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by Barbara Elias
January 25, 2001
Richard Clarke Memo: "We urgently need . . . a Principals level review on
the al Qida network."
Document Central to
Clarke-Rice Dispute on Bush Terrorism Policy Pre-9/11
National Security
Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 147
February 10, 2005
Washington, D.C., February 10, 2005 - The
National Security Archive today posted the widely-debated, but previously
unavailable,
January
25, 2001, memo from counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke to
national security advisor Condoleezza Rice - the first
terrorism strategy paper of the Bush administration. The document was
central to debates in the 9/11 hearings over the Bush administration's
policies and actions on terrorism before September 11, 2001. Clarke's memo
requests an immediate meeting of the National Security Council's
Principals Committee to discuss broad strategies for combating al-Qaeda by
giving counterterrorism aid to the Northern Alliance and Uzbekistan,
expanding the counterterrorism budget and responding to the U.S.S.
Cole attack. Despite Clarke's request, there was no Principals
Committee meeting on al-Qaeda until September 4, 2001.
The January 25, 2001, memo,
recently released to the National Security Archive by the National
Security Council, bears a declassification stamp of April 7, 2004, one day
prior to Rice's testimony before the 9/11 Commission on April 8, 2004.
Responding to claims that she ignored the al-Qaeda threat before September
11, Rice stated in a March 22, 2004 Washington Post op-ed, "No al
Qaeda plan was turned over to the new administration."
Two days after Rice's March 22
op-ed, Clarke told the 9/11 Commission, "there's a lot of debate about
whether it's a plan or a strategy or a series of options -- but all of the
things we recommended back in January were those things on the table in
September. They were done. They were done after September 11th. They were
all done. I didn't really understand why they couldn't have been done in
February."
Also attached to the original
Clarke memo are two Clinton-era documents relating to al-Qaeda. The first,
"Tab A December 2000 Paper: Strategy for Eliminating the Threat
from the Jihadist Networks of al-Qida: Status and Prospects," was
released to the National Security Archive along with the Clarke memo. "Tab
B, September 1998 Paper: Pol-Mil Plan for al-Qida," also known as the
Delenda Plan, was attached to the original memo, but was not released to
the Archive and remains under request with the National Security Council.
Below are additional references
to the January 25, 2001, memo from congressional debates and the 9/11
Commission testimonies of Richard Clarke and Condoleezza Rice.
Excerpts from:
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
Eighth Public Hearing
Wednesday, March 24, 2004
Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC
Chaired by: Thomas H. Kean
[See also
9/11 Commission Staff Statement - Intelligence Policy Staff Statement No.
7 by Alexis Albion, Michael Hurley, Dan Marcus, Lloyd Salvetti and
Steve Dunne]
Testimony of Dan Marcus -
9/11 Commission staff member, general counsel:
In December 2000, the CIA
developed initiatives -- moving off the Cole now -- based on
the assumption that policy and money were no longer constraints. The
result was the so-called Blue Sky memo, which we discussed earlier
today. This was forwarded to the NSC staff.
As the Clinton administration
drew to a close, the NSC counterterrorism staff developed another
strategy paper; the first such comprehensive effort since the Delenda
plan of 1998. The resulting paper, titled "A Strategy for
Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of Al Qaida; Status
and Prospects," reviewed the threat, the records to date,
incorporated the CIA's new ideas from the Blue Sky memo, and posed
several near-term policy choices. The goal was to roll back Al Qaida
over a period of three to five years, reducing it eventually to a rump
group like others formerly feared but now largely defunct terrorist
organizations in the 1980s. Quote, "Continued anti-Al Qaida operations
at the current level will prevent some attacks, but will not seriously
attrite their ability to plan and conduct attacks," Clarke and his staff
wrote.
…
Asked by Hadley to offer major
initiatives, on January 25, 2001 Clarke forwarded his
December 2000 strategy paper and a copy of his 1998
Delenda plan to the new national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice.
Clarke laid out a proposed agenda for urgent action by the new
Administration: Approval of covert assistance to the Northern Alliance;
significantly increase funding; choosing a standard of evidence for
attributing responsibility for the Cole and deciding on a
response; going forward with new Predator missions in the spring and
preparation of an armed version; and more work on terrorist fundraising.
…
Clarke asked on several
occasions for early principals meetings on these issues, and was
frustrated that no early meeting was scheduled. No principals committee
meetings on Al Qaida were held until September 4th, 2001. Rice and
Hadley said this was because the deputies committee needed to work
through many issues relating to the new policy on Al Qaida. The
principals committee did meet frequently before September 11th on other
subjects, Rice told us, including Russia, the Persian Gulf and the
Middle East peace process. Rice and Hadley told us that, although the
Clinton administration had worked very hard on the Al Qaida program, its
policies on Al Qaida, quote, "had run out of gas," and they therefore
set about developing a new presidential directive and a new,
comprehensive policy on terrorism.
Testimony of Richard
Clarke, former White House counterterrorism coordinator:
TIMOTHY ROEMER, Commission
Member: OK. With my 15 minutes, let's move into the Bush administration.
On January 25th, we've seen a
memo that
you've written to Dr. Rice urgently asking for a principals' review of
Al Qaida. You include helping the Northern Alliance, covert
aid, significant new '02 budget authority to help fight Al Qaida and a
response to the USS Cole. You attach to this document both the
Delenda Plan of 1998 and a strategy paper from December 2000.
Do you get a response to this
urgent request for a principals meeting on these? And how does this
affect your time frame for dealing with these important issues?
CLARKE: I did get a
response, and the response was that in the Bush administration I should,
and my committee, counterterrorism security group, should report to the
deputies committee, which is a sub-Cabinet level committee, and not to
the principals and that, therefore, it was inappropriate for me to be
asking for a principals' meeting. Instead, there would be a deputies
meeting.
ROEMER: So does this slow the
process down to go to the deputies rather than to the principals or a
small group as you had previously done?
CLARKE: It slowed it down
enormously, by months. First of all, the deputies committee didn't meet
urgently in January or February. Then when the deputies committee did
meet, it took the issue of Al Qaida as part of a cluster of policy
issues, including nuclear proliferation in South Asia, democratization
in Pakistan, how to treat the various problems, including narcotics and
other problems in Afghanistan, and launched on a series of
deputies meetings extending over several months to address Al Qaida in
the context of all of those inter-related issues. That process probably
ended, I think in July of 2001. So we were ready for a principals
meeting in July. But the principals calendar was full and then they went
on vacation, many of them in August, so we couldn't meet in August, and
therefore the principals met in September.
…
ROEMER: You then wrote a
memo on September 4th to Dr. Rice expressing some of these frustrations
several months later, if you say the time frame is May or June when you
decided to resign. A memo comes out that we have seen on September the
4th. You are blunt in blasting DOD for not willingly using the force and
the power. You blast the CIA for blocking Predator. You urge
policy-makers to imagine a day after hundreds of Americans lay dead at
home or abroad after a terrorist attack and ask themselves what else
they could have done. You write this on September the 4th, seven days
before September 11th.
CLARKE: That's right.
ROEMER: What else could have
been done, Mr. Clarke?
CLARKE: Well, all of the things
that we recommended in the plan or strategy -- there's a lot of debate
about whether it's a plan or a strategy or a series of options -- but
all of the things we recommended back in January were those things on
the table in September. They were done. They were done after September
11th. They were all done. I didn't really understand why they couldn't
have been done in February.
…
SLADE GORTON, Commission
member: Now, since my yellow light is on, at this point my final
question will be this: Assuming that the recommendations that you made
on January 25th of 2001, based on Delenda, based on Blue Sky, including
aid to the Northern Alliance, which had been an agenda item at this
point for two and a half years without any action, assuming that there
had been more Predator reconnaissance missions, assuming that that had
all been adopted say on January 26th, year 2001, is there the remotest
chance that it would have prevented 9/11?
CLARKE: No.
GORTON: It just would have
allowed our response, after 9/11, to be perhaps a little bit faster?
CLARKE: Well, the response
would have begun before 9/11.
GORTON: Yes, but there was no
recommendation, on your part or anyone else's part, that we declare war
and attempt to invade Afghanistan prior to 9/11?
CLARKE: That's right.
…
TIMOTHY J. ROEMER: Thank you,
Mr. Chairman. Having served on the joint inquiry, the only person of
this 9/11 panel to have served on the inquiry,
I can say in open session to some of Mr. Fielding's inquiries that as
the joint inquiry asked for information on the National Security Council
and we requested that the National Security Adviser Dr. Rice come before
the joint inquiry and answer those questions. She refused. And she
didn't come. She didn't come before the 9/11 commission. And when we
asked for some questions to be answered, Mr. Hadley answered those
questions in a written form. So I think part of the answer might be that
we didn't have access to the January 25th memo. We didn't have access to
the September 4th memo. We didn't have access to many of the documents
and the e-mails. We're not only talking about Mr. Clarke being before
the 9/11 commission for more than 15 hours, but I think in talking to
the staff, we have hundreds of documents and e-mails that we didn't
previously have, which hopefully informs us to ask Mr. Clarke and ask
Dr. Rice the tough questions.
Debate over the January
25, 2001 memo in Congress:
Congressional Record:
March 25, 2004 (Senate) [Page S3122-S3123]
From the Congressional Record Online via
GPO
Access [DOCID:cr25mr04-92]
Excerpt from the Senate
floor on March 26, 2004, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY):
Also in this August 2002
interview, Clarke noted the Bush administration, in mid-January of 2001
-- before the 9/11 attack -- decided to do two things to respond to the
threat of terrorism: "One, to vigorously pursue the existing policy,
including all the lethal covert action finds which we have now made
public, to some extent; the second thing the administration decided to
do was to initiate a process to look at these issues which had been on
the table for a couple of years and get them decided.''
In other words, what Clarke was
saying in 2002 to members of the press was that the Bush
administration's response to the war on terror was much more aggressive
than it was under the Clinton years.
Now he is singing an entirely
different tune. This is a man who lacks credibility. He may be an
intelligent man, he may be a dedicated public servant, but clearly he
has a grudge of some sort against the Bush administration. If he was
unable to develop a more robust response during the Clinton years, he
would only be able to blame himself. He was in charge of
counterterrorism during those 8 years. How could the Bush administration
be to blame in 8 months for the previous administration's failure over 8
years to truly declare war on al-Qaida?
Congressional Record:
March 30, 2004 (Senate) [Page S3315-S3317]
From the Congressional Record Online via
GPO
Access [DOCID:cr30mr04-151]
Excerpt from the Senate
floor on March 30, 2004, Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD):
In Mr. Clarke's case, clear and
troubling double standards are being applied. Last year, when the
administration was being criticized for the President's misleading
statement about Niger and uranium, the White House unexpectedly
declassified portions of the National Intelligence Estimate.
When the administration wants
to bolster its public case, there is little that appears too sensitive
to be declassified.
Now, people around the
President want to release parts of Mr. Clarke's earlier testimony in
2002. According to news reports, the CIA is already working on
declassifying that testimony -- at the administration's request.
And last week several documents
were declassified literally overnight, not in an effort to provide
information on a pressing policy matter to the American people, but in
an apparent effort to discredit a public servant who gave 30 years of
service to the American Government.
I'll support declassifying
Mr. Clarke's testimony before the Joint Inquiry, but the administration
shouldn't be selective. Consistent with our need to protect sources and
methods, we should declassify his entire testimony. And to make sure
that the American people have access to the full record as they consider
this question, we should also declassify
his
January 25 memo to Dr. Rice, the September 4, 2001
National Security Directive dealing with terrorism, Dr. Rice's testimony
to the 9-11 Commission, the still-classified 28 pages from the
House-Senate inquiry relating to Saudi Arabia, and a list of the dates
and topics of all National Security Council meetings before September 4,
2001.
Congressional Record:
March 31, 2004 (House) [Page H1772-H1779]
From the Congressional Record Online via
GPO
Access [DOCID:cr31mr04-105])
Excerpt from the House
floor on March 31, 2004, Representative Frank Pallone (D-NJ):
Now, this past Sunday, Clarke
said he would support the declassification of his testimony before the
joint intelligence panels if the administration also declassifies the
National Security Adviser's testimony before the 9/11 Commission and the
declassification of the January 25, 2001, memo that Clarke sent to Rice
laying out a terrorism strategy, a strategy that was not approved until
months later.
Madam Speaker, House Democrats
really want a full accounting of the events leading up to the September
11 attacks, including the extent to which a preoccupation with Iraq
affected efforts to deal with the threat posed by al Qaeda. It is nice
to see the White House has finally stopped stonewalling the commission
and now says that it will provide the public testimony the commission is
requesting. But Americans need to be able to fully evaluate the
decisions of government leaders, especially when it comes to the life
and death decisions of war and peace.
Excerpts from:
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
Ninth Public Hearing
Thursday, April 8, 2004
Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC
Chaired by: Thomas H. Kean
Testimony of national
security advisor Condoleezza Rice:
MR. BOB KERREY, Committee Member:
Well, I think it's an unfortunate figure of speech because I think --
especially after the attack on the Cole on the 12th of August --
October 2000. It would have been a swatting a fly. It would not have been
-- we did not need to wait to get a strategic plan. Dick Clarke had in his
memo on the 20th of January overt military operations as a -- he turned
that memo around in 24 hours, Dr. Clarke. There were a lot of plans in
place in the Clinton administration, military plans in the Clinton
administration. In fact, just since we're in the mood to declassify stuff,
he included in his January 25th memo two appendixes: Appendix A, "Strategy
for the Elimination of the Jihadist Threat of al Qaeda;" Appendix B,
"Political- Military Plan for al Qaeda."
So I just -- why didn't we
respond to the Cole? Why didn't we swat that fly?
MS. RICE: I believe that there is
a question of whether or not you respond in a tactical sense or whether
you respond in a strategic sense, whether or not you decide that you are
going to respond to every attack with minimal use of military force and go
after every -- on a kind of tit-for-tat basis. By the way, in that memo,
Dick Clarke talks about not doing this tit for tat, doing this on a time
of our choosing.
…
Yes, the Cole had
happened. We received, I think, on January 25th the same assessment or
roughly the same assessment of who was responsible for the Cole
that Sandy Berger talked to you about. It was preliminary. It was not
clear. But that was not the reason that we felt that we did not want to,
quote, "respond to the Cole."
We knew that the options that had
been employed by the Clinton administration had been standoff options. The
President had -- meaning missile strikes, or perhaps bombers would have
been possible, long-range bombers, although getting in place the apparatus
to use long-range bombers is even a matter of whether you have basing in
the region.
We knew that Osama bin Laden had
been, in something that was provided to me, bragging that he was going to
withstand any response, and then he was going to emerge and come out
stronger. We --
…We simply believed that the best approach was to put in place a plan that
was going to eliminate this threat, not respond to it, tit-for-tat.
…
MS. RICE: The fact is that what
we were presented on January the 25th was a set of ideas -- and a paper,
most of which was about what the Clinton administration had done, and
something called the Delenda plan, which had been considered in 1998 and
never adopted.
…
We decided to take a different
track. We decided to put together a strategic approach to this that would
get the regional powers -- the problem wasn't that you didn't have a good
counterterrorism person. The problem was you didn't have approach against
al Qaeda because you didn't have an approach against Afghanistan, and you
didn't have an approach against Afghanistan because you didn't have an
approach against Pakistan. And until we could get that right, we didn't
have a policy.
…
In the memorandum that Dick
Clarke sent me on January 25th, he mentions sleeper cells. There is no
mention or recommendation of anything that needs to be done about them.
And the FBI was pursuing them. And usually when things come to me it's
because I'm supposed to do something about it, and there was no indication
that the FBI was not adequately pursuing the sleeper cells.
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