat 
      from the Jihadist Networks of al-Qida: Status and Prospects," was 
      released to the National Security Archive along with the Clarke memo. "Tab 
      B, September 1998 Paper: Pol-Mil Plan for al-Qida," also known as the 
      Delenda Plan, was attached to the original memo, but was not released to 
      the Archive and remains under request with the National Security Council.
       Below are additional references 
      to the January 25, 2001, memo from congressional debates and the 9/11 
      Commission testimonies of Richard Clarke and Condoleezza Rice. Excerpts from:NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
 Eighth Public Hearing
 Wednesday, March 24, 2004
 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC
 Chaired by: Thomas H. Kean
 [See also
      
      9/11 Commission Staff Statement - Intelligence Policy Staff Statement No. 
      7 by Alexis Albion, Michael Hurley, Dan Marcus, Lloyd Salvetti and 
      Steve Dunne]  Testimony of Dan Marcus - 
      9/11 Commission staff member, general counsel: 
        In December 2000, the CIA 
        developed initiatives -- moving off the Cole now -- based on 
        the assumption that policy and money were no longer constraints. The 
        result was the so-called Blue Sky memo, which we discussed earlier 
        today. This was forwarded to the NSC staff. As the Clinton administration 
        drew to a close, the NSC counterterrorism staff developed another 
        strategy paper; the first such comprehensive effort since the Delenda 
        plan of 1998. The resulting paper, titled "A Strategy for 
        Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of Al Qaida; Status 
        and Prospects," reviewed the threat, the records to date, 
        incorporated the CIA's new ideas from the Blue Sky memo, and posed 
        several near-term policy choices. The goal was to roll back Al Qaida 
        over a period of three to five years, reducing it eventually to a rump 
        group like others formerly feared but now largely defunct terrorist 
        organizations in the 1980s. Quote, "Continued anti-Al Qaida operations 
        at the current level will prevent some attacks, but will not seriously 
        attrite their ability to plan and conduct attacks," Clarke and his staff 
        wrote.  … Asked by Hadley to offer major 
        initiatives, on January 25, 2001 Clarke forwarded his
        December 2000 strategy paper and a copy of his 1998 
        Delenda plan to the new national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice. 
        Clarke laid out a proposed agenda for urgent action by the new 
        Administration: Approval of covert assistance to the Northern Alliance; 
        significantly increase funding; choosing a standard of evidence for 
        attributing responsibility for the Cole and deciding on a 
        response; going forward with new Predator missions in the spring and 
        preparation of an armed version; and more work on terrorist fundraising. … Clarke asked on several 
        occasions for early principals meetings on these issues, and was 
        frustrated that no early meeting was scheduled. No principals committee 
        meetings on Al Qaida were held until September 4th, 2001. Rice and 
        Hadley said this was because the deputies committee needed to work 
        through many issues relating to the new policy on Al Qaida. The 
        principals committee did meet frequently before September 11th on other 
        subjects, Rice told us, including Russia, the Persian Gulf and the 
        Middle East peace process. Rice and Hadley told us that, although the 
        Clinton administration had worked very hard on the Al Qaida program, its 
        policies on Al Qaida, quote, "had run out of gas," and they therefore 
        set about developing a new presidential directive and a new, 
        comprehensive policy on terrorism. Testimony of Richard 
      Clarke, former White House counterterrorism coordinator: 
        TIMOTHY ROEMER, Commission 
        Member: OK. With my 15 minutes, let's move into the Bush administration. On January 25th, we've seen a
        memo that 
        you've written to Dr. Rice urgently asking for a principals' review of 
        Al Qaida. You include helping the Northern Alliance, covert 
        aid, significant new '02 budget authority to help fight Al Qaida and a 
        response to the USS Cole. You attach to this document both the 
        Delenda Plan of 1998 and a strategy paper from December 2000. Do you get a response to this 
        urgent request for a principals meeting on these? And how does this 
        affect your time frame for dealing with these important issues? CLARKE: I did get a 
        response, and the response was that in the Bush administration I should, 
        and my committee, counterterrorism security group, should report to the 
        deputies committee, which is a sub-Cabinet level committee, and not to 
        the principals and that, therefore, it was inappropriate for me to be 
        asking for a principals' meeting. Instead, there would be a deputies 
        meeting. ROEMER: So does this slow the 
        process down to go to the deputies rather than to the principals or a 
        small group as you had previously done? CLARKE: It slowed it down 
        enormously, by months. First of all, the deputies committee didn't meet 
        urgently in January or February. Then when the deputies committee did 
        meet, it took the issue of Al Qaida as part of a cluster of policy 
        issues, including nuclear proliferation in South Asia, democratization 
        in Pakistan, how to treat the various problems, including narcotics and 
        other problems in Afghanistan, and launched on a series of 
        deputies meetings extending over several months to address Al Qaida in 
        the context of all of those inter-related issues. That process probably 
        ended, I think in July of 2001. So we were ready for a principals 
        meeting in July. But the principals calendar was full and then they went 
        on vacation, many of them in August, so we couldn't meet in August, and 
        therefore the principals met in September. … ROEMER: You then wrote a 
        memo on September 4th to Dr. Rice expressing some of these frustrations 
        several months later, if you say the time frame is May or June when you 
        decided to resign. A memo comes out that we have seen on September the 
        4th. You are blunt in blasting DOD for not willingly using the force and 
        the power. You blast the CIA for blocking Predator. You urge 
        policy-makers to imagine a day after hundreds of Americans lay dead at 
        home or abroad after a terrorist attack and ask themselves what else 
        they could have done. You write this on September the 4th, seven days 
        before September 11th. CLARKE: That's right. 
         ROEMER: What else could have 
        been done, Mr. Clarke?  CLARKE: Well, all of the things 
        that we recommended in the plan or strategy -- there's a lot of debate 
        about whether it's a plan or a strategy or a series of options -- but 
        all of the things we recommended back in January were those things on 
        the table in September. They were done. They were done after September 
        11th. They were all done. I didn't really understand why they couldn't 
        have been done in February. … SLADE GORTON, Commission 
        member: Now, since my yellow light is on, at this point my final 
        question will be this: Assuming that the recommendations that you made 
        on January 25th of 2001, based on Delenda, based on Blue Sky, including 
        aid to the Northern Alliance, which had been an agenda item at this 
        point for two and a half years without any action, assuming that there 
        had been more Predator reconnaissance missions, assuming that that had 
        all been adopted say on January 26th, year 2001, is there the remotest 
        chance that it would have prevented 9/11?  CLARKE: No.  GORTON: It just would have 
        allowed our response, after 9/11, to be perhaps a little bit faster?
         CLARKE: Well, the response 
        would have begun before 9/11.  GORTON: Yes, but there was no 
        recommendation, on your part or anyone else's part, that we declare war 
        and attempt to invade Afghanistan prior to 9/11?  CLARKE: That's right. 
         … TIMOTHY J. ROEMER: Thank you, 
        Mr. Chairman. Having served on the joint inquiry, the only person of 
        this 9/11 panel to have served on the inquiry, 
        I can say in open session to some of Mr. Fielding's inquiries that as 
        the joint inquiry asked for information on the National Security Council 
        and we requested that the National Security Adviser Dr. Rice come before 
        the joint inquiry and answer those questions. She refused. And she 
        didn't come. She didn't come before the 9/11 commission. And when we 
        asked for some questions to be answered, Mr. Hadley answered those 
        questions in a written form. So I think part of the answer might be that 
        we didn't have access to the January 25th memo. We didn't have access to 
        the September 4th memo. We didn't have access to many of the documents 
        and the e-mails. We're not only talking about Mr. Clarke being before 
        the 9/11 commission for more than 15 hours, but I think in talking to 
        the staff, we have hundreds of documents and e-mails that we didn't 
        previously have, which hopefully informs us to ask Mr. Clarke and ask 
        Dr. Rice the tough questions. Debate over the January 
      25, 2001 memo in Congress: Congressional Record: 
      March 25, 2004 (Senate) [Page S3122-S3123]From the Congressional Record Online via
      GPO 
      Access [DOCID:cr25mr04-92]
 Excerpt from the Senate 
      floor on March 26, 2004, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY): 
        Also in this August 2002 
        interview, Clarke noted the Bush administration, in mid-January of 2001 
        -- before the 9/11 attack -- decided to do two things to respond to the 
        threat of terrorism: "One, to vigorously pursue the existing policy, 
        including all the lethal covert action finds which we have now made 
        public, to some extent; the second thing the administration decided to 
        do was to initiate a process to look at these issues which had been on 
        the table for a couple of years and get them decided.'' In other words, what Clarke was 
        saying in 2002 to members of the press was that the Bush 
        administration's response to the war on terror was much more aggressive 
        than it was under the Clinton years. Now he is singing an entirely 
        different tune. This is a man who lacks credibility. He may be an 
        intelligent man, he may be a dedicated public servant, but clearly he 
        has a grudge of some sort against the Bush administration. If he was 
        unable to develop a more robust response during the Clinton years, he 
        would only be able to blame himself. He was in charge of 
        counterterrorism during those 8 years. How could the Bush administration 
        be to blame in 8 months for the previous administration's failure over 8 
        years to truly declare war on al-Qaida?  Congressional Record: 
      March 30, 2004 (Senate) [Page S3315-S3317]From the Congressional Record Online via
      GPO 
      Access [DOCID:cr30mr04-151]
 Excerpt from the Senate 
      floor on March 30, 2004, Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD): 
        In Mr. Clarke's case, clear and 
        troubling double standards are being applied. Last year, when the 
        administration was being criticized for the President's misleading 
        statement about Niger and uranium, the White House unexpectedly 
        declassified portions of the National Intelligence Estimate. When the administration wants 
        to bolster its public case, there is little that appears too sensitive 
        to be declassified. Now, people around the 
        President want to release parts of Mr. Clarke's earlier testimony in 
        2002. According to news reports, the CIA is already working on 
        declassifying that testimony -- at the administration's request. And last week several documents 
        were declassified literally overnight, not in an effort to provide 
        information on a pressing policy matter to the American people, but in 
        an apparent effort to discredit a public servant who gave 30 years of 
        service to the American Government. I'll support declassifying 
        Mr. Clarke's testimony before the Joint Inquiry, but the administration 
        shouldn't be selective. Consistent with our need to protect sources and 
        methods, we should declassify his entire testimony. And to make sure 
        that the American people have access to the full record as they consider 
        this question, we should also declassify 
        his 
        January 25 memo to Dr. Rice, the September 4, 2001 
        National Security Directive dealing with terrorism, Dr. Rice's testimony 
        to the 9-11 Commission, the still-classified 28 pages from the 
        House-Senate inquiry relating to Saudi Arabia, and a list of the dates 
        and topics of all National Security Council meetings before September 4, 
        2001.  Congressional Record: 
      March 31, 2004 (House) [Page H1772-H1779]From the Congressional Record Online via
      GPO 
      Access [DOCID:cr31mr04-105])
 Excerpt from the House 
      floor on March 31, 2004, Representative Frank Pallone (D-NJ): 
        Now, this past Sunday, Clarke 
        said he would support the declassification of his testimony before the 
        joint intelligence panels if the administration also declassifies the 
        National Security Adviser's testimony before the 9/11 Commission and the 
        declassification of the January 25, 2001, memo that Clarke sent to Rice 
        laying out a terrorism strategy, a strategy that was not approved until 
        months later. Madam Speaker, House Democrats 
        really want a full accounting of the events leading up to the September 
        11 attacks, including the extent to which a preoccupation with Iraq 
        affected efforts to deal with the threat posed by al Qaeda. It is nice 
        to see the White House has finally stopped stonewalling the commission 
        and now says that it will provide the public testimony the commission is 
        requesting. But Americans need to be able to fully evaluate the 
        decisions of government leaders, especially when it comes to the life 
        and death decisions of war and peace. Excerpts from: NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
 Ninth Public Hearing
 Thursday, April 8, 2004
 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC
 Chaired by: Thomas H. Kean
 Testimony of national 
      security advisor Condoleezza Rice: MR. BOB KERREY, Committee Member: 
      Well, I think it's an unfortunate figure of speech because I think -- 
      especially after the attack on the Cole on the 12th of August -- 
      October 2000. It would have been a swatting a fly. It would not have been 
      -- we did not need to wait to get a strategic plan. Dick Clarke had in his 
      memo on the 20th of January overt military operations as a -- he turned 
      that memo around in 24 hours, Dr. Clarke. There were a lot of plans in 
      place in the Clinton administration, military plans in the Clinton 
      administration. In fact, just since we're in the mood to declassify stuff, 
      he included in his January 25th memo two appendixes: Appendix A, "Strategy 
      for the Elimination of the Jihadist Threat of al Qaeda;" Appendix B, 
      "Political- Military Plan for al Qaeda." So I just -- why didn't we 
      respond to the Cole? Why didn't we swat that fly?  MS. RICE: I believe that there is 
      a question of whether or not you respond in a tactical sense or whether 
      you respond in a strategic sense, whether or not you decide that you are 
      going to respond to every attack with minimal use of military force and go 
      after every -- on a kind of tit-for-tat basis. By the way, in that memo, 
      Dick Clarke talks about not doing this tit for tat, doing this on a time 
      of our choosing. … Yes, the Cole had 
      happened. We received, I think, on January 25th the same assessment or 
      roughly the same assessment of who was responsible for the Cole 
      that Sandy Berger talked to you about. It was preliminary. It was not 
      clear. But that was not the reason that we felt that we did not want to, 
      quote, "respond to the Cole." We knew that the options that had 
      been employed by the Clinton administration had been standoff options. The 
      President had -- meaning missile strikes, or perhaps bombers would have 
      been possible, long-range bombers, although getting in place the apparatus 
      to use long-range bombers is even a matter of whether you have basing in 
      the region. We knew that Osama bin Laden had 
      been, in something that was provided to me, bragging that he was going to 
      withstand any response, and then he was going to emerge and come out 
      stronger. We -- …We simply believed that the best approach was to put in place a plan that 
      was going to eliminate this threat, not respond to it, tit-for-tat.
 … MS. RICE: The fact is that what 
      we were presented on January the 25th was a set of ideas -- and a paper, 
      most of which was about what the Clinton administration had done, and 
      something called the Delenda plan, which had been considered in 1998 and 
      never adopted. … We decided to take a different 
      track. We decided to put together a strategic approach to this that would 
      get the regional powers -- the problem wasn't that you didn't have a good 
      counterterrorism person. The problem was you didn't have approach against 
      al Qaeda because you didn't have an approach against Afghanistan, and you 
      didn't have an approach against Afghanistan because you didn't have an 
      approach against Pakistan. And until we could get that right, we didn't 
      have a policy.  … In the memorandum that Dick 
      Clarke sent me on January 25th, he mentions sleeper cells. There is no 
      mention or recommendation of anything that needs to be done about them. 
      And the FBI was pursuing them. And usually when things come to me it's 
      because I'm supposed to do something about it, and there was no indication 
      that the FBI was not adequately pursuing the sleeper cells.  
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